The primary focus
of Book I of the Nichomachean Ethics lies in Aristotle’s attempt to define and
flesh out the meaning and nature of happiness. In chapters x and xi, Aristotle asks an intriguing question: can the
happiness of those not living be in any way affected? This small detour in the larger body of
Aristotle’s ethics has received little scholarly attention,
making it all the more intriguing. However, before a more critical examination and analysis of Aristotle’s
question can occur, it is necessary to: define and flesh out the actual meaning
of the terms ευδαιμονια and ψυχη, understand the broader
cultural and philosophical understandings of death, the soul, and immortality
in the Greek world, and investigate Aristotle’s own views of the soul and the
body, before moving on to a closer examination of what Aristotle actually meant
in EN I.x-xi so that thus, with the
issue being properly examined in a contextual manner, an evaluation of
Aristotle’s claim can be made.
I.
Definitions
It
is always necessary to begin by defining one’s terms; in the realm of
translated philosophy even more so due to the bias of the translators and the
differences in linguistic systems. One
word that has plagued translators is ευδαιμονια,
which has been roughly translated into English as “happy” or “the happy
life”. Liddell and Scott define ευδαιμονια
as, “prosperity, happiness” which of course shows the difficulty of translating
the word. However, they define ευδαιμων
as, “with a good genius or destiny, fortunate, prosperous”. This definition is more close to the actual
definition of the Greek word, which is actually a composite of two words: ευ,
which means “well, luckily, the right, the good” or ευς,
the word from which ευ is the
neuter, as “good, brave, noble”; and δαιμων,
which means “fate, fortune, destiny; one’s fate or lot”. Thus, when combined together, the word
properly means something akin to “the right destiny or a good fortune.” An obvious distinction, then, between the
Greek word and the English word is the difference between a long-term state of
being in a good condition (ευδαιμων)
and a fleeting emotion or a long-term state of an emotion (happy).
The
other word that presents some difficulty when being translated into English is
“ψυχη”, which is traditionally
translated as “soul”. However, this
translation once again carries with it the philosophical baggage of the English
language, so influenced by Christianity and Descartes that “soul” is identified
as a separate and distinct object from the body. Contrary to this view, the Greek word (and
the original, non mystery cult/Platonic meaning of the word)
meant, “breath, life, spirit; the seat of will, desires, passions.” Notice the corporeality of the soul inherent
within this definition; the soul was no more separate from the body than the
eye is separate from sight; for the soul was a function of the body in a
similar manner as sight is a function of the eye. Through a complex
philosophical devolution,
the word arrived at its more modern meaning.
These
two words are crucial to a more precise understanding of Aristotle and his
views of death. Ευδαιμονια is the end or purpose of life. The entire EN can be said to be a work on how to arrive at ευδαιμονια and thus is the central
theme of the work. Ψυχη, on the other hand, does not
play a central role in the EN. However, in order to understand why Aristotle
would even ask the question of ευδαιμονια
after death, it is essential to understand Aristotle’s view of the ψυχη and whether or not the ψυχη “carries” ευδαιμονια with it after death.
II.
The Greeks, the Ψυχη, Death,
and Immortality
Edith
Hamilton fittingly said of the Greeks that:
“With the
coming forward of Greece, mankind became the center of the universe,
the most important thing in it. This was
a revolution of thought…in
Greece alone in the ancient world people were preoccupied with
the visible; they were finding the satisfaction of their desires in what was
actually in the world around them…anyone who reads them with attention discovers that even
the most nonsensical take place in a world which
is essentially rational and matter of fact.”
It is of the utmost importance to
understand that the Greeks, unlike almost every other culture in the world, had
no conception of a mind-body dichotomy. The mind to the Greek world was corporeal; the ψυχη
was inseparable from the body. Our
earliest source, Homer, although steeped in the early mythology and mysticism
of Archaic Greece, nevertheless did not conceive of a soul separate from the
body. The visitation of Akilleus by the
dead Patroklos did not involve a disembodied spirit traveling from the
underworld to the realm of man, but rather the visitation of a shade or image,
devoid of reason and emotion and desire (ψυχη). This shade could speak, but he was not a
liberated substance out of the prison of the body. This traditional religious view of the unity
of mind and body after death was highly prevalent throughout Archaic and
early-Classical Greece; indeed, it was not until the arrival of the mystery
cults from Thrace, such as the cults of Dionysios and Orpheos, and their
codification by philosophers such as Pythagoras
and Plato, that the mind-body dichotomy came into existence in the Greek common
conscious. Yet even with the arrival of
these cults, it took a few centuries before the orgiastic debauchery of the
mind-body dichotomy cults became a powerful driving force.
Pythagoras,
to an extent, brought the concept of the mind-body dichotomy out of the
pedestrian mystery cults and into the intellectual realm via his idea of the
reoccurrence of the soul. Plato,
however, did much more to flesh out and promote this savage mysticism. Not only did Plato borrow the ideas of the
transmigration of the soul and reincarnation from the mystery cults, but he
also expanded upon the mind-body dichotomy in his realm of Forms. For indeed, the Forms, unlike the earlier
Greek conception of the gods who existed in strict contrast to man,
instilled the notion of an immortal soul that eventually came to be a powerful
force in the Greek intellectual scene. The Forms viciously stripped the soul out of its corporeal prison and
elevated it into the realm of the divine. This meant that the ψυχη,
the seat of emotions, desires, and the will, was able, alongside the mind with
its reason, to continue its existence after the corporeal prison died. Thus it was very proper, especially in the
later Platonic tradition, the neo-Pythagorean tradition, and the mystery cults,
to think of the soul after death as retaining anthropic characteristics. Though the details were debated (Could the ψυχη, in the face of such
perfection, actually become sad? Did it
actually join the Forms, or God, or did it exist in another realm?),
nevertheless it was true that one could state that soul A, having lived a good
life, was ευδαιμων after
death.
Save
Pythagoras and Plato, the majority of Greek philosophy before the Hellenistic
age built upon the framework set up by Homer. Metaphysically, Aristotle belonged to a line of philosophers with the
likes of Democritus who espoused a non-supernatural, materialistic view of the
world, the gods, and the afterlife. Sextus Empiricus remarks that Democritus, “…says that men in the distant
past, remarking the events of the upper air-thunder and lightning, thunderbolts
and conjunctions of stars, and eclipses of sun and moon-were frightened,
thinking gods to be their cause.” Thus Democritus explains the supernatural as
a pre-rational attempt to define the unknown. Aristotle seems to have built upon the theories of Democritus, in
typical Aristotelian fashion, and adopted a modified materialist view of the
world. The materialist, due to the fact that they
believed the ψυχη to consist
of the same basic elements as the body, did not conceive of a corporeal prison
holding a transcendent and immortal ψυχη. When the body ceased to exist, so too did the
ψυχη; when the heart stopped
pumping blood, so too did the ψυχη
stop desiring. Death meant the death of
body and ψυχη. By the time of Aristotle, the supernaturalism
of Homer had been cast off, leaving only one possibility for immortality: τιμη. If by the end of one’s lifetime an individual
had attained the status of ευδαιμονια,
then they had in effect “won” the contest of life and received the proper
accolades of τιμη or
honor. Their immortality was the
immortality of fame throughout time; to this day, people still read and praise
Homer, movies are made in celebration of the Spartan 300, and Socrates is still
admired as the paragon of intellectual activity. The materialist would say that they had
acquired so much τιμη in their
own lifetime through their achievements that it propelled their shade or image
into the distant future. Yet even those individuals who had not done
something heroic nevertheless experienced immortality with their friends and
family. The concept is akin to a star
that, though having been dead for thousands of years, still shines on to us
today.
Thankfully,
Aristotle lived at the exact end of Classical Greece and thus was not alive to
witness the collapse of Greek culture into a culture of revelry, debauchery,
and mysticism. Thus there is no need to
examine subsequent views; it is only relevant to note that Aristotle came from
a vastly different school of thought than Plato. Aristotle, the materialists, and the majority
of pre-Hellenic Greek culture, on the one hand, did not believe in an actual
“life after death”; Plato and the mystery cults, on the other hand, did.
III. Aristotle on Ευδαιμονια,
Ψυχη, and Death Happiness
In
the EN, Aristotle lays out an entire
account of how an individual might obtain ευδαιμονια. For indeed, he states that ευδαιμονια ought to be the ultimate
aim or goal of life towards which all actions and contemplations are
directed. Aristotle states, “Ευδαιμονια, then, is found to be
something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are
directed.” But does he mean “happiness”, as we
understand it? Or, is Aristotle talking
about something entirely different? Focusing on the definition of ευδαιμονια
as the right destiny or good fortune, one can clearly see that Aristotle was
aiming for an entity or goal far more broad than just an emotional state of
being. The man who had obtained ευδαιμονια not only lived a virtuous
life, but also had good friends, a good family, was materially prosperous, and
followed the Delphic maxim of γνωθι
σεαυτον, or
contemplation. In a famous passage of
the EN, I.ix, Aristotle states that
the mythical Priam was very virtuous, but after the fall of Troy, he could not
be considered to have ευδαιμονια
due to the loss of his friends, his family, his nation, and his
prosperity. Similarly, the Greeks viewed
with disdain the opulent Persians (save Cyrus the younger) because, though they
had prosperity and most likely good friends and family, they lacked the Greek
idea of virtue.
Due
to Aristotle being a materialist and thus not believing in a mind-body
dichotomy, it is clear that even those attributes of the mind and ψυχη, such as virtue and
contemplation, were viewed just as corporeally as prosperity, friends, and
family. Nowhere in the entire
Aristotelian corpus does Aristotle speak of an “inner eye”, of “divine
knowledge”, of a “higher state of ecstasy” achieved through ritualistic dance,
of wisdom as a Form, of virtues existing in the realm of the gods which reason
attained, or of ευδαιμονια
existing outside of the realm of the real. Ευδαιμονια, then, was a
worldly state of being, attained via a worldly pursuit of the right objects,
and existing within each individual to the extent to which this person had
attained the necessary attributes. Moreover, Aristotle states, “One swallow does not make a summer; neither
does one day. Similarly neither can one
day, or a brief space of time, make a man blessed and happy.” Ευδαιμονια,
then, is not the golden ticket found randomly or by luck inside a Wonka Bar,
nor is it the planned and calculated winning of a marathon. Ευδαιμονια
is the sum of all of its parts over a long period of time.
Aristotle
himself discusses the link between the ψυχη
and ευδαιμονια when he states,
at EN I.xiii, “...ευδαιμονια is an activity of the ψυχη in accordance with perfect
virtue.” The chapter then continues with
a brief overview of the ψυχη
as having two parts: the rational and the irrational. Aristotle states that the irrational part of
the ψυχη consists of the
vegetative part, which he says is the cause for nutrition and growth, and the
desiring part (Plato calls this the appetitive), which he explains as the
element that drives us either to good or to bad things and is thus
“semi”-receptive to reason. The rational
part of the ψυχη, on the other
hand, consists of our ability to reason. The proper or healthy ψυχη
comes about when a person uses his reason to guide the irrational part of the ψυχη. Unfortunately, the account of the ψυχη is very brief in the EN; Aristotle continues his discussion
of continence and incontinence later on in Book VII, but this account focuses
more on the application of or relationship of the desiring element with reason
or virtue.
Ever
the scientist and philosopher, Aristotle expanded upon his view of the ψυχη, writing an entire work devoted
to the subject entitled De Anima (Latin for: “Concerning the ψυχη”). From the beginning, Aristotle states that,
“We must…repeat that the affections of ψυχη
are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life.” It is clear from this materialist view that
Aristotle does not conceive of the ψυχη
as an independent, incorporeal, “immortal” entity separate and distinct from
the body. Rather, though it is distinct,
it is built from the same basic elements. Aristotle even takes a jab at Pythagoras when he states, “…as if it were
possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any ψυχη
could be clothed upon with any body-an absurd view.” Though it is clear that Aristotle believes
the ψυχη to be distinct from the body (as the eyes, as
an entity, are distinct from the
action of seeing; the eye is the cause or origin behind the act of seeing), it
is incorrect to take this distinction and automatically assign to Aristotle the
belief that the ψυχη is separate from the body (as a passenger
on a cruise ship is separate from the
vessel itself, merely along for the ride). This distinction is because Aristotle believes the ψυχη to be the originator of
movement or motion within the body. The
emotion of anger “makes” the blood boil, which thus moves the body to act in an
angry manner (or to acknowledge the anger “boiling” inside of himself but to
act contrary to his ψυχη). Aristotle continues his attack on the
mind-body dichotomy when he states:
“...in
the ‘Orphic’ poems…it is said that the ψυχη comes in
from the whole when breathing takes
place, being borne upon the winds. Now
this cannot take place in the case of plants, nor indeed in the case of certain classes of animals, for
not all classes of animals breathe. This
fact has escaped the notice of
the holders of this view.”
Here Aristotle shows himself as the
scientist, stating that all living things have some version of a ψυχη because all living things are
“moved” to act in certain ways. Man thus cannot be unique in having a
supernatural “ψυχη”, as is
suggested by the mystery cults, because all
living things have a ψυχη. Aristotle concludes his investigation into
the definition of the ψυχη by
stating, “From this it indubitably follows that the ψυχη is inseparable from its body…for the actuality of
some of them [parts of the soul] is nothing but the actualities of their bodily
parts.”
What,
then, does this say about the relationship between ευδαιμονια and the ψυχη? Ευδαιμονια,
as an activity of the ψυχη,
seemingly cannot exist with the death of the actuality of the ψυχη. For indeed the death of the body means the
cessation of movement and generation, which in turn means the cessation of the ψυχη. This
is the reason why EN I.x-xi is so
perplexing, for Aristotle says, “So it appears that the dead are affected to
some extent by the good fortunes of those whom they love, and similarly by
their misfortunes.”
Though it is true that Aristotle states that these events, as not being the
primary attributes of ευδαιμονια,
do not have the potential to make a ευδαιμων
individual non ευδαιμων, as it
is while they are living, it is still true that these actions can indeed have
an affect upon the quality of the ευδαιμονια
of the individual. Even though
Aristotle does say that friends, family, and prosperity are key attributes of ευδαιμονια, how could these things
have any impact upon a ψυχη
that is not in existence to experience them?
IV. The Answer and Analysis
The
answer to this dilemma can be found almost 400 years before Aristotle lived in
the epics of Homer. As was stated
earlier, to the materialist, immortality or life after death was characterized
by τιμη. The τιμη
that Akilleus had accrued was so great that he lived on in the minds of
individuals for millennia. For
Aristotle, the τιμη
of any individual lived on in relation to the magnitude of his impact. This is why Aristotle states, when speaking
to the majority of humans as opposed to heroes exclusively, in EN I.x-xi that the ευδαιμονια of the dead could in fact
be affected by the fortunes, or the vicissitudes of fate, of his friends and
family. Let us create a hypothetical
situation. George Washington had a son, John Washington, who also strove to be
in politics. George Washington, renowned
in his own time, lived a very virtuous and prosperous life. When he died, it could be properly said that
he had ευδαιμονια. After his death, his son John led a
revolution in favor of the British. This
revolution was so bloody and caused such widespread destruction that the
struggling United States was forced to give all of the southern states to
Britain and the remaining northern states were forced to become vassal states
of Britain until eventually, 200 years later, they were freed as their own
country. In this hypothetical situation,
though George Washington himself had lived a life of ευδαιμονια, the impact of John Washington cast a very
dark image upon the name “Washington”, so that George Washington today was
nearly forgotten. Though these actions,
as bad as they were, did not “make” George Washington non ευδαιμονια, they nevertheless
affected his “blessedness” or the maximization of his ευδαιμων.
Let
us take another hypothetical situation on a much smaller scale. Sarah is a loving mother of two who works in
an office. She has lived a very virtuous
life, has a wonderful family, endearing friends, and has made enough money to
live comfortably. Upon her death, her
friends reveal that they were only friends with her because it made them “look
good” being seen around such a nice and good person. Her children used their inheritance to start
a drug business that is eventually discovered by the police, who arrest
them. Though Sarah had all of the
requirements for a life of ευδαιμονια,
the horrendous actions that occurred after her death stripped away her friends,
her family, and her prosperity, leaving her only with her virtue. Thus it can be said that the ευδαιμονια of Sarah was lowered by
these action.
The
affect upon the ευδαιμονια of
the dead does not always have to be negative; it can indeed be a positive
thing. Let us say that when Sarah died,
her friends cherished her memory so much that they established a “Sarah” club
to spread her optimism and virtue. Similarly, her sons took the inheritance money and started a company,
named in her honor, which rapidly became a Fortune 500 company. In this situation it could be said that the ευδαιμονια of Sarah was increased
due to the great fortunes of her loved ones after death.
To
Aristotle, the vicissitudes of fortune play an important role in the ευδαιμονια of an individual. Even though they themselves have died, fate
has the ability to affect those components of the ευδαιμονια of the dead person, for not all of the
friends and family of the deceased have died, and thus the degree of ευδαιμονια of the dead individual is
semi-dependent upon those still living. Aristotle says, “So it appears that the dead are affected to some extent
by the good fortunes of those whom they love, and similarly by their
misfortunes.” It is apparent from this to assume that, the
degree to which time passes and the loved ones of the individual die, is the
degree to which the affects of fortune diminish their impact upon the ευδαιμονια of the individual. By fully understanding the context within
which Aristotle wrote and viewing death ευδαιμονια
through such a lens, the perplexities of I.x-xi can be sorted out and
understood.
Yet
now comes the ultimate question: is Aristotle correct in his assertion that the
ευδαιμονια of a dead person
can be affected? Once again, we must
start at the beginning: what is the nature of the ψυχη and is there a mind-body dichotomy? If we use the Aristotelian definition of the ψυχη as the seat of human desires,
passions, the will, and reason, and discard the notion of the ψυχη as the originator of movement
in favor of a more scientific understanding of the nature of movement, it can
be concluded that the ψυχη of
an individual is similar to what we in the modern world call the mind. Leonard Peikoff states:
“The theory of a mind-body conflict, which has
corrupted every branch and issue of philosophy, does have its root in a real conflict, but of a special kind. Its root is a breach between some men’s consciousness and
existence. In this sense, the basis of
the theory is not reality, but a human error: the
error of turning away from reality, of refusing to accept the absolutism of the
metaphysically given.”
It is interesting to note that the
origins of the mind-body split in Greece came from the mystery cults. They derived this conclusion because of their
special religious practices: the women in the cult would gather around in a
circle, drinking highly intoxicating alcohol, smoking hallucinatory seeds,
dancing to the point of exhaustion, and wailing, screeching, and
ululating. The men would sit outside the
circle, also drinking the highly potent alcohol and smoking the hallucinatory
seeds, banging on drums. In the middle
of the circle was a sacrificial victim, and the women, after reaching the point
of exhaustion, would rush forward and tear the animal apart, taking the limbs
and eating them raw, smearing the blood all over their naked body. The “mania” or ecstasy achieved by such an
act convinced the cultist that they were communing with the “divine”, and thus
lead them to believe that their souls were the only thing “heightened” enough
to commune with the divine. From this
belief, it was concluded that the soul was in fact distinct from the body, and
only a special ritual could allow the soul to be “free” for a fleeting moment
from its bodily prison. The philosophers, such as Plato, picked up
these beliefs and discarded the actions in favor of another ritual, “reason”,
by which the soul could transcend the mortal realm and communicate with the
divine. Inherent in these ideas is a
rejection of the actual facts of existence in favor of the primacy of
consciousness, attained by a special ritual, which itself could reject the
metaphysically given in favor of the metaphysically unknown. Reality itself
actually exists, independent of our ψυχη,
which itself is just the means by which we understand, interpret, or comprehend
that which is in front of us. It is
self-evident then that the ψυχη
is but merely a tool, an attribute of the body and thus inseparable from it.
Aristotle
also appears to be correct in his definition of ευδαιμονια. The “good life” of an individual cannot just
contain his virtue. Using the example of
Aristotle, Priam lived a highly virtuous life. Before the Trojan War he was described as having ευδαιμονια. But
after the war, though he retained his virtue, the loss of everything else led
him to become miserable. This is because
a “good life” is not a fleeting emotion (for it is assumed that even Hitler had
happy moments), or state of an emotion (it is probable that a mafia lord could
have a state of happiness), but is the combination of living life well
(self-esteem generated through the efficacy of an individual actualizing and
maintaining his virtues), having good friends and a good family (for no man is
an island, and regardless of his virtue can no man have a good life alone), and
being prosperous (always having to struggle to pay bills, eating ramen noodles,
and watching your children go hungry is not as good as living a comfortable
life). Having ευδαιμονια then must include a variety of things:
virtue, good friends and family, and comfortable living via general prosperity.
What
then of the individual who has ευδαιμονια
but has died? If ευδαιμονια is dependent upon things outside of one’s
own body, such as friends, family, and prosperity, then ευδαιμονια is dependent upon things outside of an
individual’s direct control. As there is
no ψυχη which, upon death,
floats up to heaven to join the divine, it must be concluded that the death of
an individual also entails the death of the virtue of said individual. The external entities, however, remain after
his death. Thus, as in the examples
given above, were tragedy or fortune to befall these external entities after
the death of an individual, it is indeed reasonable to conclude that the
overall state of the ευδαιμονια
of that individual would suffer. Aristotle, once again, seems correct in his analysis of death ευδαιμονια. Thus this author whole-heatedly agrees with
the evaluation of Aristotle.
With
this assumption, it becomes necessary for any individual striving to achieve a
state of ευδαιμονια to mind
not only his own virtues, but to carefully choose his friends, work well to
strengthen the bond and improve his family, and insure some means of prosperity
after death. In this world where death
is the end, it is a proper desire for every individual to strive to have some
sort of immortality. This immortality,
of course, can be achieved through accomplishing extraordinary deeds. But more importantly, to achieve a state of ευδαιμονια, we must endeavor while
we are alive to strengthen the bonds with wonderful people, be they our friends
or family, and to protect our prosperity so that not even death can take such
wonderful things away from us.
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---Jason Roberts