Aristotle and Death Happiness

The primary focus of Book I of the Nichomachean Ethics lies in Aristotle’s attempt to define and flesh out the meaning and nature of happiness. In chapters x and xi, Aristotle asks an intriguing question: can the happiness of those not living be in any way affected? This small detour in the larger body of Aristotle’s ethics has received little scholarly attention[1], making it all the more intriguing. However, before a more critical examination and analysis of Aristotle’s question can occur, it is necessary to: define and flesh out the actual meaning of the terms ευδαιμονια and ψυχη, understand the broader cultural and philosophical understandings of death, the soul, and immortality in the Greek world, and investigate Aristotle’s own views of the soul and the body, before moving on to a closer examination of what Aristotle actually meant in EN I.x-xi so that thus, with the issue being properly examined in a contextual manner, an evaluation of Aristotle’s claim can be made.

 

I. Definitions

 

It is always necessary to begin by defining one’s terms; in the realm of translated philosophy even more so due to the bias of the translators and the differences in linguistic systems. One word that has plagued translators is ευδαιμονια, which has been roughly translated into English as “happy” or “the happy life”. Liddell and Scott define ευδαιμονια[2] as, “prosperity, happiness” which of course shows the difficulty of translating the word. However, they define ευδαιμων[3] as, “with a good genius or destiny, fortunate, prosperous”. This definition is more close to the actual definition of the Greek word, which is actually a composite of two words: ευ[4], which means “well, luckily, the right, the good” or ευς[5], the word from which ευ is the neuter, as “good, brave, noble”; and δαιμων[6], which means “fate, fortune, destiny; one’s fate or lot”. Thus, when combined together, the word properly means something akin to “the right destiny or a good fortune.” An obvious distinction, then, between the Greek word and the English word is the difference between a long-term state of being in a good condition (ευδαιμων) and a fleeting emotion or a long-term state of an emotion (happy)[7].

The other word that presents some difficulty when being translated into English is “ψυχη”, which is traditionally translated as “soul”. However, this translation once again carries with it the philosophical baggage of the English language, so influenced by Christianity and Descartes that “soul” is identified as a separate and distinct object from the body. Contrary to this view, the Greek word (and the original, non mystery cult/Platonic meaning of the word)[8] meant, “breath, life, spirit; the seat of will, desires, passions.”[9] Notice the corporeality of the soul inherent within this definition; the soul was no more separate from the body than the eye is separate from sight; for the soul was a function of the body in a similar manner as sight is a function of the eye. Through a complex philosophical devolution[10], the word arrived at its more modern meaning.

These two words are crucial to a more precise understanding of Aristotle and his views of death. Ευδαιμονια is the end or purpose of life. The entire EN can be said to be a work on how to arrive at ευδαιμονια and thus is the central theme of the work. Ψυχη, on the other hand, does not play a central role in the EN. However, in order to understand why Aristotle would even ask the question of ευδαιμονια after death, it is essential to understand Aristotle’s view of the ψυχη and whether or not the ψυχη “carries” ευδαιμονια with it after death.

 

II. The Greeks, the Ψυχη, Death, and Immortality

 

Edith Hamilton fittingly said of the Greeks that:

“With the coming forward of Greece, mankind became the center of the universe, the most important thing in it. This was a revolution of thought…in Greece alone in the ancient world people were preoccupied with the visible; they were finding the satisfaction of their desires in what  was actually in the world around them…anyone who reads them with attention discovers that even the most nonsensical take place in a world which is essentially rational and matter of fact.”[11]

It is of the utmost importance to understand that the Greeks, unlike almost every other culture in the world, had no conception of a mind-body dichotomy. The mind to the Greek world was corporeal; the ψυχη[12] was inseparable from the body. Our earliest source, Homer, although steeped in the early mythology and mysticism of Archaic Greece, nevertheless did not conceive of a soul separate from the body. The visitation of Akilleus by the dead Patroklos did not involve a disembodied spirit traveling from the underworld to the realm of man, but rather the visitation of a shade or image, devoid of reason and emotion and desire (ψυχη). This shade could speak, but he was not a liberated substance out of the prison of the body.[13] This traditional religious view of the unity of mind and body after death was highly prevalent throughout Archaic and early-Classical Greece; indeed, it was not until the arrival of the mystery cults from Thrace, such as the cults of Dionysios and Orpheos, and their codification by philosophers such as Pythagoras[14] and Plato, that the mind-body dichotomy came into existence in the Greek common conscious. Yet even with the arrival of these cults, it took a few centuries before the orgiastic debauchery of the mind-body dichotomy cults became a powerful driving force[15].

Pythagoras, to an extent, brought the concept of the mind-body dichotomy out of the pedestrian mystery cults and into the intellectual realm via his idea of the reoccurrence of the soul. Plato, however, did much more to flesh out and promote this savage mysticism. Not only did Plato borrow the ideas of the transmigration of the soul and reincarnation from the mystery cults, but he also expanded upon the mind-body dichotomy in his realm of Forms. For indeed, the Forms, unlike the earlier Greek conception of the gods who existed in strict contrast to man[16], instilled the notion of an immortal soul that eventually came to be a powerful force in the Greek intellectual scene. The Forms viciously stripped the soul out of its corporeal prison and elevated it into the realm of the divine. This meant that the ψυχη, the seat of emotions, desires, and the will, was able, alongside the mind with its reason, to continue its existence after the corporeal prison died. Thus it was very proper, especially in the later Platonic tradition, the neo-Pythagorean tradition, and the mystery cults, to think of the soul after death as retaining anthropic characteristics. Though the details were debated (Could the ψυχη, in the face of such perfection, actually become sad? Did it actually join the Forms, or God, or did it exist in another realm?), nevertheless it was true that one could state that soul A, having lived a good life, was ευδαιμων after death.

Save Pythagoras and Plato, the majority of Greek philosophy before the Hellenistic age built upon the framework set up by Homer. Metaphysically, Aristotle belonged to a line of philosophers with the likes of Democritus who espoused a non-supernatural, materialistic view of the world, the gods, and the afterlife. Sextus Empiricus remarks that Democritus, “…says that men in the distant past, remarking the events of the upper air-thunder and lightning, thunderbolts and conjunctions of stars, and eclipses of sun and moon-were frightened, thinking gods to be their cause.”[17] Thus Democritus explains the supernatural as a pre-rational attempt to define the unknown. Aristotle seems to have built upon the theories of Democritus, in typical Aristotelian fashion, and adopted a modified materialist view of the world[18]. The materialist, due to the fact that they believed the ψυχη to consist of the same basic elements as the body, did not conceive of a corporeal prison holding a transcendent and immortal ψυχη. When the body ceased to exist, so too did the ψυχη; when the heart stopped pumping blood, so too did the ψυχη stop desiring. Death meant the death of body and ψυχη. By the time of Aristotle, the supernaturalism of Homer had been cast off, leaving only one possibility for immortality: τιμη[19]. If by the end of one’s lifetime an individual had attained the status of ευδαιμονια, then they had in effect “won” the contest of life and received the proper accolades of τιμη or honor. Their immortality was the immortality of fame throughout time; to this day, people still read and praise Homer, movies are made in celebration of the Spartan 300, and Socrates is still admired as the paragon of intellectual activity. The materialist would say that they had acquired so much τιμη in their own lifetime through their achievements that it propelled their shade or image into the distant future.[20] Yet even those individuals who had not done something heroic nevertheless experienced immortality with their friends and family. The concept is akin to a star that, though having been dead for thousands of years, still shines on to us today.

Thankfully, Aristotle lived at the exact end of Classical Greece and thus was not alive to witness the collapse of Greek culture into a culture of revelry, debauchery, and mysticism. Thus there is no need to examine subsequent views; it is only relevant to note that Aristotle came from a vastly different school of thought than Plato. Aristotle, the materialists, and the majority of pre-Hellenic Greek culture, on the one hand, did not believe in an actual “life after death”; Plato and the mystery cults, on the other hand, did.

 

III. Aristotle on Ευδαιμονια, Ψυχη, and Death Happiness

 

In the EN, Aristotle lays out an entire account of how an individual might obtain ευδαιμονια. For indeed, he states that ευδαιμονια ought to be the ultimate aim or goal of life towards which all actions and contemplations are directed. Aristotle states, “Ευδαιμονια, then, is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed.”[21] But does he mean “happiness”, as we understand it? Or, is Aristotle talking about something entirely different? Focusing on the definition of ευδαιμονια as the right destiny or good fortune, one can clearly see that Aristotle was aiming for an entity or goal far more broad than just an emotional state of being. The man who had obtained ευδαιμονια not only lived a virtuous life, but also had good friends, a good family, was materially prosperous, and followed the Delphic maxim of γνωθι σεαυτον, or contemplation. In a famous passage of the EN, I.ix, Aristotle states that the mythical Priam was very virtuous, but after the fall of Troy, he could not be considered to have ευδαιμονια due to the loss of his friends, his family, his nation, and his prosperity. Similarly, the Greeks viewed with disdain the opulent Persians (save Cyrus the younger) because, though they had prosperity and most likely good friends and family, they lacked the Greek idea of virtue.

Due to Aristotle being a materialist and thus not believing in a mind-body dichotomy, it is clear that even those attributes of the mind and ψυχη, such as virtue and contemplation, were viewed just as corporeally as prosperity, friends, and family. Nowhere in the entire Aristotelian corpus does Aristotle speak of an “inner eye”, of “divine knowledge”, of a “higher state of ecstasy” achieved through ritualistic dance, of wisdom as a Form, of virtues existing in the realm of the gods which reason attained, or of ευδαιμονια existing outside of the realm of the real. Ευδαιμονια, then, was a worldly state of being, attained via a worldly pursuit of the right objects, and existing within each individual to the extent to which this person had attained the necessary attributes. Moreover, Aristotle states, “One swallow does not make a summer; neither does one day. Similarly neither can one day, or a brief space of time, make a man blessed and happy.”[22] Ευδαιμονια, then, is not the golden ticket found randomly or by luck inside a Wonka Bar, nor is it the planned and calculated winning of a marathon. Ευδαιμονια is the sum of all of its parts over a long period of time.

Aristotle himself discusses the link between the ψυχη and ευδαιμονια when he states, at EN I.xiii, “...ευδαιμονια is an activity of the ψυχη in accordance with perfect virtue.” The chapter then continues with a brief overview of the ψυχη as having two parts: the rational and the irrational. Aristotle states that the irrational part of the ψυχη consists of the vegetative part, which he says is the cause for nutrition and growth, and the desiring part (Plato calls this the appetitive), which he explains as the element that drives us either to good or to bad things and is thus “semi”-receptive to reason. The rational part of the ψυχη, on the other hand, consists of our ability to reason. The proper or healthy ψυχη comes about when a person uses his reason to guide the irrational part of the ψυχη. Unfortunately, the account of the ψυχη is very brief in the EN; Aristotle continues his discussion of continence and incontinence later on in Book VII, but this account focuses more on the application of or relationship of the desiring element with reason or virtue.

Ever the scientist and philosopher, Aristotle expanded upon his view of the ψυχη, writing an entire work devoted to the subject entitled De Anima (Latin for: “Concerning the ψυχη”). From the beginning, Aristotle states that, “We must…repeat that the affections of ψυχη are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life.”[23] It is clear from this materialist view that Aristotle does not conceive of the ψυχη as an independent, incorporeal, “immortal” entity separate and distinct from the body. Rather, though it is distinct, it is built from the same basic elements. Aristotle even takes a jab at Pythagoras when he states, “…as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any ψυχη could be clothed upon with any body-an absurd view.”[24] Though it is clear that Aristotle believes the ψυχη to be distinct from the body (as the eyes, as an entity, are distinct from the action of seeing; the eye is the cause or origin behind the act of seeing), it is incorrect to take this distinction and automatically assign to Aristotle the belief that the ψυχη is separate from the body (as a passenger on a cruise ship is separate from the vessel itself, merely along for the ride). This distinction is because Aristotle believes the ψυχη to be the originator of movement or motion within the body. The emotion of anger “makes” the blood boil, which thus moves the body to act in an angry manner (or to acknowledge the anger “boiling” inside of himself but to act contrary to his ψυχη). Aristotle continues his attack on the mind-body dichotomy when he states:

“...in the ‘Orphic’ poems…it is said that the ψυχη comes in from the whole when breathing  takes place, being borne upon the winds. Now this cannot take place in the case of plants, nor  indeed in the case of certain classes of animals, for not all classes of animals breathe. This fact  has escaped the notice of the holders of this view.”[25]

Here Aristotle shows himself as the scientist, stating that all living things have some version of a ψυχη because all living things are “moved” to act in certain ways[26]. Man thus cannot be unique in having a supernatural “ψυχη”, as is suggested by the mystery cults, because all living things have a ψυχη. Aristotle concludes his investigation into the definition of the ψυχη by stating, “From this it indubitably follows that the ψυχη is inseparable from its body…for the actuality of some of them [parts of the soul] is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts.”[27]

What, then, does this say about the relationship between ευδαιμονια and the ψυχη? Ευδαιμονια, as an activity of the ψυχη, seemingly cannot exist with the death of the actuality of the ψυχη. For indeed the death of the body means the cessation of movement and generation, which in turn means the cessation of the ψυχη. This is the reason why EN I.x-xi is so perplexing, for Aristotle says, “So it appears that the dead are affected to some extent by the good fortunes of those whom they love, and similarly by their misfortunes.”[28] Though it is true that Aristotle states that these events, as not being the primary attributes of ευδαιμονια, do not have the potential to make a ευδαιμων individual non ευδαιμων, as it is while they are living, it is still true that these actions can indeed have an affect upon the quality of the ευδαιμονια of the individual. Even though Aristotle does say that friends, family, and prosperity are key attributes of ευδαιμονια, how could these things have any impact upon a ψυχη that is not in existence to experience them?

 

IV. The Answer and Analysis

 

The answer to this dilemma can be found almost 400 years before Aristotle lived in the epics of Homer. As was stated earlier, to the materialist, immortality or life after death was characterized by τιμη. The τιμη that Akilleus had accrued was so great that he lived on in the minds of individuals for millennia. For Aristotle, the τιμη[29] of any individual lived on in relation to the magnitude of his impact. This is why Aristotle states, when speaking to the majority of humans as opposed to heroes exclusively, in EN I.x-xi that the ευδαιμονια of the dead could in fact be affected by the fortunes, or the vicissitudes of fate, of his friends and family. Let us create a hypothetical situation. George Washington had a son, John Washington, who also strove to be in politics. George Washington, renowned in his own time, lived a very virtuous and prosperous life. When he died, it could be properly said that he had ευδαιμονια. After his death, his son John led a revolution in favor of the British. This revolution was so bloody and caused such widespread destruction that the struggling United States was forced to give all of the southern states to Britain and the remaining northern states were forced to become vassal states of Britain until eventually, 200 years later, they were freed as their own country. In this hypothetical situation, though George Washington himself had lived a life of ευδαιμονια, the impact of John Washington cast a very dark image upon the name “Washington”, so that George Washington today was nearly forgotten. Though these actions, as bad as they were, did not “make” George Washington non ευδαιμονια, they nevertheless affected his “blessedness” or the maximization of his ευδαιμων.

Let us take another hypothetical situation on a much smaller scale. Sarah is a loving mother of two who works in an office. She has lived a very virtuous life, has a wonderful family, endearing friends, and has made enough money to live comfortably. Upon her death, her friends reveal that they were only friends with her because it made them “look good” being seen around such a nice and good person. Her children used their inheritance to start a drug business that is eventually discovered by the police, who arrest them. Though Sarah had all of the requirements for a life of ευδαιμονια, the horrendous actions that occurred after her death stripped away her friends, her family, and her prosperity, leaving her only with her virtue. Thus it can be said that the ευδαιμονια of Sarah was lowered by these action.

The affect upon the ευδαιμονια of the dead does not always have to be negative; it can indeed be a positive thing. Let us say that when Sarah died, her friends cherished her memory so much that they established a “Sarah” club to spread her optimism and virtue. Similarly, her sons took the inheritance money and started a company, named in her honor, which rapidly became a Fortune 500 company. In this situation it could be said that the ευδαιμονια of Sarah was increased due to the great fortunes of her loved ones after death.

To Aristotle, the vicissitudes of fortune play an important role in the ευδαιμονια of an individual. Even though they themselves have died, fate has the ability to affect those components of the ευδαιμονια of the dead person, for not all of the friends and family of the deceased have died, and thus the degree of ευδαιμονια of the dead individual is semi-dependent upon those still living. Aristotle says, “So it appears that the dead are affected to some extent by the good fortunes of those whom they love, and similarly by their misfortunes.”[30] It is apparent from this to assume that, the degree to which time passes and the loved ones of the individual die, is the degree to which the affects of fortune diminish their impact upon the ευδαιμονια of the individual. By fully understanding the context within which Aristotle wrote and viewing death ευδαιμονια through such a lens, the perplexities of I.x-xi can be sorted out and understood.

Yet now comes the ultimate question: is Aristotle correct in his assertion that the ευδαιμονια of a dead person can be affected? Once again, we must start at the beginning: what is the nature of the ψυχη and is there a mind-body dichotomy? If we use the Aristotelian definition of the ψυχη as the seat of human desires, passions, the will, and reason, and discard the notion of the ψυχη as the originator of movement in favor of a more scientific understanding of the nature of movement, it can be concluded that the ψυχη of an individual is similar to what we in the modern world call the mind. Leonard Peikoff states:

  “The theory of a mind-body conflict, which has corrupted every branch and issue of philosophy,  does have its root in a real conflict, but of a special kind. Its root is a breach between some men’s consciousness and existence. In this sense, the basis of the theory is not reality, but a human error:  the error of turning away from reality, of refusing to accept the absolutism of the metaphysically  given.”[31]

It is interesting to note that the origins of the mind-body split in Greece came from the mystery cults. They derived this conclusion because of their special religious practices: the women in the cult would gather around in a circle, drinking highly intoxicating alcohol, smoking hallucinatory seeds, dancing to the point of exhaustion, and wailing, screeching, and ululating. The men would sit outside the circle, also drinking the highly potent alcohol and smoking the hallucinatory seeds, banging on drums. In the middle of the circle was a sacrificial victim, and the women, after reaching the point of exhaustion, would rush forward and tear the animal apart, taking the limbs and eating them raw, smearing the blood all over their naked body. The “mania” or ecstasy achieved by such an act convinced the cultist that they were communing with the “divine”, and thus lead them to believe that their souls were the only thing “heightened” enough to commune with the divine. From this belief, it was concluded that the soul was in fact distinct from the body, and only a special ritual could allow the soul to be “free” for a fleeting moment from its bodily prison.[32] The philosophers, such as Plato, picked up these beliefs and discarded the actions in favor of another ritual, “reason”, by which the soul could transcend the mortal realm and communicate with the divine. Inherent in these ideas is a rejection of the actual facts of existence in favor of the primacy of consciousness, attained by a special ritual, which itself could reject the metaphysically given in favor of the metaphysically unknown. Reality itself actually exists, independent of our ψυχη, which itself is just the means by which we understand, interpret, or comprehend that which is in front of us. It is self-evident then that the ψυχη is but merely a tool, an attribute of the body and thus inseparable from it.

Aristotle also appears to be correct in his definition of ευδαιμονια. The “good life” of an individual cannot just contain his virtue. Using the example of Aristotle, Priam lived a highly virtuous life. Before the Trojan War he was described as having ευδαιμονια. But after the war, though he retained his virtue, the loss of everything else led him to become miserable. This is because a “good life” is not a fleeting emotion (for it is assumed that even Hitler had happy moments), or state of an emotion (it is probable that a mafia lord could have a state of happiness), but is the combination of living life well (self-esteem generated through the efficacy of an individual actualizing and maintaining his virtues), having good friends and a good family (for no man is an island, and regardless of his virtue can no man have a good life alone), and being prosperous (always having to struggle to pay bills, eating ramen noodles, and watching your children go hungry is not as good as living a comfortable life). Having ευδαιμονια then must include a variety of things: virtue, good friends and family, and comfortable living via general prosperity.

What then of the individual who has ευδαιμονια but has died? If ευδαιμονια is dependent upon things outside of one’s own body, such as friends, family, and prosperity, then ευδαιμονια is dependent upon things outside of an individual’s direct control. As there is no ψυχη which, upon death, floats up to heaven to join the divine, it must be concluded that the death of an individual also entails the death of the virtue of said individual. The external entities, however, remain after his death. Thus, as in the examples given above, were tragedy or fortune to befall these external entities after the death of an individual, it is indeed reasonable to conclude that the overall state of the ευδαιμονια of that individual would suffer. Aristotle, once again, seems correct in his analysis of death ευδαιμονια. Thus this author whole-heatedly agrees with the evaluation of Aristotle.

With this assumption, it becomes necessary for any individual striving to achieve a state of ευδαιμονια to mind not only his own virtues, but to carefully choose his friends, work well to strengthen the bond and improve his family, and insure some means of prosperity after death. In this world where death is the end, it is a proper desire for every individual to strive to have some sort of immortality. This immortality, of course, can be achieved through accomplishing extraordinary deeds. But more importantly, to achieve a state of ευδαιμονια, we must endeavor while we are alive to strengthen the bonds with wonderful people, be they our friends or family, and to protect our prosperity so that not even death can take such wonderful things away from us.

 

Bibliography

 

Aristotle. J.A.K. Thomson, translator. “Nicomachean Ethics.” London: Penguin Classics. 1953.

 

Aristotle. McKeon, Richard, ed. “On Democritus.” Fr. 208.; “Metaphysics.” 985b4-20.; “On Generation and Corruption.” 316a13-b16.; “On the Soul.” New York: Random House. 1941.

 

Gooch, Paul W. “Aristotle and the Happy Dead.” Classical Philology. Vol 78, No.2. April, 1983. 112-116.

 

Hamilton, Edith. Mythology. New York: Warner Books. 1942. 16-17.

 

Herodotus. Aubrey de Selincourt, translator. “The Histories.” Penguin: New York. 1954.

 

Liddell and Scott. Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891.

 

Livy. Gary Forsythe, ed. “History of Rome: XXXIX.” Bryn Mawr: Bryn Mawr. 1994.

 

Peikoff, Leonard. “Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand.” New York: Meridian. 1991.

 

Pritzl, Kurt. “Aristotle and Happiness after Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11.” Classical Philology, Vol. 78, No. 2. April, 1983. 101-111.

 

Rhode, Erwin. “Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks.” London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., Ltd. 1925.

 

Roberts, John ed. The Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005.

 

---

[1] See Kurt Pritzl. “Aristotle and Happiness after Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11.” Classical Philology, Vol. 78, No. 2. April, 1983. 101-111. and also Paul W. Gooch. “Aristotle and the Happy Dead.” Classical Philology. Vol 78, No.2. April, 1983. 112-116

[2] “ευδαιμονια.” Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891. 280.

[3] Ibid., “ευδαιμων.”

[4] Ibid., “ευ.” at 278.

[5] Ibid., “ευς.” at 288.

[6] Ibid., “δαιμων.” at 148.

[7] While it is true that the English definition of happy can have a similar meaning to ευδαιμονια, it is a mistake to take the philosophical baggage of “happy” and try and equate it with the philosophical baggage of “ευδαιμων”. Thus it must always be kept in mind that ευδαιμων encompasses a far greater range of things than just a “happy” life, as Aristotle discusses in Book I of the EN.

[8] This point will be examined in greater detail in a succeeding section.

[9] Ibid., “ψυχη.” at 798.

[10] For more on this complex devolution, see the wonderful and insightful work by Erwin Rhode, “Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks.” London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., Ltd. 1925.

[11] Edith Hamilton, Mythology. New York: Warner Books. 1942. 16-17.

[12] Mind and soul, in ways synonymous in the modern world, will henceforth be used interchangeably in order to allow a more thorough understanding of the Greek view.

[13] For more on the Homeric conception of the afterlife, see Rohde, “Psyche”.

[14] There is wide scholarly debate concerning the influences upon Pythagoras. Nevertheless, a general direction or idea may be taken from Herodotus when he says, in his Histories IV.95, that, “…Salmoxis…was a man, and lived in Samos, where he was a slave in the household of Pythagoras…he subsequently gained his freedom…and returned to his native country of Thrace…and endeavoured to teach them that neither he nor they…would ever die, but would go to a place where they would live in perpetual enjoyment of every blessing.”, to which Rohde adds, in “Psyche” 279 n.68, “…that such a belief in the “return” of the dead was actually held by the Thracians is clear enough…the story…seemed suspicious even to Herodotus, but it is not pure invention…it is rather a euhemerist version off a miraculous legend…the Thracian belief must also have included the idea of a periodical appearance of the god in the upper world.” Rohde thus concludes that Pythagoras gained his view in the reoccurrence of the soul from the Thracian mystery cult of Salmoxis. An eternally reoccurring soul which comes back to the realm of the living to “inhabit” a corporeal vessel is a clear indication off a mind-body dichotomy promulgated by one of Greece’s first and most influential philosophers.

[15] For an interesting point of view from an outsider, see the reactions of the Romans and the decrees of the Roman Senate upon the arrival of the cult of Dionysos to Rome in Livy XXXIX.

[16] A binarism exists here: gods, immortal; man, mortal.

[17] Sextus Empiricus. “Against the Mathematicians.” IX.24.

[18] See Aristotle. “On Democritus.” Fr. 208.; “Metaphysics.” 985b4-20.; “On Generation and Corruption.” 316a13-b16.; “On the Soul.” 403b28-404a4.

[19] See “Philotimia.” The Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World. John Roberts, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005.

[20] It is important to note here that τιμη did not apply to those who had “lost” the race, or who had done bad things. It could not be said that Caesar or Hitler, through the ευδαιμονια of their life, had achieved τιμη and thus were immortal. Their “immortality” would have been viewed in a negative way.

[21] Aristotle. J.A.K. Thomson, translator. “Nicomachean Ethics.” London: Penguin Classics. 1953. 1097b21.

[22] Ibid. 1098a17-18.

[23] Aristotle. J.A. Smith, translator. “De Anima.” New York: Random House. 1941. 403b18-19. As a biologist, Aristotle believed that mankind was part of the animal kingdom.

[24] Ibid. 407b23.

[25] Ibid. 410b27-411a1.

[26] Aristotle describes the movement of stationary living organisms, such as plants, by classifying growth as movement. A tree, which began as a seed, then grew into a brittle sapling, before finally growing to a mighty tree has “moved” from a seed to a tree.

[27] Ibid. 413a4-5.

[28] “Nicomachean Ethics.” 1101b7-8.

[29] Remember that τιμη was possible only for the good. The evil “lived” on in a different sense.

[30] Ibid. 1101b7

[31] Leonard Peikoff. “Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand.” New York: Meridian. 1991.

[32] A discussion of the process of transformation and the origins of the mind-body dichotomy in Greece can be found in Rohde, 253-281.

---Jason Roberts

Comments

[RamonGustav]

Do you desire a house but you lack enough cash to acquire it?

[Antivirus_man]

I liked your site, you are very interesting to write. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!