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March 28, 2008

Aristotle's Organic Ethics

It is a colloquial expectation that morality is a strict set of rules, of thou shall and thou shall not, the purpose of which is to guide humans to a better life. Many non-philosophically-minded people who strive toward moral excellence view each encounter requiring moral action in a strict sense. For example, many do not see a difference between the virtue of honesty in one situation (let us say, a situation where a person is late to work and must decide whether to lie to his boss, lying that he was in a wreck) and in another situation (let us say, a situation where a sketchy and dangerous looking man asks if a woman has any money, and though she does, she must decide whether to tell him or not.) This rigid system of morality, where each virtue is an angel or a demon upon one’s shoulders, has lead to a popular conception that morality is burdensome. In fact, many people view morality as a hindrance to the actual enjoyment of life; a necessary evil. A large number of modern philosophers have tried to solve this problem, viewing the problematic morality as an objective black or white, by introducing a subjective grey. It is their purpose, supposedly, to do away with the guilt, the rigor, or the road-block imposed by traditional morality in favor of a “new” moral grey whereby individuals can wear both the badge of moral and the badge of pleasurable living. Ironically, however, this move towards a moral grey does away with the need for morality at all, leaving only a slim visage in title that only serves to falsely boost the self esteem of the deluded advocate. However, the idea that morality is burdensome need not always apply. Morality can not only abate happiness, but it can indeed lead one to a greater level of happiness. For morality must not necessarily be a system of thou shall and thou shall not; similarly, it must not necessarily also be a subjective grey area veneering one in a pseudo-self esteem. Morality can be objective without being rigid and can be life-enhancing and happiness-promoting without being subjective or without giving one a pseudo-self esteem. It was this exact type of morality that Aristotle promoted in the Nicomachean Ethics. Thus it will be necessary to display what exactly Aristotle’s meta-ethical framework is, henceforth called organic ethics or organic virtue; what the benefits are of an organic ethical system; and what the implications are of such a system.

Organic ethics seems an odd term, especially when observing the plentitude of terms that exist to differentiate all of the ethical systems that exist. However, the term organic not only serves to describe Aristotelian ethics, but also serves as a wonderful image to keep in mind when thinking about his ethics. The term organic not only comes to mind because of the teleological nature of Aristotle’s ethics, but also from the fact that he himself was primarily a biologist, and thus it seems quite fitting that a man who viewed the world through the lens of a biologist would incorporate naturalistic or biological imagery into the inner-workings of his ethics. Organic ethics can thus be defined qua Aristotle as an ethical system with a teleological end, happiness (henceforth called flourishing), towards which all actions aim, tailored to the specific qualities of each individual. The end, for Aristotle, is to flourish (or to be “happy”), as fleshed out in almost all of Book I. In Book II, Aristotle describes how the actions which lead to flourishing are properly called virtues, stating, “…the good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.” It is by means of the different virtues that an individual can attain a state of flourishing, similar to the way in which a tree must gain water and nutrients from its roots, must protect itself from external forces by its bark, and must gain sunlight via photosynthesis, in order to flourish and grow. This focus on growing is essential, for growing is merely another term for acting. When faced with either two choices, to act and thus to grow and thus to flourish, or to not act and thus to whither and thus to die, it is simple to see why actions are so important for Aristotle. To not act, or to act in an improper way (if trees had volition, were trees to choose not to gather sunlight with their leaves, or to stick their roots straight up into the air as opposed to in the ground) will not lead to a blessed and flourishing life, but will lead to the death of the entity.

The goal of Aristotle’s normative ethics is not to contemplate the good but to act in a good manner. Imagine the absurdity of a conscious and volitional tree pondering whether or not it should gather light from the sun, and then once discovering that the sun is the good, separating itself from the world in order to contemplate the sun. Similarly, Aristotle was not as concerned with a life of contemplation devoid of action, but rather viewed contemplation as a means to fully understanding why and how to act in a proper manner. Unlike any other animal, man is a rational creature. Reason, however, is not automatic and thus will not automatically operate as will the leaves of a tree. This means that for man to act in accordance with a rational principle in order to lead the good life, as Aristotle describes, he must discover via his tool of reason what exactly the good life is and the steps to take in order to reach that point. Once he discovers the necessary steps, it is essential for man to act in a proper manner, for just as a tree cannot stop photosynthesizing once its leaves are fully grown, so too can a man not cease his virtues once he actualizes them. Rather, man must continually and consistently act with his reason and by his virtues in order to flourish. However, this process is not as cruel and unforgiving as it sounds. Quite the contrary, Aristotle’s ethical theory allows for mistakes and mishaps, for breaches of morality, for just as an entire limb of a tree can be severed in a storm, so too can man suffer setbacks and pitfalls yet continue to grow, being damaged only in correlation to the strength of the storm[1]. Just as a tree will grow a large number of limbs, a few of them falling off for some reason or another (being too low to the ground, to near an obstacle, to hidden in shade, diseased, broken off, etc.), and others growing quite large, so too must man grow in regards to his virtues by experiencing life, through all of its trials and tribulations, through the good and the bad, in order to discover the correct growth path which leads to a maximum state of flourishing.

One might raise an objection here, straining to see the objectivity in such a seemingly subjective system. How can it be that Aristotle promotes an objective ethics, yet allows for such variation, such growth, such individual development? The objectivity in Aristotle lies in his evaluation of the nature of man, and the end for which man must strive. He states that man is a rational animal and that the ultimate end for which man must strive is happiness, eudaimonia, or to flourish. The path to flourishing lies in the rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Figuratively speaking in an objective manner, Aristotle states that an oak seed will grow into an oak tree, will grow by the same means and using the same resources, sharing a general similarity with other oak seeds, regardless of its environment (being of course in an environment in which it can live). Thus it is not the beginning, the end, or the general means which allows for leeway, for “subjectivity”, for “variance”, but rather the specific path or the individual steps that are taken from the beginning to the end via a more broad yet absolute means. As one would not say that an oak seed could become an oak tree by growing fur instead of bark and hands instead of leaves, so too would Aristotle say that a man could not flourish by being a coward or by being licentious. But the exact way that the limbs grow, the exact number of leaves, and the location of the tree are relative to each individual tree. Similarly, the same general actions must be taken regardless of a location; a man will flourish in modern America in a similar way to tribal man living in the wild Amazon. Though their circumstances may be different, and though the degree of their virtues might be different, the same general acts will yield the same general results regardless of race, gender, or sexual orientation. In II.ii, Aristotle states:

“Now that we should act according to the right principle is common ground and may be assumed as a basis for discussion…But we must first agree that any account of conduct must be stated in outline and not in precise detail, just as we said at the beginning that accounts are to be required only in such a form as befits their subject-matter. Now questions of conduct and expedience have as little fixity about them as questions of what is healthful; and if this is true of the general rule, it is still more true that its application to particular problems admits of no precision. For they do not fall under any art or professional tradition, but the agents are compelled at every step to think out for themselves what the circumstances demand, just as happens in the arts of medicine and navigation.”

In proclaiming the universal nature of ethics for man qua man, Aristotle strongly pronounces an objective morality whose normative form is not full of thou shall and thou shall not, but rather, aim here and shy away from there. Though this distinction may seem non existent, its existence lies in the difference between a rigid set of rules (for good health, drink 8 cups of water a day) versus a guiding principle allowing room for leeway (for good health, if you are a male child under the age of 10, drink 5 cups of water a day, unless you have exercised a lot, in which case drink 7; for good health, if you are a female adult over the age of 60, drink 6 cups of water a day, unless you are sick, in which case increase your water intake to 8 cups a day). Thus the organic nature of Aristotle’s ethics lies in its teleological qualities, aiming towards the goal of flourishing; its focus on continual action (habituation) versus stagnation and decay; its ability to mold to different circumstances for different people; and its objectivity in being universal for a general species.

A deeper understanding of the meaning of Aristotle’s organic ethics allows one to begin to see the benefits of such a system. As stated in the opening paragraph, many people feel that guilt and morality go hand in hand. Guilt hereafter is defined in a very strict sense as a deep and looming psychological state of shame and regret attained by a breach of morality. Many moral systems endow a sense of guilt in people from the 10 year old child who lets slip a curse word and feels utterly horrible about it to the 70 year old who still holds guilt over a lie told 50 years prior, all strangling themselves with the noose of guilt, cutting their efficacy, happiness, and self worth due to a rigid moral system. It comes then as no surprise that morality is seen as a burden if the direct consequences, within the soul, of a moral breach include a low and powerful feeling of guilt. Guilt can originate from a variety of sources, from the concept of original sin (guilty from birth) to a system with so many rules that one is guaranteed to break them, to a system that restricts and represses the most basic human needs or desires, and so on. Aristotle’s organic ethics, on the other hand, has no conception of guilt due firstly to the fact that Aristotle places ethics within the realm of the individual, making the ultimate arbiter of an individual’s moral actions reality. The man who has too much to drink will get a hangover. The man who is rash will get killed in battle. The woman who is unjust will gain such a reputation, thereby not being dealt with by other people. However, even in these cases, reality is forgiving. For the person who gets drunk once does not risk the destruction of his liver, and the person who tells one white lie does not risk the reputation of a liar (though of course, moral breaches are correlational to the depth of the action; intense over-consumption of alcohol will lead to alcohol poisoning, which can lead to death. These cases, however, are rare.) If a limb is torn in a storm and falls off of a tree, the tree can still work and grow and flourish. Similarly, a person who commits an immoral act can “regrow” their moral “limbs” and live a flourishing life. Because it is inevitable that a tree will lose branches or limbs throughout the course of its life, so too is it inevitable that an individual will experience moral setbacks. However, as long as the individual continues to strive for moral growth and excellence, these acts will be nothing more than setbacks. Indeed, it is sometimes even necessary for an individual to have setbacks (and in reality, almost guaranteed) so that they can grow and flourish even better than before; any gardener will tell you that the best way to help your plant grow large and healthy is to have it trimmed.

It is also a fault of many moral systems to set unreasonable, “universal” expectations for all people, through all walks of life, all ages, and all levels of maturity. Is it truly reasonable to expect a 13 year old to honor his mother and father in the same way that a 31 year old does? While, thankfully, some moral systems have incorporated an organic approach, allowing room for moral growth, into their ethics, Aristotle’s ethics from its conception does not suffer from this problem. A tiny sprout cannot be expected to weather a storm as well as a tall and sturdy tree can. Similarly, a youth or an individual just setting down on the path of moral excellence will encounter difficulties that might “knock them off the bike”. But they are not expected to jump on the bike and ride it like Lance Armstrong. Aristotle’s organic ethics states that an individual must develop moral habits or dispositions, which can only come about through repeated actions of a virtue coupled with the knowledge about that virtue. Over time, what once was intemperance can slowly evolve to “slightly” temperate, until a habit is formed that eventually an individual becomes temperate. Each step along the path is moral growth and is a necessary step in order to reach the end goal. Thus, by not setting unrealistic expectations, Aristotle’s organic ethics allows an individual to celebrate and marvel at each stage of his moral development.

As stated above, many individuals view morality as an impediment to pleasure, a “necessary” evil. Pleasure can only be obtained either by engaging in the act and then “repenting” afterwards, or by abandoning morality all together. However, the dichotomy between pleasure and morality is not present in an organic ethics. Aristotle encourages people to drink or engage in sensual pleasures (saying that the mean for temperance is closer to licentiousness than it is to insensibility), showing a deep understanding of the need for pleasure and relaxation within the psyche of an individual. Though it could be argued that the licentious person is experiencing more pleasure, it is necessary to view a large span of time as opposed to a single isolated incident. The long-term licentious individual will find their health failing, their addictions leading to problems at home and work, ultimately resulting in a net displeasure or misery. The long-term temperate individual, on the other hand, will be able to engage in pleasure over an entire period of time without it being a detriment to his well being; in fact, as a virtue, it will benefit his life and aid in his ability to flourish. It is also true that, due to an organic ethics not setting insurmountable expectations and due to the fact that youth have a larger tendency towards excess in regards to pleasure than do adults and especially the elderly, the growth and maturation of an individuals ethical system will conversely see a decrease in the excess without damning the youth who engaged in such an act. Thus it is entirely proper for a college person to go out and party, as long as he is on the path to flourishing, because this path will slowly develop within him the framework and the habit of temperance enough to where he will always experience a maximum level of pleasure at a reduced actual intake. For Aristotle even says that what once was pleasurable to a person without the right dispositions will, upon gaining the proper dispositions, not become pleasurable (rarely does a person enjoy his first beer or cigar, but rather “gains a taste” for it). Thus a flourishing life is inseparable from the pleasant life, because to a flourishing and active organism, the pleasant is the act of flourishing.

In the true democratic spirit of Athens, Aristotle’s organic ethics is also applicable to all individuals[2] and not restricted to an elite class or a pre-chosen set of people. The objectivity of his organic ethics means that any man, because they are of the same species and possess the same tools (reason), can live a flourishing life. Though some individuals might flourish more than others, due to them being more wealthy or them being more philosophically oriented, it nevertheless is true that all men have the potential to flourish to the best of their abilities. Many other ethical systems can also claim to allow anybody to practice their system and gain the rewards thereof. However, it is a unique characteristic of organic ethics that the most that an individual can achieve is indeed the best, and that individual can be satisfied as opposed to being belittled by “moral superiors”. Anybody from the simple farmer to the wise philosopher has the ability to flourish and live a rewarding life. The role of fate in this situation is minimal, however it is important to remember that Aristotle does place fate as a component of happiness (an unforeseen mudslide can topple a tree; though rare, it can happen). Nevertheless, the majority of flourishing lies in the hands of the individual. Moreover, though he may not have stated it himself, Aristotle’s ethics laid the framework for the equality of all people regardless of race, gender, or sexual orientation. For Aristotle’s analysis that all men are the same basic species, and perform in the same basic ways, and can all reach the same basic level of flourishing, if taken to its logical conclusion, also means that all women are the same as well, that they too have the same faculties, and that they too can flourish just as well as men can (and the same for other minority groups). While it is true that Aristotle believed in barbarians, in brutes and savages, his evaluation of people as such was not an evaluation of an intrinsic character, bur rather an evaluation of a disposition brought about by culture and actions. Thus a barbarian was a barbarian because he was a human who was not acting qua human. Ultimately, though, it is a benefit of organic ethics that the good life, flourishing, is able to be reached by any human who so desires.

The concept of organic ethics leaves room for a few peculiar implications. Aristotle’s ethical framework allows for the possibility that the virtues he discusses may not be the correct virtues, and, akin to the Constitution, his ethical system may need “amendments” as time goes on. Interestingly enough, these “amendments” do not contradict Aristotle’s ethics, but rather, follow along in the exact metaethical framework that he set up. If mankind has a uniform nature and the same tool (reason), and mankind lives the best life when is he flourishing via virtuous activity guided by a rational principle, then those virtues which might be found not to be conducive, or optimally conducive, to a flourishing life are allowed to be discarded in favor of virtues which do. Thus it is necessary to distinguish between absolute and optional virtues, or rather, virtues that are objective and necessary, in all places, for all people, throughout time, and those virtues that may be more relevant to certain individuals in certain situations in a specific period of time. Though it is not my intention to delve into Aristotle’s normative ethics, an example might serve to further the point. It would be correct to say that temperance is a universal virtue, because the acts of eating, drinking (alcoholic or nonalcoholic), and sex are necessary to the very nature of man. Liberality, on the other hand, may not be so. Take the example of the pioneer family who does not have money, but takes from the land what they need (be it lumber or water or food). What use would liberality be to them? One might stretch the definition of liberality to include how the wife acts towards her children, or the husband to his wife, but this stretch seems unjustified. Unlike the modern urban city dweller, however, it could be said that “the virtue of land management” might be important to the pioneer, because his ability to flourish depends on his ability to properly manage his land, ensuring that the ground does not become “over-farmed”, that rivers are diverted enough to provide the right amount of water to his crops and livestock, and so on. Thus while lawn care might be a luxury for the urban dweller, land management would be a necessity for the pioneer, and the proper action in regards to this value would lead to a life of flourishing, whereas a poorly kept lawn will not cause the urban dweller to morally decay (though it could be said that his psychology might become more depressed). On the other hand, the “virtue of time management” may not be as important to the pioneer. Though he does have work to do, it does not necessarily matter that he finishes feeding the chickens at 5:00 a.m., that he milks the cows at exactly 6:15 a.m., and that he begins tilling his fields at 7:30 a.m. The urban dweller, however, finds time management to be of the utmost importance to him. The ability to properly manage his time ensures that he can keep his job (which leads to money, which leads to the many necessities and luxuries conducive to a flourishing life), that he watches his daughter’s softball game (which is necessary to ensure a positive and flourishing family life), and that he turns in his income tax form at the appropriate time. Thus time management is a very important virtue for the urban dweller, for the proper actualization of this virtue will yield a more flourishing life. Ironically, an organic ethics that promotes the growth and development of its adherents has itself the ability to grow and change while maintaining its same basic structure and same key attributes.

As was eluded to in the discussion of the egalitarian nature of Aristotle’s organic ethics, an organic ethics that places its objectivity in human nature has the ability to grow and develop from early human prejudices to modern human understandings. While Aristotle did not say that the Nicomachean Ethics was intended for women, and indeed it can be assumed that it was not, the very nature of Aristotle’s organic ethics means that once society advanced to the point of realizing that women were equal to men and shared the same basic nature, it was thus logical to assume that the same ethical system which allowed men to flourish would be the same ethical system which must allow women to flourish as well. For though the way in which each virtue is specifically practiced might be difference (for example, a woman on the battlefield; though in our modern world, even this is coming to be accepted), the fact is not changed that a woman can be just as courageous as a man. Similarly, a black homosexual man is by nature the same as a white heterosexual female, and thus just like her, it can be expected that a black homosexual man has the potential to be just as virtuous as anybody else. Yet even beyond this, Aristotle’s organic ethics has the ability to answer modern moral questions that did not exist in Aristotle’s own time, such as abortion. For it is one interpretation to say that a potentiality (a fetus) is not an actuality (a born human) similar to how a potential temperate man is not an actual temperate man. Though Aristotle did not directly discuss such issues, it can be rationally concluded from the framework that he set up that an organic ethics has the ability to expand and grow to new areas that Aristotle himself had no notion.

Aristotle’s organic ethics is vastly different than any other ethical system in philosophy. While most philosophical systems contain either a very rigid set of rules that one must follow in order to be “burdened” by morality, or a loose and subjective moral system that gives one the visage of morality while leading one down a path that is far from moral, it is unique that organic ethics allows for an objective system of morals that is applicable and true in almost any situation while also allowing the growth and flexibility needed to cater towards the specific peculiarities of each individual’s life. The benefits of the system not only lie in its accessible objectivity, but in its ability to grow and develop, custom tailored towards each individual. This means that any person must discover how to properly adhere to virtue in order to live a flourishing life. For morality is not a lifeless and rigid stone but is a flourishing and organic entity that will only enhance the life of its adherents by actualizing their potential.

 

 

 

 


[1] See Aristotle’s account of Priam in EN I.ix.

[2] The term individuals here is understood as normal humans, functioning as they were intended to by nature, devoid of any ailments (such as mental retardation).

March 21, 2008

Obama: The Sophist

While reading through Obama's speech on Race I spotted a perfect example of sophistical argumentation, which really brings into light the essence of his whole ploy.

“...unless we perfect our union by understanding that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look the same and we may not have come from the same place, but we all want to move in the same direction - towards a better future for our children and our grandchildren.”

If I was to assert that justice, in the case of a wrongly convicted man, consists in releasing him, and another man was to assert that it consists in shooting him, we find, in this case, that we both share the same goal insofar as both of us want to “move in the same direction – towards” justice, but one of the proposed means is obviously fallacious – i.e not consistent with the meaning of justice. Thus the question is not whether you want to make a better future for your children and grandchildren, but rather in what that consists. The effectiveness of this sophistry is not to be doubted as any man may assume whatever implications please him. A communist may assume it consists in the destruction of the bourgeoisie, a socialist in the state control of property, and a feminist in the elimination of  “discrimination” against women by government regulation, etc. In this way he can please all of his supporters by not committing to anything in particular.

-Jeffrey Luebcke

March 07, 2008

A Debate Involving Wafa Sultan and some Commentary

There is an excellent new debate between Wafa Sultan and an Egyptian Islamist, where she verbally abuses this insolent and ignorant man.

In this debate between Wafa Sultan and Tal'at Rmeih, the latter claimed that he was "defending a magnificent past of a magnificent nation, which was the cradle of knowledge and civilization, at a time when the most that people in the West could do was to catch a rabbit and scurry back to their caves. This nation has made the greatest contribution to civilization and humanity.” Does he know that Thales, the first natural philosopher, lived eleven-hundred years before his Islamic “nation” was born or that Aristotle systematized philosophy and logic nine-hundred years prior to the same? The west is superior both in antiquity, which is not a just measure of a civilization at any rate, as well as in fact. I doubt it would be a stretch to say that anything good in the Islamic golden age was taken from the ancient West since nearly all the great Arabic philosophers of that time were Aristotelian or Platonic. Aristotle was referred to as the “wise man”, just as he was called “the master of those who know” by Dante or "the philosopher" by Thomas Aquinas.


--Jeffrey Luebcke

March 06, 2008

Worst of the Three Simple Forms of Government

There is great disagreement as to which is the worst of the three simple forms of degraded government. There are those who assert that the worst is the abuse of the mob, while some assert it is the despotism of a single tyrant. The two representatives of each case being Cicero and Aristotle respectively. I will approach this question first by putting forth the opinions of these great authors and then asserting my own opinion endeavoring to show that both forms are so intricately connected and bound up into one another as to be nearly indistinguishable; this is to say that tyranny almost always arises and is supported by the popular will.

Aristotle rests his argument upon the premise that a proper kingship requires a man to have the greatest virtue, thus the greatest harm will come from a man destitute of virtue, for he says, "And just as a royal rule, if not a mere name, must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king, so tyranny, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily the farthest removed from a well-constituted form; oligarchy is little better, for it is a long way from aristocracy, and democracy is the most tolerable of the three." He reasons that a single corrupt man -- or indeed a few --  is liable to do more harm then the great mass of the people, as it is not as likely that the majority are to be simultaneously corrupted.

Cicero, on the other hand, shows his extreme contempt for popular rule, when he says, " There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely deny the name of a Commonwealth, than that in which all things lie in the power of the multitude." He goes on to say that this type of rule is the most odious because the mob can hide their crimes behind the mask of the people. The danger in this is clearly evident, since a man can say that it was not him who murdered but rather that it was an act of the people. Democracy is all the more noxious as the people can easily depose a tyrant or an oligarchy by sheer force and number, but the people, once they have become despotic have no one to oppose them except some minority which is necessarily oppressed under their weight.

Cicero can then be seen to be closer to the truth in this case, as history attests that it is the great movements of the people which have lead to the greatest tragedies. I would go even further by saying that a tyrant may only exist by the explicit approval or implicit acquiescence of the people. Hitler, Mussolini, and Joseph Stalin were not acting against the popular will, on the contrary the general population was their greatest bulwark! Communism, Nazism, and Fascism were all popular movements and were portrayed as such by their intellectual founders. Nearly every despot in history was raised to their position of power by the people and any one of them which long remained did so by their support.  This is why the tyrannicide Brutus was driven from Rome by the Romans and why the Republic after a long and bloody struggle fell at last to a Caesar's absolute power.

--Jeffrey Luebcke

God or Gods?

It is uncontroversial to state that the Old Testament and the New Testament represent different traditions; not only in the adherence to one or both of these books by Judaism or Christianity, but also in the fundamental shift in thought and action from the Old Testament to the New Testament. Upon closer inspection, a more controversial image is projected. Is the god of the Old Testament the same god as the New Testament? Mainline Christianity would unanimously state yes, as the union of the Old and New Testaments are essential to the well being and structural integrity of their religious system. Others would state that the Old Testament god is indeed a different and distinct entity from the New Testament god. In order to arrive at a proper conclusion, it is necessary to examine the original conception of “God” to the Jews and the Christians, and then compare their respective developments in order to understand if the Bible portrays one and the same deity, or distinct and separate deities.

 Judaism falls into the larger religious environment of the Ancient Near East, sharing similar customs and rituals with the Levant religions, including the Phoenician religion, and the religions of Sumeria, Babylon, and Assyria. Within this context, it is proper to assume that the earliest form of Judaic religion encompassed the polytheistic tendencies of its neighbors. Modern scholars, in fact, call pre-Abrahamic Judaism henotheistic (after the works of the prominent German scholar Max Mϋller), meaning that the early Jews believed in the existence of a large number of deities but excluded themselves to the strict devotion to only one of the gods (a similarity to this can be found in the revolution in Egyptian religion whereby Akhenaten tried to impose the strict worship of Aten in favor of all the other gods). Elements of the belief in more than one god can be found within the Old Testament itself, hinting at the earlier polytheistic beliefs of the Jews. Linguistically, Elohim and Adonai, two words used extensively in the Old Testament to refer to god, are plural nouns. This plurality is shown in Genesis 1:26, where it states, “And God [Elohim] said, Let us make man in our image.”[1] The Babylonian Captivity and the arrival of Abraham seems to mark a turning point in the development of Judaism, as Abraham made a covenant with Yahweh (the Hebrew god) that his people would worship only Yahweh, abandoning all the other gods. This strict covenant slowly began the degeneration of Judaic henotheism in favor of a new Judaic monotheism. Nevertheless, it is within this Near Eastern framework that many of the actions of Yahweh can be understood: his anger and wrath[2], his demand for law (as codified in the Ten Commandments and the Torah) and a strict adherence to a religious code, and his offer of salvation via qualitative adherence to this law. Save the monotheism, the other structural components of Judaism shared similarities with the other religions in the Near East.

 To understand Christianity, one must properly begin in Thrace. The very first known mystery cult in the Greco-Roman culture began in Thrace, where the worship of Dionysus and Sabazius found its way into mainland Greece, spreading and duplicating like a wildfire. Soon, many other mystery cults appeared, be they more original Greek beliefs like the Eleusinian Mysteries, Thracian Orphic Mysteries, or more Eastern Egyptian Isis Mysteries and Persian Mithras Mysteries. By the time of the birth of Christ, almost every major religion or religious segment had a corresponding mystery cult, save Judaism. But as Israel was conquered first by the Greeks, and later by the Romans, Greco-Roman ideas and culture slowly began to fuse itself with the native Jewish culture. It was thus inevitable that a new mystery cult would arise based upon the beliefs of Judaism: Christianity. Like most other mystery cults, Christianity based itself upon the mother religion (Judaism), and added a new set of customs (most mystery religions had a bread and wine ceremony, akin to the Christian Communion), and a new personal path for salvation via the resurrected savior[3].  Thus from the offset, Christianity differed dramatically from Judaism in regards to salvation; Judaism believed in salvation via adherence to the Law, whereas Christianity believed in salvation via the acceptance of Christ as savior. As the religion developed, other differences emerged as well, with Christianity abandoning the strict adherence to the law. The sacrifice of Christ and his compassion towards people also caused Christians to slowly begin to view their deity in a more optimistic and benevolent light. Thus the formation of the religion saw the need to restructure their supreme deity to fit the requirements of benevolence and compassion that Jesus taught. Like most other mystery cults, Christianity began as an obscure branch of Judaism which eventually, in order to justify its beliefs and strengthen its own religious structure, evolved to the point of being a separate and distinct religion.

 It is apparent to a neutral outside observer that Judaism and the god of the Old Testament is quite different from Christianity and the god of the New Testament. Where Yahweh was a Semitic/Near Eastern deity who evolved out of a completely Near Eastern environment, possessing extreme wrath, anger, and judgment, and offering a path of salvation via adherence to a law code, God the Father was an amalgamation of Semitic/Near Eastern religious attitudes and Greco-Roman religious attitudes, possessing benevolence and compassion, and offering a path of salvation via the new savior of mankind, Jesus Christ. The distinct nature of the two deities does not necessarily mean that a Jew or a Christian would believe in the incorporeal existence of two deities, but rather that the god of the Old Testament was different from the god from the New Testament. Attempts to explain this away have given rise to a number of wild stories which hold no serious philosophical or logical validity (for indeed, how could an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient being “change”?). However, to a neutral observer, it is clear that a religious evolution took place when the Judaic tradition came in contact with the Hellenistic tradition, spawning a child much different than, and at the same time a combination of, its parents. The question then of whether or not there are two deities can be answered with a firm yes, understood in the context that the Old Testament, embodying the Judaic faith, is only compatible with the New Testament, embodying the Christian faith, to the extent to which a child possesses the same genetic attributes of one of his parents: partial and important similarities, but at the same time, keen and distinct differences, leading to the development of an entirely new entity altogether. 



[1] Cf. Genesis 3:22; 11:7; Isaiah 6:8.

[2] See 2 Samuel 6:6-11, Numbers 16:16-49, 1 Kings 20:30, 1 Samuel 6:19, and 2 Kings 2:23-24.

[3] Cf. the ideas of resurrection, salvation by a savior, and god coming down as a mortal in the mystery cults of Orpheus, Isis, Serapis, and Mithras.

February 26, 2008

John, Faust, Plato, Aristotle

    John 1:1, in the New Testament, states, "In the beginning was the word."  In Koine Greek, the word logos means, "something said (e.g. word; saying;message; teaching; talk)."  About 1.5 thousand years later, Goethe, through his character Faust, took a very interesting take on this passage.  At 1224-1237, Faust says:
                    "'In the beginning was the Word': why, now
                    I'm struck already! I must change that; how?
                    Is then 'the word' so great and high a thing?
                    There is some other rendering.
                    Which with the spirit's guidance I must find.
                    We read: 'In the beginning was the Mind.'
                    Before you write this first phrase, think again;
                    Good sense eludes the overhasty pen.
                    Does 'mind' set worlds on their creative course?
                    It means: 'In the beginning was the Force.'
                    So it should be-but as I write this too,
                    Some instinct warns me that this will not do.
                    The spirit speaks! I see how it must read,
                    And boldly write, 'In the beginning was the Deed!'"
If one reads this without much thought, you would accuse Goethe of merely tossing the mind, or reason, aside.  However, I think the implications here are much deeper, stemming back to that eternal debate between Plato and Aristotle: thought or action, word or deed?
    Plato says that pure knowledge is sufficient, that if one merely knows what the good is, then someone will be good.  Aristotle, on the other hand, rejects this notion.  Aristotle states that knowledge alone is not sufficient, but rather it takes action.  It is not the man who knows what the good is, but who actually does it!  Suppose that you were getting ready to get on an airplane, and you had to choose between two pilots.  One had read all the manuals, knew all the physics, mechanics, and engineering behind flight and the airplane, had seen a thousand how-to videos on flying, but had actually never flown a plane.  The other guy started out as an apprentice to a pilot, observing what he does and how he does it, slowly beginning to a fly a plane on his own, until eventually now he has been flying for twenty years.  Which pilot would you choose?
    One could argue against this point with the maxim, "Think before you act."  However, I do not think that this maxim applies-the real debate is not between pure thought and pure action, but rather how one relates to the world.  Are you an Ivory Towered intellectual, sitting away at your armchair, deducing how the world works?  Or, are you likened to a child again, constantly examining the world, taking in as much experience as possible, and from this forming your ideas?  Philosophically, this distinction is called deductive versus inductive reasoning.  Plato and John would state that the world must be understood via deductive reasoning, by starting first with the "word", with the "idea", and taking this "knowledge" and then applying it to the world.  Aristotle, Goethe, and Ayn Rand would state that the world must be understood via inductive reasoning, by starting first with the "deed", with the "action", and taking a collection of the knowledge gained via experience, organizing it in our head, finding a common denominator between actions, and forming our ideas from the world.
    Of course it stands to reason that if your "word" is based upon previous experience and subsequent reasonings, then it is okay to use this knowledge in order to apply it to future situations.  This is not deductive reasoning.  But what always must be remembered is that before the "word" came the "deed", and a mind which constantly seeks the real through the active process of experiencing the world will be safely able to fly the plane of life.

February 23, 2008

An Anecdote Concerning Cassius

Cassius was a friend of Brutus who died at the same battle after which Brutus ended his own life. Brutus called him "the last of the Romans". He was more enthusiastic in the removal of Caesar then even Brutus himself, though it is reported that this zeal had more to do with private enmity than a principled defense of liberty; this fact renders him less noble then a Cicero or a Brutus but the sentiment in this extract, taken from Plutarch's Life of Marcus Brutus, still ought to be appealing.

For Cassius had from his youth a natural hatred and rancor against the whole race of tyrants, which he showed when he was but a boy, and went to the same school with Faustus, the son of Sylla; for, on his boasting himself among the boys, and extolling the sovereign power of his father, Cassius rose up and struck him two or three boxes on the ear; which when the guardians and relations of Faustus designed to inquire into and to prosecute, Pompey forbade them, and, sending for both the boys together, examined the matter himself. And Cassius is then reported to have said thus, "Come, then, Faustus, dare to speak here those words that provoked me, that I may strike you again as I did before." Such was the disposition of Cassius.
-Plutarch's Lives Volume II, the Modern Library Edition, Translated by John Dryden on page 577-578

In a somewhat related strain, we have a quote from Thomas Gordon in his defense of Brutus for having slain Caesar. It was written in the begining of the 18th century in that elegant style which helps to render pleasant the conclusions of reason. In addition to being a passionate defense of Brutus it strikes against that ridiculous notion of Christianity which renders the mere act of existing as a duty turning suffering into an act of virtue. Happiness, it is rightly concluded, is the sole end of life, that object for which everything else ought to be done, and thus when it is no longer possible, life is no longer a positive value.

It was a Roman spirit; and those who possessed it, did as much disdain to be tyrants, as to submit to tyranny, a spirit that scorned an ignominious life, held only at the mercy of an usurper, or by flattering his villainy, and abetting his usurpations; and a spirit, which those that want it can never admire.... It is undoubtedly true, that by the percepts of Christianity we are not at liberty to dispose of our own lives; but are to wait for the call of heaven to alleviate or end our calamities: But the Romans had no other laws to act by, but the natural dictates of uncorrupted reason. I call upon the great pretenders to philosophy and refined morals, to assign one fair reason, why a Roman, why Brutus and Cassius, should prefer a miserable life to an honourable death; should bear vassalage, chains, and tortures of body or mind, when all those evils were to be avoided by doing only that, which, by the course of nature, every man must soon do. It is better not to be, than to be unhappy...

-Letter 56 from Cato's Letters, By Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard


 


-Jeffrey Luebcke

February 22, 2008

America, Beware...

     America is facing a danger much greater than the liberals or the conservative Christians, more ominous than postmodernism or her intellectuals, more insiduous even than Islamofascism.  This may seem odd coming from me, lover of Capitalism, material success, and secularism.  The danger is oppulence, or more specifically, how the average citizen handles such wealth.  The West has survived long enough under the burden of hideous philosophy and despicable politicians, a battle which is valiantly being fought by Objectivism.  But no movement today is correctly battling the wide acceptance by the average person of hedonism.  As I have displayed earlier in what I wrote concerning Aristotle and Hedonism, it is hedonism that has the ability to corrupt the very morality and sense of life of the average citizen in such a way that the pursuit of better values is seemingly impossible. 

     Wealth is a very funny thing; indeed, a double-edged sword.  For while it can provide a society with the greatest of benefits, ranging from the basic requirements of food, health, and shelter, to a greater enjoyment of life in nice clothes, nice food, a nice house, music, movies, cell phones, and computers, wealth also has the ability to destroy a society who does not know how to properly use and handle money.  Historically, one need only look at Classical Athens, a society who at one time gave the world some of its greatest philosopy, art, science, literature, which in a matter of only one hundred years lost herself in her own oppulence and wealth; a society who defeated the Persians at Marathon so spectacularly eventually was utterly defeated by the Macedonians due to the effete and oppulent nature of the Athenian population.  Rome, too, offers a historical anecdote, for the once mighty, masculine, and virtuous Rome who defeated Hannibal and conquered the entire known world eventually succumbed, in its own hedonism, to the barbaric and savage German tribes who at one time had been nothing but a mere annoyance.

     Even Ayn Rand noticed this distinction in wealth, and the virtue of proper wealth management, in her novel "Atlas Shrugged".  Notice the difference between characters like Dagny Taggart or Hank Rearden who properly managed their wealth, living almost Stoic lives, using wealth in a proper manner to afford them an enjoyable life.  Contrast this with characters like Jim Taggart, who improperly squandered his wealth on such hedonistic things as parties, alcohol, flagrant wealth, and sex.  Those who enjoyed their wealth properly lived very virtuous and moral lives, allowing money to add to their existence, while those who improperly used wealth lived highly immoral lives and ultimately were faced with a sad and miserable future.

     It is very difficult to see this distinction between proper and improper use of wealth.  Yet the problem with wealth lies not as much with the older generations, who had grown up with a proper moral structure which by the time of America's oppulence had had proper moral habits to combat this influence, but the youth who, though many had been properly raised, had not ingrained within themselves the moral habits strong enough to withstand the onslought of hedonism.  The nihilistic and destructive nature of hedonism means that these youths, so ingrained in their clubs, parties, drinking, and sexuality would be lucky to escape in time to turn out okay as they age, for many will sadly suffer the effete laziness and apathy that results from a hedonistic lifestyle.  Who needs war when we could have peace?  Where is the government to help us out of our crises? they shout from the comfort of their padded lifestyle.  The Iranians are not our enemy, they just think differently than us, but we are bad for judging them upon our standards-they cry as they sip their Starbuck's Mocha Frapuccinos, their iPods in their ears and their laptops at their side.

     The solution, then, must be a campaign by these people's friends and families, by your average Joe, who realizes the dangers of hedonism and oppulence, to stop the tide of our demise before we too will be faced with a Macedon or a Vandal whom we cannot control.

---Jason Roberts

February 20, 2008

Aristotle and Death Happiness

The primary focus of Book I of the Nichomachean Ethics lies in Aristotle’s attempt to define and flesh out the meaning and nature of happiness. In chapters x and xi, Aristotle asks an intriguing question: can the happiness of those not living be in any way affected? This small detour in the larger body of Aristotle’s ethics has received little scholarly attention[1], making it all the more intriguing. However, before a more critical examination and analysis of Aristotle’s question can occur, it is necessary to: define and flesh out the actual meaning of the terms ευδαιμονια and ψυχη, understand the broader cultural and philosophical understandings of death, the soul, and immortality in the Greek world, and investigate Aristotle’s own views of the soul and the body, before moving on to a closer examination of what Aristotle actually meant in EN I.x-xi so that thus, with the issue being properly examined in a contextual manner, an evaluation of Aristotle’s claim can be made.

 

I. Definitions

 

It is always necessary to begin by defining one’s terms; in the realm of translated philosophy even more so due to the bias of the translators and the differences in linguistic systems. One word that has plagued translators is ευδαιμονια, which has been roughly translated into English as “happy” or “the happy life”. Liddell and Scott define ευδαιμονια[2] as, “prosperity, happiness” which of course shows the difficulty of translating the word. However, they define ευδαιμων[3] as, “with a good genius or destiny, fortunate, prosperous”. This definition is more close to the actual definition of the Greek word, which is actually a composite of two words: ευ[4], which means “well, luckily, the right, the good” or ευς[5], the word from which ευ is the neuter, as “good, brave, noble”; and δαιμων[6], which means “fate, fortune, destiny; one’s fate or lot”. Thus, when combined together, the word properly means something akin to “the right destiny or a good fortune.” An obvious distinction, then, between the Greek word and the English word is the difference between a long-term state of being in a good condition (ευδαιμων) and a fleeting emotion or a long-term state of an emotion (happy)[7].

The other word that presents some difficulty when being translated into English is “ψυχη”, which is traditionally translated as “soul”. However, this translation once again carries with it the philosophical baggage of the English language, so influenced by Christianity and Descartes that “soul” is identified as a separate and distinct object from the body. Contrary to this view, the Greek word (and the original, non mystery cult/Platonic meaning of the word)[8] meant, “breath, life, spirit; the seat of will, desires, passions.”[9] Notice the corporeality of the soul inherent within this definition; the soul was no more separate from the body than the eye is separate from sight; for the soul was a function of the body in a similar manner as sight is a function of the eye. Through a complex philosophical devolution[10], the word arrived at its more modern meaning.

These two words are crucial to a more precise understanding of Aristotle and his views of death. Ευδαιμονια is the end or purpose of life. The entire EN can be said to be a work on how to arrive at ευδαιμονια and thus is the central theme of the work. Ψυχη, on the other hand, does not play a central role in the EN. However, in order to understand why Aristotle would even ask the question of ευδαιμονια after death, it is essential to understand Aristotle’s view of the ψυχη and whether or not the ψυχη “carries” ευδαιμονια with it after death.

 

II. The Greeks, the Ψυχη, Death, and Immortality

 

Edith Hamilton fittingly said of the Greeks that:

“With the coming forward of Greece, mankind became the center of the universe, the most important thing in it. This was a revolution of thought…in Greece alone in the ancient world people were preoccupied with the visible; they were finding the satisfaction of their desires in what  was actually in the world around them…anyone who reads them with attention discovers that even the most nonsensical take place in a world which is essentially rational and matter of fact.”[11]

It is of the utmost importance to understand that the Greeks, unlike almost every other culture in the world, had no conception of a mind-body dichotomy. The mind to the Greek world was corporeal; the ψυχη[12] was inseparable from the body. Our earliest source, Homer, although steeped in the early mythology and mysticism of Archaic Greece, nevertheless did not conceive of a soul separate from the body. The visitation of Akilleus by the dead Patroklos did not involve a disembodied spirit traveling from the underworld to the realm of man, but rather the visitation of a shade or image, devoid of reason and emotion and desire (ψυχη). This shade could speak, but he was not a liberated substance out of the prison of the body.[13] This traditional religious view of the unity of mind and body after death was highly prevalent throughout Archaic and early-Classical Greece; indeed, it was not until the arrival of the mystery cults from Thrace, such as the cults of Dionysios and Orpheos, and their codification by philosophers such as Pythagoras[14] and Plato, that the mind-body dichotomy came into existence in the Greek common conscious. Yet even with the arrival of these cults, it took a few centuries before the orgiastic debauchery of the mind-body dichotomy cults became a powerful driving force[15].

Pythagoras, to an extent, brought the concept of the mind-body dichotomy out of the pedestrian mystery cults and into the intellectual realm via his idea of the reoccurrence of the soul. Plato, however, did much more to flesh out and promote this savage mysticism. Not only did Plato borrow the ideas of the transmigration of the soul and reincarnation from the mystery cults, but he also expanded upon the mind-body dichotomy in his realm of Forms. For indeed, the Forms, unlike the earlier Greek conception of the gods who existed in strict contrast to man[16], instilled the notion of an immortal soul that eventually came to be a powerful force in the Greek intellectual scene. The Forms viciously stripped the soul out of its corporeal prison and elevated it into the realm of the divine. This meant that the ψυχη, the seat of emotions, desires, and the will, was able, alongside the mind with its reason, to continue its existence after the corporeal prison died. Thus it was very proper, especially in the later Platonic tradition, the neo-Pythagorean tradition, and the mystery cults, to think of the soul after death as retaining anthropic characteristics. Though the details were debated (Could the ψυχη, in the face of such perfection, actually become sad? Did it actually join the Forms, or God, or did it exist in another realm?), nevertheless it was true that one could state that soul A, having lived a good life, was ευδαιμων after death.

Save Pythagoras and Plato, the majority of Greek philosophy before the Hellenistic age built upon the framework set up by Homer. Metaphysically, Aristotle belonged to a line of philosophers with the likes of Democritus who espoused a non-supernatural, materialistic view of the world, the gods, and the afterlife. Sextus Empiricus remarks that Democritus, “…says that men in the distant past, remarking the events of the upper air-thunder and lightning, thunderbolts and conjunctions of stars, and eclipses of sun and moon-were frightened, thinking gods to be their cause.”[17] Thus Democritus explains the supernatural as a pre-rational attempt to define the unknown. Aristotle seems to have built upon the theories of Democritus, in typical Aristotelian fashion, and adopted a modified materialist view of the world[18]. The materialist, due to the fact that they believed the ψυχη to consist of the same basic elements as the body, did not conceive of a corporeal prison holding a transcendent and immortal ψυχη. When the body ceased to exist, so too did the ψυχη; when the heart stopped pumping blood, so too did the ψυχη stop desiring. Death meant the death of body and ψυχη. By the time of Aristotle, the supernaturalism of Homer had been cast off, leaving only one possibility for immortality: τιμη[19]. If by the end of one’s lifetime an individual had attained the status of ευδαιμονια, then they had in effect “won” the contest of life and received the proper accolades of τιμη or honor. Their immortality was the immortality of fame throughout time; to this day, people still read and praise Homer, movies are made in celebration of the Spartan 300, and Socrates is still admired as the paragon of intellectual activity. The materialist would say that they had acquired so much τιμη in their own lifetime through their achievements that it propelled their shade or image into the distant future.[20] Yet even those individuals who had not done something heroic nevertheless experienced immortality with their friends and family. The concept is akin to a star that, though having been dead for thousands of years, still shines on to us today.

Thankfully, Aristotle lived at the exact end of Classical Greece and thus was not alive to witness the collapse of Greek culture into a culture of revelry, debauchery, and mysticism. Thus there is no need to examine subsequent views; it is only relevant to note that Aristotle came from a vastly different school of thought than Plato. Aristotle, the materialists, and the majority of pre-Hellenic Greek culture, on the one hand, did not believe in an actual “life after death”; Plato and the mystery cults, on the other hand, did.

 

III. Aristotle on Ευδαιμονια, Ψυχη, and Death Happiness

 

In the EN, Aristotle lays out an entire account of how an individual might obtain ευδαιμονια. For indeed, he states that ευδαιμονια ought to be the ultimate aim or goal of life towards which all actions and contemplations are directed. Aristotle states, “Ευδαιμονια, then, is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed.”[21] But does he mean “happiness”, as we understand it? Or, is Aristotle talking about something entirely different? Focusing on the definition of ευδαιμονια as the right destiny or good fortune, one can clearly see that Aristotle was aiming for an entity or goal far more broad than just an emotional state of being. The man who had obtained ευδαιμονια not only lived a virtuous life, but also had good friends, a good family, was materially prosperous, and followed the Delphic maxim of γνωθι σεαυτον, or contemplation. In a famous passage of the EN, I.ix, Aristotle states that the mythical Priam was very virtuous, but after the fall of Troy, he could not be considered to have ευδαιμονια due to the loss of his friends, his family, his nation, and his prosperity. Similarly, the Greeks viewed with disdain the opulent Persians (save Cyrus the younger) because, though they had prosperity and most likely good friends and family, they lacked the Greek idea of virtue.

Due to Aristotle being a materialist and thus not believing in a mind-body dichotomy, it is clear that even those attributes of the mind and ψυχη, such as virtue and contemplation, were viewed just as corporeally as prosperity, friends, and family. Nowhere in the entire Aristotelian corpus does Aristotle speak of an “inner eye”, of “divine knowledge”, of a “higher state of ecstasy” achieved through ritualistic dance, of wisdom as a Form, of virtues existing in the realm of the gods which reason attained, or of ευδαιμονια existing outside of the realm of the real. Ευδαιμονια, then, was a worldly state of being, attained via a worldly pursuit of the right objects, and existing within each individual to the extent to which this person had attained the necessary attributes. Moreover, Aristotle states, “One swallow does not make a summer; neither does one day. Similarly neither can one day, or a brief space of time, make a man blessed and happy.”[22] Ευδαιμονια, then, is not the golden ticket found randomly or by luck inside a Wonka Bar, nor is it the planned and calculated winning of a marathon. Ευδαιμονια is the sum of all of its parts over a long period of time.

Aristotle himself discusses the link between the ψυχη and ευδαιμονια when he states, at EN I.xiii, “...ευδαιμονια is an activity of the ψυχη in accordance with perfect virtue.” The chapter then continues with a brief overview of the ψυχη as having two parts: the rational and the irrational. Aristotle states that the irrational part of the ψυχη consists of the vegetative part, which he says is the cause for nutrition and growth, and the desiring part (Plato calls this the appetitive), which he explains as the element that drives us either to good or to bad things and is thus “semi”-receptive to reason. The rational part of the ψυχη, on the other hand, consists of our ability to reason. The proper or healthy ψυχη comes about when a person uses his reason to guide the irrational part of the ψυχη. Unfortunately, the account of the ψυχη is very brief in the EN; Aristotle continues his discussion of continence and incontinence later on in Book VII, but this account focuses more on the application of or relationship of the desiring element with reason or virtue.

Ever the scientist and philosopher, Aristotle expanded upon his view of the ψυχη, writing an entire work devoted to the subject entitled De Anima (Latin for: “Concerning the ψυχη”). From the beginning, Aristotle states that, “We must…repeat that the affections of ψυχη are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life.”[23] It is clear from this materialist view that Aristotle does not conceive of the ψυχη as an independent, incorporeal, “immortal” entity separate and distinct from the body. Rather, though it is distinct, it is built from the same basic elements. Aristotle even takes a jab at Pythagoras when he states, “…as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any ψυχη could be clothed upon with any body-an absurd view.”[24] Though it is clear that Aristotle believes the ψυχη to be distinct from the body (as the eyes, as an entity, are distinct from the action of seeing; the eye is the cause or origin behind the act of seeing), it is incorrect to take this distinction and automatically assign to Aristotle the belief that the ψυχη is separate from the body (as a passenger on a cruise ship is separate from the vessel itself, merely along for the ride). This distinction is because Aristotle believes the ψυχη to be the originator of movement or motion within the body. The emotion of anger “makes” the blood boil, which thus moves the body to act in an angry manner (or to acknowledge the anger “boiling” inside of himself but to act contrary to his ψυχη). Aristotle continues his attack on the mind-body dichotomy when he states:

“...in the ‘Orphic’ poems…it is said that the ψυχη comes in from the whole when breathing  takes place, being borne upon the winds. Now this cannot take place in the case of plants, nor  indeed in the case of certain classes of animals, for not all classes of animals breathe. This fact  has escaped the notice of the holders of this view.”[25]

Here Aristotle shows himself as the scientist, stating that all living things have some version of a ψυχη because all living things are “moved” to act in certain ways[26]. Man thus cannot be unique in having a supernatural “ψυχη”, as is suggested by the mystery cults, because all living things have a ψυχη. Aristotle concludes his investigation into the definition of the ψυχη by stating, “From this it indubitably follows that the ψυχη is inseparable from its body…for the actuality of some of them [parts of the soul] is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts.”[27]

What, then, does this say about the relationship between ευδαιμονια and the ψυχη? Ευδαιμονια, as an activity of the ψυχη, seemingly cannot exist with the death of the actuality of the ψυχη. For indeed the death of the body means the cessation of movement and generation, which in turn means the cessation of the ψυχη. This is the reason why EN I.x-xi is so perplexing, for Aristotle says, “So it appears that the dead are affected to some extent by the good fortunes of those whom they love, and similarly by their misfortunes.”[28] Though it is true that Aristotle states that these events, as not being the primary attributes of ευδαιμονια, do not have the potential to make a ευδαιμων individual non ευδαιμων, as it is while they are living, it is still true that these actions can indeed have an affect upon the quality of the ευδαιμονια of the individual. Even though Aristotle does say that friends, family, and prosperity are key attributes of ευδαιμονια, how could these things have any impact upon a ψυχη that is not in existence to experience them?

 

IV. The Answer and Analysis

 

The answer to this dilemma can be found almost 400 years before Aristotle lived in the epics of Homer. As was stated earlier, to the materialist, immortality or life after death was characterized by τιμη. The τιμη that Akilleus had accrued was so great that he lived on in the minds of individuals for millennia. For Aristotle, the τιμη[29] of any individual lived on in relation to the magnitude of his impact. This is why Aristotle states, when speaking to the majority of humans as opposed to heroes exclusively, in EN I.x-xi that the ευδαιμονια of the dead could in fact be affected by the fortunes, or the vicissitudes of fate, of his friends and family. Let us create a hypothetical situation. George Washington had a son, John Washington, who also strove to be in politics. George Washington, renowned in his own time, lived a very virtuous and prosperous life. When he died, it could be properly said that he had ευδαιμονια. After his death, his son John led a revolution in favor of the British. This revolution was so bloody and caused such widespread destruction that the struggling United States was forced to give all of the southern states to Britain and the remaining northern states were forced to become vassal states of Britain until eventually, 200 years later, they were freed as their own country. In this hypothetical situation, though George Washington himself had lived a life of ευδαιμονια, the impact of John Washington cast a very dark image upon the name “Washington”, so that George Washington today was nearly forgotten. Though these actions, as bad as they were, did not “make” George Washington non ευδαιμονια, they nevertheless affected his “blessedness” or the maximization of his ευδαιμων.

Let us take another hypothetical situation on a much smaller scale. Sarah is a loving mother of two who works in an office. She has lived a very virtuous life, has a wonderful family, endearing friends, and has made enough money to live comfortably. Upon her death, her friends reveal that they were only friends with her because it made them “look good” being seen around such a nice and good person. Her children used their inheritance to start a drug business that is eventually discovered by the police, who arrest them. Though Sarah had all of the requirements for a life of ευδαιμονια, the horrendous actions that occurred after her death stripped away her friends, her family, and her prosperity, leaving her only with her virtue. Thus it can be said that the ευδαιμονια of Sarah was lowered by these action.

The affect upon the ευδαιμονια of the dead does not always have to be negative; it can indeed be a positive thing. Let us say that when Sarah died, her friends cherished her memory so much that they established a “Sarah” club to spread her optimism and virtue. Similarly, her sons took the inheritance money and started a company, named in her honor, which rapidly became a Fortune 500 company. In this situation it could be said that the ευδαιμονια of Sarah was increased due to the great fortunes of her loved ones after death.

To Aristotle, the vicissitudes of fortune play an important role in the ευδαιμονια of an individual. Even though they themselves have died, fate has the ability to affect those components of the ευδαιμονια of the dead person, for not all of the friends and family of the deceased have died, and thus the degree of ευδαιμονια of the dead individual is semi-dependent upon those still living. Aristotle says, “So it appears that the dead are affected to some extent by the good fortunes of those whom they love, and similarly by their misfortunes.”[30] It is apparent from this to assume that, the degree to which time passes and the loved ones of the individual die, is the degree to which the affects of fortune diminish their impact upon the ευδαιμονια of the individual. By fully understanding the context within which Aristotle wrote and viewing death ευδαιμονια through such a lens, the perplexities of I.x-xi can be sorted out and understood.

Yet now comes the ultimate question: is Aristotle correct in his assertion that the ευδαιμονια of a dead person can be affected? Once again, we must start at the beginning: what is the nature of the ψυχη and is there a mind-body dichotomy? If we use the Aristotelian definition of the ψυχη as the seat of human desires, passions, the will, and reason, and discard the notion of the ψυχη as the originator of movement in favor of a more scientific understanding of the nature of movement, it can be concluded that the ψυχη of an individual is similar to what we in the modern world call the mind. Leonard Peikoff states:

  “The theory of a mind-body conflict, which has corrupted every branch and issue of philosophy,  does have its root in a real conflict, but of a special kind. Its root is a breach between some men’s consciousness and existence. In this sense, the basis of the theory is not reality, but a human error:  the error of turning away from reality, of refusing to accept the absolutism of the metaphysically  given.”[31]

It is interesting to note that the origins of the mind-body split in Greece came from the mystery cults. They derived this conclusion because of their special religious practices: the women in the cult would gather around in a circle, drinking highly intoxicating alcohol, smoking hallucinatory seeds, dancing to the point of exhaustion, and wailing, screeching, and ululating. The men would sit outside the circle, also drinking the highly potent alcohol and smoking the hallucinatory seeds, banging on drums. In the middle of the circle was a sacrificial victim, and the women, after reaching the point of exhaustion, would rush forward and tear the animal apart, taking the limbs and eating them raw, smearing the blood all over their naked body. The “mania” or ecstasy achieved by such an act convinced the cultist that they were communing with the “divine”, and thus lead them to believe that their souls were the only thing “heightened” enough to commune with the divine. From this belief, it was concluded that the soul was in fact distinct from the body, and only a special ritual could allow the soul to be “free” for a fleeting moment from its bodily prison.[32] The philosophers, such as Plato, picked up these beliefs and discarded the actions in favor of another ritual, “reason”, by which the soul could transcend the mortal realm and communicate with the divine. Inherent in these ideas is a rejection of the actual facts of existence in favor of the primacy of consciousness, attained by a special ritual, which itself could reject the metaphysically given in favor of the metaphysically unknown. Reality itself actually exists, independent of our ψυχη, which itself is just the means by which we understand, interpret, or comprehend that which is in front of us. It is self-evident then that the ψυχη is but merely a tool, an attribute of the body and thus inseparable from it.

Aristotle also appears to be correct in his definition of ευδαιμονια. The “good life” of an individual cannot just contain his virtue. Using the example of Aristotle, Priam lived a highly virtuous life. Before the Trojan War he was described as having ευδαιμονια. But after the war, though he retained his virtue, the loss of everything else led him to become miserable. This is because a “good life” is not a fleeting emotion (for it is assumed that even Hitler had happy moments), or state of an emotion (it is probable that a mafia lord could have a state of happiness), but is the combination of living life well (self-esteem generated through the efficacy of an individual actualizing and maintaining his virtues), having good friends and a good family (for no man is an island, and regardless of his virtue can no man have a good life alone), and being prosperous (always having to struggle to pay bills, eating ramen noodles, and watching your children go hungry is not as good as living a comfortable life). Having ευδαιμονια then must include a variety of things: virtue, good friends and family, and comfortable living via general prosperity.

What then of the individual who has ευδαιμονια but has died? If ευδαιμονια is dependent upon things outside of one’s own body, such as friends, family, and prosperity, then ευδαιμονια is dependent upon things outside of an individual’s direct control. As there is no ψυχη which, upon death, floats up to heaven to join the divine, it must be concluded that the death of an individual also entails the death of the virtue of said individual. The external entities, however, remain after his death. Thus, as in the examples given above, were tragedy or fortune to befall these external entities after the death of an individual, it is indeed reasonable to conclude that the overall state of the ευδαιμονια of that individual would suffer. Aristotle, once again, seems correct in his analysis of death ευδαιμονια. Thus this author whole-heatedly agrees with the evaluation of Aristotle.

With this assumption, it becomes necessary for any individual striving to achieve a state of ευδαιμονια to mind not only his own virtues, but to carefully choose his friends, work well to strengthen the bond and improve his family, and insure some means of prosperity after death. In this world where death is the end, it is a proper desire for every individual to strive to have some sort of immortality. This immortality, of course, can be achieved through accomplishing extraordinary deeds. But more importantly, to achieve a state of ευδαιμονια, we must endeavor while we are alive to strengthen the bonds with wonderful people, be they our friends or family, and to protect our prosperity so that not even death can take such wonderful things away from us.

 

Bibliography

 

Aristotle. J.A.K. Thomson, translator. “Nicomachean Ethics.” London: Penguin Classics. 1953.

 

Aristotle. McKeon, Richard, ed. “On Democritus.” Fr. 208.; “Metaphysics.” 985b4-20.; “On Generation and Corruption.” 316a13-b16.; “On the Soul.” New York: Random House. 1941.

 

Gooch, Paul W. “Aristotle and the Happy Dead.” Classical Philology. Vol 78, No.2. April, 1983. 112-116.

 

Hamilton, Edith. Mythology. New York: Warner Books. 1942. 16-17.

 

Herodotus. Aubrey de Selincourt, translator. “The Histories.” Penguin: New York. 1954.

 

Liddell and Scott. Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891.

 

Livy. Gary Forsythe, ed. “History of Rome: XXXIX.” Bryn Mawr: Bryn Mawr. 1994.

 

Peikoff, Leonard. “Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand.” New York: Meridian. 1991.

 

Pritzl, Kurt. “Aristotle and Happiness after Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11.” Classical Philology, Vol. 78, No. 2. April, 1983. 101-111.

 

Rhode, Erwin. “Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks.” London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., Ltd. 1925.

 

Roberts, John ed. The Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005.

 


[1] See Kurt Pritzl. “Aristotle and Happiness after Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11.” Classical Philology, Vol. 78, No. 2. April, 1983. 101-111. and also Paul W. Gooch. “Aristotle and the Happy Dead.” Classical Philology. Vol 78, No.2. April, 1983. 112-116

[2]ευδαιμονια.” Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891. 280.

[3] Ibid., “ευδαιμων.”

[4] Ibid., “ευ.” at 278.

[5] Ibid., “ευς.” at 288.

[6] Ibid., “δαιμων.” at 148.

[7] While it is true that the English definition of happy can have a similar meaning to ευδαιμονια, it is a mistake to take the philosophical baggage of “happy” and try and equate it with the philosophical baggage of “ευδαιμων”. Thus it must always be kept in mind that ευδαιμων encompasses a far greater range of things than just a “happy” life, as Aristotle discusses in Book I of the EN.

[8] This point will be examined in greater detail in a succeeding section.

[9] Ibid., “ψυχη.” at 798.

[10] For more on this complex devolution, see the wonderful and insightful work by Erwin Rhode, “Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks.” London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., Ltd. 1925.

[11] Edith Hamilton, Mythology. New York: Warner Books. 1942. 16-17.

[12] Mind and soul, in ways synonymous in the modern world, will henceforth be used interchangeably in order to allow a more thorough understanding of the Greek view.

[13] For more on the Homeric conception of the afterlife, see Rohde, “Psyche”.

[14] There is wide scholarly debate concerning the influences upon Pythagoras. Nevertheless, a general direction or idea may be taken from Herodotus when he says, in his Histories IV.95, that, “…Salmoxis…was a man, and lived in Samos, where he was a slave in the household of Pythagoras…he subsequently gained his freedom…and returned to his native country of Thrace…and endeavoured to teach them that neither he nor they…would ever die, but would go to a place where they would live in perpetual enjoyment of every blessing.”, to which Rohde adds, in “Psyche” 279 n.68, “…that such a belief in the “return” of the dead was actually held by the Thracians is clear enough…the story…seemed suspicious even to Herodotus, but it is not pure invention…it is rather a euhemerist version off a miraculous legend…the Thracian belief must also have included the idea of a periodical appearance of the god in the upper world.” Rohde thus concludes that Pythagoras gained his view in the reoccurrence of the soul from the Thracian mystery cult of Salmoxis. An eternally reoccurring soul which comes back to the realm of the living to “inhabit” a corporeal vessel is a clear indication off a mind-body dichotomy promulgated by one of Greece’s first and most influential philosophers.

[15] For an interesting point of view from an outsider, see the reactions of the Romans and the decrees of the Roman Senate upon the arrival of the cult of Dionysos to Rome in Livy XXXIX.

[16] A binarism exists here: gods, immortal; man, mortal.

[17] Sextus Empiricus. “Against the Mathematicians.” IX.24.

[18] See Aristotle. “On Democritus.” Fr. 208.; “Metaphysics.” 985b4-20.; “On Generation and Corruption.” 316a13-b16.; “On the Soul.” 403b28-404a4.

[19] See “Philotimia.” The Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World. John Roberts, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005.

[20] It is important to note here that τιμη did not apply to those who had “lost” the race, or who had done bad things. It could not be said that Caesar or Hitler, through the ευδαιμονια of their life, had achieved τιμη and thus were immortal. Their “immortality” would have been viewed in a negative way.

[21] Aristotle. J.A.K. Thomson, translator. “Nicomachean Ethics.” London: Penguin Classics. 1953. 1097b21.

[22] Ibid. 1098a17-18.

[23] Aristotle. J.A. Smith, translator. “De Anima.” New York: Random House. 1941. 403b18-19. As a biologist, Aristotle believed that mankind was part of the animal kingdom.

[24] Ibid. 407b23.

[25] Ibid. 410b27-411a1.

[26] Aristotle describes the movement of stationary living organisms, such as plants, by classifying growth as movement. A tree, which began as a seed, then grew into a brittle sapling, before finally growing to a mighty tree has “moved” from a seed to a tree.

[27] Ibid. 413a4-5.

[28] “Nicomachean Ethics.” 1101b7-8.

[29] Remember that τιμη was possible only for the good. The evil “lived” on in a different sense.

[30] Ibid. 1101b7

[31] Leonard Peikoff. “Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand.” New York: Meridian. 1991.

[32] A discussion of the process of transformation and the origins of the mind-body dichotomy in Greece can be found in Rohde, 253-281.

---Jason Roberts

February 19, 2008

Say "NO" to Nationalized Medicine

Dr. Gary Forsythe, professor of Ancient History at Texas Tech University, wrote this to be published here. What an honor!

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In recent times one of the biggest issues cooked up by members of
the professional political class is the need to establish a
national health program to cover all U.S. citizens. In doing so
the U.S.A. would join other advanced Western countries such as
Canada and the United Kingdom. Although health care is not
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution, these
politicians argue that it should be regarded as a basic right.
They keep telling us that there are forty or more million people in
the U.S.A. who are living without any form of health insurance, and
that this situation is intolerable.

First of all, it could be equally argued that since no human being
can survive without water, why don't the politicians raise our
taxes to create a federal bureaucracy that redistributes the tax
money in order to make sure that every single U.S. citizen's monthly
water bill has been paid? Secondly, when stressing the horror of
having so many people uninsured, the politicians fail to mention
that a significant portion of the people being included in this
number are illegal aliens. Thus, if the number of illegal aliens
were to be subtracted out of the uninsured, the figure would be
substantially reduced. Another large component of the uninsured
are people under the age of 35 or so, who are very healthy and have
decided that they do not wish to fork out a chunk of their monthly
income for health coverage. Why should they when our permissive
society forces others to pick up their medical tab? This group of
the young uninsured by choice are much more interested in using
that money for making their monthly payment for their nice car,
having a cellphone with all the up-to-date bells and whistles, as
well as having satellite dish TV and buying DVD's of the most
current movies. In the current climate of our permissive culture,
in which few are ever forced to own up to their actions and
decisions, if a young uninsured citizen is in need of health
services, many automatically cry out that it must be given to them,
and the hospital and other patients will simply have to pay the
bill, because after all that is simply the kind hearted thing to
do, even if in the end a policy may result in the hospital having
to close its doors because it has gone bankrupt. Indeed, this is
what has happened to a number of hospitals in southern California
that have been inundated by illegal aliens who are required by law
to be treated.

What would happen if it were an established fact in our society
that if someone shows up at a hospital in need of care and has no
insurance coverage, services will be denied? Would most people not
organize their lives so as to make sure that they had at least some
form of health coverage? Politicians are constantly forcing us to
modify our lives and spending habits by taxing certain activities
and giving tax breaks for others. If the expectation just outlined
were to be part of our culture, young people might have to do
without their cherished celphone and all its costly features, or go
without having satellite dish TV, or not be able to keep adding to
their DVD collection of movies, but why should hospitals and their
other patients be forced to pay other people's bills when many of
them could afford health care if only they reconfigured their
lives?

If there still remained a considerable number of uninsured people
after we eliminate the illegal aliens and the self-indulgent young
from the equation, many things could be done far short of national
health care for everyone in order to make sure that these people
had affordable health care, and it would not require coming up with
a solution that is analogous to killing an ant with an atomic bomb.
Doctors and hospital staff are already groaning under all the
mandates imposed upon them by the goverment. What we need is less
government intrution, not more, and far more sensible and
intelligent solutions to target specific groups and their needs
rather than creating yet another enormously vast and inefficient
federal bureaucracy to try to dole out hhealth care to everyone.

If you are perfectly happy with the poor quality of education
regularly churned out by the public school system in the U.S., for
which the federal government bears a large share of the blame, then
you will love what the federal government will do to everyone's
health care if it is nationalized. Within a decade or two services
will become so degraded that many people will look back upon the
previous period as a golden age, but by then it will be too late,
because as history clearly demonstrates, once a huge government
bureaucracy is established, it is virtually impossible to do
anything to it other than to make minor modifications and
superficial reforms. If health care were to become the
responsibility of a federal program, it would constitute one of the
largest power grabs in U.S. history, because overnight the federal
government would be seizing control of about one-seventh of the
entire U.S. economy. Do not believe anything a politician says
about how much their nationalized health care plan is going to
cost. When was the last time that you heard of a federal program
coming in under budget and staying there? It never happens.
Feeding us such lies is a slick way of convincing some people that
it really will not cost all that much. In addition, these same
politicians insist that the program will be paid by going after big
rich corporations, as if the latter do not employ large numbers of
ordinary people whose jobs may be put in jeopardy by federal
confiscatory tax policies implemented to soak the rich. These
statements are nothing more than demagogery calculated to persuade
the gullible to get behind the idea, but then when the program is
established, and it is too late to reverse course, politicians will
shed crocodile tears in telling us how much more expensive it has
now become; and although they really hate to do so, they are going
to have to increase our taxes significantly to pay for it all. A
nationalized health program will soon begin to consume an
absolutely gigantic portion of the U.S. budget and will make it
very difficult for us to afford other things. No matter what a
politician may promise, taxes will have to be increased
significantly in order to pay for it. It will also place a heavier
burden upon employers; and all these increased expenses will soon
begin to result in slow economic growth generally. The program
will act as a sever choke hold around the neck of the capitalistic
goose that has been laying for us the golden eggs responsible for
the greatest economic system in world history. It will condemn the
U.S. to a stagnant economy similar to the United Kingdom. Small
businesses have long been the most important area fostering
economic growth in the U.S., but imposing larger costs upon them
will make it much harder for these businesses to come into being;
and others already in existence may have to close, because they
cannot afford the increased expenses; and others will have to lay
people off in order to economize. There will be very many adverse
economic consequences of nationalized health care, and of course,
no politician selling the idea will ever mention them, but that
assumes that they are even sufficiently educated in matters of
economics to realize that there will be such consequences. All
that they will do is paint such a rosy picture of the grass being
greener on the other side that many people, like dumb beasts, will
want to jump over the fence and get into that pasture where the
grass is supposed to be greener and tastier.

Given what you know about how politicians manage our tax dollars,
how well do you think that their nationalized health program will
spend our hard earned money? We already have one good example from
the Clinton administration. Indeed, how many people even remember
this? It serves as an excellent illustration of how short most
people's memories are, and how that fact is constantly being
exploited by politicians, because they can come up with one idea,
impliment a program, and have it function poorly, but since most
people forget such things, the same politicians can come right back
at us with their newest idea and program that functions just as
badly as their other one with no accountability ever being exacted
from the programs' proposers. But to return to the main subject,
when Hillary Clinton, the self-appointed and self-anointed expert
in health care, decided that the federal government must take over
the responsibility of having all school-age children immunized
against common childhood diseases, the federal government
established what manufacturers of vaccines could charge, but since
it provided the producers with virtually no profit margin, all of
them decided "why bother?" They simply stopped producing the
vaccines, and the federal government had to go abroad to the U.K.
to buy up millions of vaccines. Then what happened? it turned out
that many of the vaccines were defective and could not be used.
What a classic clusterfuck produced by well intentioned politicians
with no knowledge of how things work in the real economic world!
After leaving his career in politics, George McGovern, a leading
liberal U.S. senator from South Dakota who went down to the worst
electoral defeat as president in 1972, decided to establish in his
retirement a small bed and breakfast tourist business in the
Northeast. When he was confronted with all the regulations
required of him by the government, he was heard to remark that if
he had known this as a senator, his voting record would have been
much different. In fact, a large proportion of politicians at the
federal level have been nothing more but politicians for their
entire adult lives and have had little, if any, real-world
experience in organizing and operating a business enterprise. The
case of the vaccines during the Clinton administration is all too
typical of politicians in their arrogance, thinking that by their
laws and policies they can control fundamental market forces of the
economy, as if they could pass a law forbidding gravity to operate
in nature, or prohibiting tornados from occurring. Free market
forces will continue to operate, no matter what politicians in
Washington D.C. do; and if the latters' policies are in obvious
defiance of such irrepressible forces, the result will be like a
freight train smashing into a car parked on the railroad tracks;
and all the good intentions of the politicians, based upon faulty
economic logic, will be utterly destroyed. In the former Soviet
Union, where all aspects of the economy were controlled by the
government, everyone in theory had a job, so that unlike the evil
capitalist countries, the Soviet Union never suffered from
unemployment, and every worker received a pay-check. It did not
matter that much of the work being done was of dubious economic
value, as was the pay-checks doled out, but it at least allowed the
government to boast to the outside world that everyone was employed
and received a pay-check. In this supposed workers' paradise the
common joke among the general population was that "we pretend to
work, and they pretend to pay us."

Consider the following facts concerning national health care in
Canada and the United Kingdom, which the politicians are always
holding before us as the example that we backward citizens of the
U.S. should be following. Recently a survey in the U.K discovered
that six percent of it citizens were using glue and pliers to
administer their own dental care, because they could not be
scheduled to see a dentist to tend to their teeth. The N. H.S.
(Britain's National Health Service) also released a formal
pronouncement saying that they were incapable of giving all
pregnant women services for delivering their children, so taht
those who were not in immediate danger should seek out the services
of private midwives. The same N.H.S. also recently reported that
they could not keep all the hospitals equipped with clean bed
sheets. How is that for maintaining a sanitary environment?
Besides these clear illustrations of the N.H.S. to supply
everyone's needs, there are constantly coming into the news stories
of persons having to wait months or even years to receive needed
operations. In fact, the situation has become so severe in the
U.K. that another recent survey has reported that its citizens are
leaving in record numbers to travel abroad to find doctors to
service their needs. A few years ago a report was in the news
concerning Canada's system, which some U.S. politicians regard as
vastly superior to that in our lower 48 states. According to this
report, although it is illegal for private medical clinics to exist
in Canada, they were coming into being on a regular basis to
provide services that the state sponsored program was failing to
deliver; and even though such activity was illegal, the government
was doing nothing to stop it, because it realized that the
government system clearly needed help by such privately owned and
operated clinics.

Perhaps the most horrific story that has surfaced in the news
lately concerning the N.H.S. in the U.K. is the following. A man
had an accident resulting in his foot being broken. When he sought
to have it tended to through the N.H.S., he was denied treatment.
Why? He was a smoker, and the N.H.S. insisted that he stop smoking
as a condition for him receiving medical care. He replied that he
had in fact tried to stop, but he simply could not manage to do it.
This is a perfect illustration of how a nationalized system can
intrude itself into people's lives in all sorts of unwelcome and
oppressive ways. We have already seen in recent years in this
country how a large team of trial lawyers successfully sued the
tobacco companies by arguing that they owed the U.S. public
billions and billions of dollars for health care costs. Juries and
judges bought their argument, and the trial lawyers and state
governments enjoyed gigantic windfalls of cash forced out of the
tobacco industry. How much of that money was then spent on health
care? Very little. The issue of increasing numbers of people
being overweight has been in the news for months and months. If a
national health plan were created, what would stop a small number
of its zealous administrators from deciding that they needed to use
their coercive power to give or deny health care in order to force
people to go on diets, to exercise several times a week, and to
give up ice cream, doughnuts, candy bars, potato chips, etc., etc.,
etc.?

If health care is akin to a civil right, why isn't having daily
food to consume? We already do have various programs to provide
the needy with the means of buying food, but so far at least, we do
not have a nationalized grocery plan for all citizens. Using the
analogy of a nationalized health plan, why doesn't the government
simply nationalize all grocery stores and allow everyone to go in
to take what they want? Obviously, this would result in many
grocery stores going bankrupt and out of business. In addition, it
would give the government the power to dictate what people should
or should not eat. one can easily imagine a time when government
employees stand guard at what used to be the check-out lines, where
they oversee what we are taking out of the store; and their job is
to tell us, "you can't have that half gallon of ice cream. You
already look too fat to me. Instead, take this bag of carrots."

This may sound too strange to be believable, but is it? The record
of human history is quite clear in showing that the one thing that
bureaucracies are best at is perpetuating themselves and making
sure that they continue to grow and exercise more and more power.
In addition, of course, they are always very inefficient
economically and become increasingly costly as they grow in size.
Recently in California some politicians have come up with the idea
of having all thermostats in homes and businesses controlled from
a central authority that decides how warm or how cold the place
should be, so that the government can regulate people's energy
consumption.

A nationalized health plan in the U.S. would be a truly gigantic
step down the road of socialism from which it would be very hard to
retreat. Someone has said that communism is simply socialism in a
hurry: that is to say, whatever or whoever (and it might be
millions of ordinary people) stands in the way of establishing
communism is simply run over and destroyed, because the end in such
cases is regarded as justifying the means. Conversely, socialism
could be called communism in increments, communism on the
installment plan, or communism in slow motion.

I truly fear the establishment of nationalized health care in this
cuntry that I love so dearly, because I see it as undermining the
basic economic health of our society that has produced the largest
and most affluent middle class in all of human history. I really
dread to see the day when this begins to be eroded. I truly hope
that if or when that begins to happen, I will be dead and cannot
witness it. I am convinced that contrary to what the politicians
maintain, nationalized health care will be one of the worst things
ever to befall this nation. It is simply their most recent brand
of snake oil medicine that they are hawking to justify their
continued existence as people needing to be kept in power to solve
all our horrible problems to fix things even when they are not
really broken.

Besides causing economic ruin, national health care will result in
just the opposite of what the uninformed members of the public are
being told that it will accomplish. Rather than delivering good
health care to all, it will degrade the quality of health care for
almost everyone, as has been abundantly shown by the workings of
the systems in the U.K. and Canada, which, of course, U.S.
politicians and their fellow travelers in TV journalism are careful
to hide from us.

Finally, another national health care program that receives the
highest praise from these same U.S. politicians and journalists is,
of course, that of communist Cuba under the rule of that dictator
Fidel, whom many on the lunatic left in the U.S. worship as an
icon. We are told how wonderful health care is in that supposed
island utopia, where it is hard to buy almost anything, including
tooth paste, toilet paper, and female sanitary napkins. If their
system is so wonderful as the U.S. left are constantly telling us,
why isn't Cuba being plagued by illegal aliens wanting to get in?
Why instead are there so many illegal aliens flooding into this
country? There is the old adage that imitation is the sincerest
form of flattery. I have heard this adapted to be "immigration is
the sincerest form of flattery." I do not want to see a time when,
like in the present-day U.K., numerous citizens are leaving their
country to travel abroad to seek much needed medical care. Our
current system may not be perfect, because no human institution
ever is; but the health delivery system in the U.S. is outstanding
and is certainly not broken. it does not need to be fixed by a
gang of damn politicians in Washington D.C., who are so full of
good intentions, but whose knowledge of basic economics and history
is profound. When was the last time that they created a large
government program that really fixed a serious problem and did it
well without creating other unforeseen problems that enabled the
same politicians to create additional costly government programs as
remedies for the messes that the initial program created?

You can be sure that if politicians ever do succeed in persuading
enough of the U.S. public to go along with nationalized health
care, one feature of the program will be that all federal employees
(or at least all elected officials) are exempt from it, and that
there will be allowance made for a special group of clinics
(lavishly funded by our tax dollars, of course) whose sole function
will be to provide the politicians with the highest quality of
health care, while everyone else must settle for what they can
obtain from the Frankenstein that they have created and imposed
upon us.

December 21, 2007

Good and Evil

I wrote this on the Forum For Ayn Rand Fans and liked it so much that I figured I would share it here:

Plato, via Socrates, believed that knowledge dictated action. So for him, what is most important is to know what something is, ie. to be able to have a (Socratic) definition of a virtue, and thus from having a definition, the proper action would follow. So, when an individual is able to properly define what Good is, Good will reside within him, making him unable to do anything else.

However, this gets much more intricate when you delve more deeply into Platonic Psychology. For having a knowledge of the Good is similar to being a mechanic, where the Good is an automobile as a whole. Thus it is impossible to have a knowledge of the Good without having a knowledge of all of the parts which constitute the Good. This is where Plato's concept of the Tripartite Soul comes into play (if you are interested, I wrote extensively on the Tripartite Soul previously in this blog). It is only when one has the virtue of Temperance (all parts of the soul acting properly and in harmony) that the Soul, combined with a knowledge of the Good, allows an individual to act accordingly.

Aristotle, and similarly Objectivism, rejects this because neither believe in a world of Forms and in the related epistemology. Aristotle said that for one to live the Good life, one must act accordingly by developing the proper habits conducive to a good life. Most importantly, this process is not a deductive process via the world of Forms, but is an inductive process from the world of reality. To observe reality, one must "Gnothi S'auton", or "Know Thyself". This means one must introspect and understand who you are as an individual, what it means to be a human, and how you should properly act in order to be true to a human's nature. Philosophy is only a guide-it cannot do this for you because, unlike Plato's false belief, knowledge does NOT dictate proper corresponding action...or even proper understanding. Proper knowledge comes from living and experiencing life, and as such, philosophy acts as a guide to interpret the world around you and to, from properly understanding the experiences you and (through history) others have gone through, properly project how you ought to act in the future. Repetition of this process leads to the development of proper habits, thus endowing within the individual a proper framework correlative to the good life.

This brings up the question, then, on what really is evil. The Greek word for evil is "hamartano", which originally meant "to miss the mark" (though later on, the Christians took this word and used it to mean sin). The Greeks and the Romans did not actually believe in a metaphysical evil-Satan, Demons, and a 'Fallen Nature' did not exist to them. To commit hamartano was simply to "slip up" on one's path to moral perfection. If a child who is learning how to ride a bike falls off the bike, you do not chide him for being evil! Rather, you understand that the child should get back on the bike, learn from the mistake, and will eventually become a master of bike riding. Similarly, an individual who attempts to become moral might slip up here and there, but these slip ups are not evil. Rather, they are just "missing the mark"-aiming at the bull’s-eye but landing two inches away. The verdict? Try again! Eventually the individual will reach such a state that to hit the bull’s-eye is natural, just as is riding a bike to many people.

There is another type of evil, though, and the Greeks and the Romans were well aware of this. This evil was to volitionally act contrary to one's nature. They called this barbarism and did not view such individuals as human (for really, they are not). Barbarians who lived within the borders of civilization were allowed to wallow in their own misery until they committed a crime, in which case they were imprisoned and, if the crime were serious enough, executed. Barbarians who lived outside the borders of civilization were also generally ignored unless they encroached upon the borders, in which case they were dealt with as one would deal with a nest of wasps. When the barbaric Iberians began attacking Roman allies in Spain, the Romans responded by conquering all of Spain, executing the leaders, and forcing peace upon the region by strict military rule. When the time came that these barbarians were willing to accept civilization and began to act accordingly, they were incorporated into the Roman state as citizens with rights protected by law.

Ultimately, the Classical world viewed morality in two parts: volition and habits. Those who made the choice to act in accordance with nature were civilized, and thus their journey towards the good life was reinforced by habits until they reached the point that the good life was seemingly natural. Those who made the choice to act contrary to nature were barbarians, and thus their journey to satiate their barbaric needs instilled habits within them that could only be met with proper correlative force.

In the Classical world, Plato was ignored. His view on how to live ethically was not taken seriously until around 250-300 A.D. ...almost 1000 years later! For most of the Classical world, it was the ethical system of Aristotle and the Stoics (such as Seneca, who had very similar views to Aristotle) that guided these men to act in such a way that, 2000 years later, we still live under their shadow.

December 10, 2007

Song of the Exposition

Here is an amazing (though long) poem by Walt Whitman.

1

AFTER all, not to create only, or found only,
 
But to bring, perhaps from afar, what is already founded,  
To give it our own identity, average, limitless, free;  
To fill the gross, the torpid bulk with vital religious fire;  
Not to repel or destroy, so much as accept, fuse, rehabilitate;          5
To obey, as well as command—to follow, more than to lead;  
These also are the lessons of our New World;  
—While how little the New, after all—how much the Old, Old World!  
 
Long, long, long, has the grass been growing,  
Long and long has the rain been falling,   10
Long has the globe been rolling round.  
 
2

Come, Muse, migrate from Greece and Ionia;
 
Cross out, please, those immensely overpaid accounts,  
That matter of Troy, and Achilles’ wrath, and Eneas’, Odysseus’ wanderings;  
Placard “Removed” and “To Let” on the rocks of your snowy Parnassus;   15
Repeat at Jerusalem—place the notice high on Jaffa’s gate, and on Mount Moriah;  
The same on the walls of your Gothic European Cathedrals, and German, French and Spanish Castles;  
For know a better, fresher, busier sphere—a wide, untried domain awaits, demands you.  
 
3

Responsive to our summons,
 
Or rather to her long-nurs’d inclination,   20
Join’d with an irresistible, natural gravitation,  
 
She comes! this famous Female—as was indeed to be expected;  
(For who, so-ever youthful, ’cute and handsome, would wish to stay in mansions such as those,  
When offer’d quarters with all the modern improvements,  
With all the fun that ’s going—and all the best society?)   25
 
She comes! I hear the rustling of her gown;  
I scent the odor of her breath’s delicious fragrance;  
I mark her step divine—her curious eyes a-turning, rolling,  
Upon this very scene.  
 
The Dame of Dames! can I believe, then,   30
Those ancient temples classic, and castles strong and feudalistic,  
could none of them restrain her?  
Nor shades of Virgil and Dante—nor myriad memories, poems, old associations, magnetize and hold on to her?  
But that she ’s left them all—and here?  
 
Yes, if you will allow me to say so,   35
I, my friends, if you do not, can plainly see Her,  
The same Undying Soul of Earth’s, activity’s, beauty’s, heroism’s Expression,  
Out from her evolutions hither come—submerged the strata of her former themes,  
Hidden and cover’d by to-day’s—foundation of to-day’s;  
Ended, deceas’d, through time, her voice by Castaly’s fountain;   40
Silent through time the broken-lipp’d Sphynx in Egypt—silent those century-baffling tombs;  
Closed for aye the epics of Asia’s, Europe’s helmeted warriors;  
Calliope’s call for ever closed—Clio, Melpomene, Thalia closed and dead;  
Seal’d the stately rhythmus of Una and Oriana—ended the quest of the Holy Graal;  
Jerusalem a handful of ashes blown by the wind—extinct;   45
The Crusaders’ streams of shadowy, midnight troops, sped with the sunrise;  
Amadis, Tancred, utterly gone—Charlemagne, Roland, Oliver gone,  
Palmerin, ogre, departed—vanish’d the turrets that Usk reflected,  
Arthur vanish’d with all his knights—Merlin and Lancelot and Galahad—all gone—dissolv’d utterly, like an exhalation;  
Pass’d! pass’d! for us, for ever pass’d! that once so mighty World—now void, inanimate, phantom World!   50
 
Embroider’d, dazzling World! with all its gorgeous legends, myths,  
Its kings and barons proud—its priests, and warlike lords, and courtly dames;  
Pass’d to its charnel vault—laid on the shelf—coffin’d, with Crown and Armor on,  
Blazon’d with Shakspeare’s purple page,  
And dirged by Tennyson’s sweet sad rhyme.   55
 
I say I see, my friends, if you do not, the Animus of all that World,  
Escaped, bequeath’d, vital, fugacious as ever, leaving those dead remains, and now this spot approaching, filling;  
—And I can hear what maybe you do not—a terrible aesthetical commotion,  
With howling, desperate gulp of “flower” and “bower,”  
With “Sonnet to Matilda’s Eyebrow” quite, quite frantic;   60
With gushing, sentimental reading circles turn’d to ice or stone;  
With many a squeak, (in metre choice,) from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, London;  
As she, the illustrious Emigré, (having, it is true, in her day, although the same, changed, journey’d considerable,)  
Making directly for this rendezvous—vigorously clearing a path for herself—striding through the confusion,  
By thud of machinery and shrill steam-whistle undismay’d,   65
Bluff’d not a bit by drain-pipe, gasometers, artificial fertilizers,  
Smiling and pleased, with palpable intent to stay,  
She ’s here, install’d amid the kitchen ware!  
 
4

But hold—don’t I forget my manners?
 
To introduce the Stranger (what else indeed have I come for?) to thee, Columbia:   70
In Liberty’s name, welcome, Immortal! clasp hands,  
And ever henceforth Sisters dear be both.  
 
Fear not, O Muse! truly new ways and days receive, surround you,  
(I candidly confess, a queer, queer race, of novel fashion,)  
And yet the same old human race—the same within, without,   75
Faces and hearts the same—feelings the same—yearnings the same,  
The same old love—beauty and use the same.  
 
5

We do not blame thee, Elder World—nor separate ourselves from thee:
 
(Would the Son separate himself from the Father?)  
Looking back on thee—seeing thee to thy duties, grandeurs, through past ages bending, building,   80
We build to ours to-day.  
 
Mightier than Egypt’s tombs,  
Fairer than Grecia’s, Roma’s temples,  
Prouder than Milan’s statued, spired Cathedral,  
More picturesque than Rhenish castle-keeps,   85
We plan, even now, to raise, beyond them all,  
Thy great Cathedral, sacred Industry—no tomb,  
A Keep for life for practical Invention.  
 
As in a waking vision,  
E’en while I chant, I see it rise—I scan and prophesy outside and in,   90
Its manifold ensemble.  
 
6

Around a Palace,
 
Loftier, fairer, ampler than any yet,  
Earth’s modern Wonder, History’s Seven outstripping,  
High rising tier on tier, with glass and iron façades.   95
 
Gladdening the sun and sky—enhued in cheerfulest hues,  
Bronze, lilac, robin’s-egg, marine and crimson,  
Over whose golden roof shall flaunt, beneath thy banner, Freedom,  
The banners of The States, the flags of every land,  
A brood of lofty, fair, but lesser Palaces shall cluster. 100
 
Somewhere within the walls of all,  
Shall all that forwards perfect human life be started,  
Tried, taught, advanced, visibly exhibited.  
 
Here shall you trace in flowing operation,  
In every state of practical, busy movement, 105
The rills of Civilization.  
 
Materials here, under your eye, shall change their shape, as if by magic;  
The cotton shall be pick’d almost in the very field,  
Shall be dried, clean’d, ginn’d, baled, spun into thread and cloth, before you:  
You shall see hands at work at all the old processes, and all the new ones; 110
You shall see the various grains, and how flour is made, and then bread baked by the bakers;  
You shall see the crude ores of California and Nevada passing on and on till they become bullion;  
You shall watch how the printer sets type, and learn what a composing stick is;  
You shall mark, in amazement, the Hoe press whirling its cylinders, shedding the printed leaves steady and fast:  
The photograph, model, watch, pin, nail, shall be created before you. 115
 
In large calm halls, a stately Museum shall teach you the infinite, solemn lessons of Minerals;  
In another, woods, plants, Vegetation shall be illustrated—in another Animals, animal life and development.  
 
One stately house shall be the Music House;  
Others for other Arts—Learning, the Sciences, shall all be here;  
None shall be slighted—none but shall here be honor’d, help’d, exampled. 120
 
7

This, this and these, America, shall be your Pyramids and Obelisks,
 
Your Alexandrian Pharos, gardens of Babylon,  
Your temple at Olympia.  
 
The male and female many laboring not,  
Shall ever here confront the laboring many, 125
With precious benefits to both—glory to all,  
To thee, America—and thee, Eternal Muse.  
 
And here shall ye inhabit, Powerful Matrons!  
In your vast state, vaster than all the old;  
Echoed through long, long centuries to come, 130
To sound of different, prouder songs, with stronger themes,  
Practical, peaceful life—the people’s life—the People themselves,  
Lifted, illumin’d, bathed in peace—elate, secure in peace.  
 
8

Away with themes of war! away with War itself!
 
Hence from my shuddering sight, to never more return, that show of blacken’d, mutilated corpses! 135
That hell unpent, and raid of blood—fit for wild tigers, or for lop-tongued wolves—not reasoning men!  
And in its stead speed Industry’s campaigns!  
With thy undaunted armies, Engineering!  
Thy pennants, Labor, loosen’d to the breeze!  
Thy bugles sounding loud and clear! 140
 
Away with old romance!  
Away with novels, plots, and plays of foreign courts!  
Away with love-verses, sugar’d in rhyme—the intrigues, amours of idlers,  
Fitted for only banquets of the night, where dancers to late music slide;  
The unhealthy pleasures, extravagant dissipations of the few, 145
With perfumes, heat and wine, beneath the dazzling chandeliers.  
 
9

To you, ye Reverent, sane Sisters,
 
To this resplendent day, the present scene,  
These eyes and ears that like some broad parterre bloom up around, before me,  
I raise a voice for far superber themes for poets and for Art, 150
To exalt the present and the real,  
To teach the average man the glory of his daily walk and trade,  
To sing, in songs, how exercise and chemical life are never to be baffled;  
Boldly to thee, America, to-day! and thee, Immortal Muse!  
To practical, manual work, for each and all—to plough, hoe, dig, 155
To plant and tend the tree, the berry, the vegetables, flowers,  
For every man to see to it that he really do something—for every woman too;  
To use the hammer, and the saw, (rip or cross-cut,)  
To cultivate a turn for carpentering, plastering, painting,  
To work as tailor, tailoress, nurse, hostler, porter, 160
To invent a little—something ingenious—to aid the washing, cooking, cleaning,  
And hold it no disgrace to take a hand at them themselves.  
 
I say I bring thee, Muse, to-day and here,  
All occupations, duties broad and close,  
Toil, healthy toil and sweat, endless, without cessation, 165
The old, old general burdens, interests, joys,  
The family, parentage, childhood, husband and wife,  
The house-comforts—the house itself, and all its belongings,  
Food and its preservations—chemistry applied to it;  
Whatever forms the average, strong, complete, sweet-blooded Man or Woman—the perfect, longeve Personality, 170
And helps its present life to health and happiness—and shapes its Soul,  
For the eternal Real Life to come.  
 
With latest materials, works,  
Steam-power, the great Express lines, gas, petroleum,  
These triumphs of our time, the Atlantic’s delicate cable, 175
The Pacific Railroad, the Suez canal, the Mont Cenis tunnel;  
Science advanced, in grandeur and reality, analyzing every thing,  
This world all spann’d with iron rails—with lines of steamships  
threading every sea,  
Our own Rondure, the current globe I bring. 180
 
10

And thou, high-towering One—America!
 
Thy swarm of offspring towering high—yet higher thee, above all towering,  
With Victory on thy left, and at thy right hand Law;  
Thou Union, holding all—fusing, absorbing, tolerating all,  
Thee, ever thee, I bring. 185
 
Thou—also thou, a world!  
With all thy wide geographies, manifold, different, distant,  
Rounding by thee in One—one common orbic language,  
One common indivisible destiny and Union.  
 
11

And by the spells which ye vouchsafe,
190
To those, your ministers in earnest,  
I here personify and call my themes,  
To make them pass before ye.  
 
Behold, America! (And thou, ineffable Guest and Sister!)  
For thee come trooping up thy waters and thy lands: 195
Behold! thy fields and farms, thy far-off woods and mountains,  
As in procession coming.  
 
Behold! the sea itself!  
And on its limitless, heaving breast, thy ships:  
See! where their white sails, bellying in the wind, speckle the green and blue! 200
See! thy steamers coming and going, steaming in or out of port!  
See! dusky and undulating, their long pennants of smoke!  
 
Behold, in Oregon, far in the north and west,  
Or in Maine, far in the north and east, thy cheerful axemen,  
Wielding all day their axes! 205
 
Behold, on the lakes, thy pilots at their wheels—thy oarsmen!  
Behold how the ash writhes under those muscular arms!  
 
There by the furnace, and there by the anvil,  
Behold thy sturdy blacksmiths, swinging their sledges;  
Overhand so steady—overhand they turn and fall, with joyous clank, 210
Like a tumult of laughter.  
 
Behold! (for still the procession moves,)  
Behold, Mother of All, thy countless sailors, boatmen, coasters!  
The myriads of thy young and old mechanics!  
Mark—mark the spirit of invention everywhere—thy rapid patents, 215
Thy continual workshops, foundries, risen or rising;  
See, from their chimneys, how the tall flame-fires stream!  
 
Mark, thy interminable farms, North, South,  
Thy wealthy Daughter-States, Eastern, and Western,  
The varied products of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Georgia, Texas, and the rest; 220
Thy limitless crops—grass, wheat, sugar, corn, rice, hemp, hops,  
Thy barns all fill’d—thy endless freight-trains, and thy bulging store-houses,  
The grapes that ripen on thy vines—the apples in thy orchards,  
Thy incalculable lumber, beef, pork, potatoes—thy coal—thy gold and silver,  
The inexhaustible iron in thy mines. 225
 
12

All thine, O sacred Union!
 
Ship, farm, shop, barns, factories, mines,  
City and State—North, South, item and aggregate,  
We dedicate, dread Mother, all to thee!  
 
Protectress absolute, thou! Bulwark of all! 230
For well we know that while thou givest each and all, (generous as God,)  
Without thee, neither all nor each, nor land, home,  
Ship, nor mine—nor any here, this day, secure,  
Nor aught, nor any day secure.  
 
13

And thou, thy Emblem, waving over all!
235
Delicate beauty! a word to thee, (it may be salutary;)  
Remember, thou hast not always been, as here to-day, so comfortably ensovereign’d;  
In other scenes than these have I observ’d thee, flag;  
Not quite so trim and whole, and freshly blooming, in folds of stainless silk;  
But I have seen thee, bunting, to tatters torn, upon thy splinter’d staff, 240
Or clutch’d to some young color-bearer’s breast, with desperate hands,  
Savagely struggled for, for life or death—fought over long,  
’Mid cannon’s thunder-crash, and many a curse, and groan and yell—and rifle-volleys cracking sharp,  
And moving masses, as wild demons surging—and lives as nothing risk’d,  
For thy mere remnant, grimed with dirt and smoke, and sopp’d in blood; 245
For sake of that, my beauty—and that thou might’st dally, as now, secure up there,  
Many a good man have I seen go under.  
 
14

Now here, and these, and hence, in peace all thine, O Flag!
 
And here, and hence, for thee, O universal Muse! and thou for them!  
And here and hence, O Union, all the work and workmen thine! 250
The poets, women, sailors, soldiers, farmers, miners, students thine!  
None separate from Thee—henceforth one only, we and Thou;  
(For the blood of the children—what is it only the blood Maternal?  
And lives and works—what are they all at last except the roads to Faith and Death?)  
 
While we rehearse our measureless wealth, it is for thee, dear Mother! 255
We own it all and several to-day indissoluble in Thee;  
—Think not our chant, our show, merely for products gross, or lucre—it is for Thee, the Soul, electric, spiritual!  
Our farms, inventions, crops, we own in Thee! Cities and States in Thee!  
Our freedom all in Thee! our very lives in Thee!

December 08, 2007

Aristotle and Hedonism

 In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle has two primary discussions of pleasure: the first at VII.xi-xiv and the second at X.i-v. The nature of the relationship between these two discussions and the subsequent debate amongst scholars serves no purpose here. Thus, what is required is a brief explanation of Aristotle’s views in both sections.

 Aristotle begins, in VII.xi, by examining three critical views of pleasure. Having just finished his discussion of continence and incontinence, Aristotle characteristically beings his discussion of a new topic by examining popular views and conceptions of that topic. The purpose of studying pleasure, he states, is because:

   “The study of pleasure and pain is the task of the political philosopher,     because he is the master  craftsman who decides the end which is the standard by which we call any given thing good or  bad without qualification. Besides, the examination of pleasure and pain is one of our necessary  tasks, because we have established that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pains and  pleasures; and the great majority of people maintain that happiness involves pleasure (whish is  why the word for ‘blessed’ is derived from a word meaning ‘to rejoice’).”[1]

After stating his purpose, Aristotle delves straight away into three common criticisms. The three arguments can be summarized as such: (1) Pleasure is not a good at all, (2) Not all pleasures are good, and (3) Pleasure is not the supreme good. In response to (1), Aristotle states that there are two types of good: absolute (objective) and relative (subjective). A good also can either be an activity (walking) or a state (contemplation). As such, some pleasures have an opposite pain or deficiency while other pleasures exist in a natural state containing no deficiency and as such are pleasurable in relation to the individual and the situation. Also, Aristotle makes the claim that pleasure is not a process[2] but an activity, and thus are an end in themselves. Aristotle prefers to call pleasures ‘an activity of our natural state’, and ‘unimpeded’. Aristotle continues to state that pleasure, when in its proper state, cannot hinder any other activity and thought because proper pleasure actually encourage proper activities and thoughts. Aristotle finally concludes his refutation of point (1) by stating that pleasure is not a product of any kind of art because an art never produces an activity. Thus, in relation to his other refutations, pleasure is not found in certain products in and of themselves but in relation to the individual and the product. As to argument (2), Aristotle answers this argument through a synthesis of his replies to (1) and (3). Thus he continues directly from his response to argument (1) to his response to argument (3) by stating that argument (2) does not necessarily disprove argument (3)-meaning that, if not all pleasures were bad, then there is no justification for why pleasure is not the Supreme Good. He then states that, if the unimpeded exercise of a faculty is a pleasure, then pleasure must be the supreme good because the good or virtuous man will exercise his proper faculties in an unimpeded manner. Thus, because happiness is perfect, the exercise of an unimpeded faculty is pleasurable, and an unimpeded activity is perfect, it is reasonable to assume then that pleasure following perfection is supremely good alongside happiness (though of course, Aristotle is careful to stress that this must indeed be the proper exercise of a faculty in order to achieve a proper pleasure). Aristotle then surveys nature, stating that because all animals and human beings desire pleasure and shun pain, pleasure must be the supreme good. This leads him to state that the reason pleasure is commonly understood only in relation to bodily pleasures is because this type of pleasure is the most common amongst all humans.  Aristotle finishes his criticism of the three arguments by stating that pleasure must be a good because the life of the happy man must be pleasant, and the happy life is good. If the happy man’s life were not pleasant, then pleasure would not be a good, and the happy life would not be what everyone seeks.

 After examining the different arguments against pleasure, Aristotle seeks to classify the different types or kinds of pleasure. Aristotle essentially portrays two major categories of pleasure: bodily and noble. He then begins to describe the nature of bodily actions, defending why they are not, as many other philosophers had said, bad or immoral in and of themselves. Using the principle of opposites, he states that because the opposite of pleasure is pain, and because pain is bad, it stands to reason that pleasure then is good. Moreover, the good and moral/virtuous man does not have to worry about bodily pleasures turning into licentious excess because his habits are good in such a way that correlationally his pursuit of bodily pleasures will be proper. He continues on to give two major points as two why bodily pleasures are so desirable. The first is that pleasures drive out pain; the more intense the pain, the more intense the pleasure. Thus bodily pleasures act, in once sense remedially to cure pain. Secondly, bodily pleasures being intense, people pursue these pleasures because of this intensity. If the pleasure is harmless, then Aristotle does not view this pursuit of intensity as a bad thing. However, if the pleasure entails some sort of harm, then Aristotle views this pursuit as bad. Thus Aristotle states that licentiousness and viciousness arrive when people do not have the moral fortitude to properly gain pleasure out of the proper things, instead substituting pleasure for other sources of enjoyment. Aristotle concludes his discussion of pleasure in VII.xiv by reiterating the point that pleasures which do not contain an accompanying pain do not contain or do not admit to excess.

 Aristotle picks back up his discussion of pleasure at X.i, after a lengthy discussion of friendship, by stating that:

 “After this our next task is presumably to discuss pleasure; for it is generally agreed that pleasure  is very closely bound up with human nature; which is why those who are educating the young  keep them straight by the use of pleasure and pain. It is also thought to be most important for the  forming of a virtuous character to like and dislike the right things; because pleasure and pain  permeate the whole of life, and have a powerful influence upon virtue and the happy life, since  people choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful. It would seem most improper, then, to  neglect such important factors, especially since they admit of a great deal of controversy.”[3]

Akin to VII.xi, Aristotle begins by analyzing different views of pleasure. The three main arguments that he analyses are: (1) Pleasure is the Supreme Good, (2) Pleasure is wholly bad, and (3) Some pleasures are bad. In argument (1), he directly addresses the view of the philosopher Eudoxus. Similar to what Aristotle himself previously stated, Eudoxus believed that pleasure is the Supreme Good because every animal, rational and irrational, is drawn to it and seeks it above other things, and thus it must be the Supreme Good. Because pleasure, in this view, is not sought after as a means to something else, but is sought after in and of itself, pleasure must then be the Supreme Good. To this first point Aristotle seems to be in agreement. However, his disagreement with Eudoxus comes later on when Eudoxus states that the addition of pleasure to any good thing makes that thing more desirable. Aristotle states that this views stands in contradiction to the first statement because, if pleasure added to a good makes the good more desirable, then pleasure couldn’t be the Supreme Good because the good which was enhanced by pleasure would be a higher good than pleasure. Aristotle then begins his examination of argument (2) by calling this argument “nonsense”. If every animal, both rational and irrational, sought pleasure, Aristotle states that this argument does not make sense because there is no reason why all animals would strive for the bad. He then goes into a lengthy discussion about pleasure and degree or processes, defending his view that pleasure is not a process but an activity (as explained above; he will also, soon, magnify this distinction). Finally, he examines the view that some pleasures are bad by stating that those “bad pleasures” are not even really pleasures at all because what is pleasant to a bad person, who is not natural, is not the same as what is pleasant to a good person, who is natural. He continues by reiterating his point that some pleasures are good in and of themselves, because they do not have a deficiency, while other pleasures contain a deficiency, and thus must be handled with caution. Aristotle then begins a lengthy discussion as to why he believes that pleasure is not a process (this has been described above). What is most important from this lengthy discussion is that pleasure is whole or complete. He then relates pleasure to activity by stating that, in effect, pleasure is the proper functioning of an activity. Pleasure, if you will, is the gasoline of a car: the gasoline (pleasure) allows the proper activity of the car (to drive) to occur. Different than a car, though, is the fact that pleasure does not start or is not the cause of an activity, but rather is the essence of an activity which maximizes the potential of that activity. To the question of why people do not constantly feel pleasure, Aristotle replies with the answer of fatigue.  Continued use of anything for a prolonged period of time fatigues that something due to the large volume of energy expended, and thus energy must be restored before that something is able to properly function again. Ultimately, Aristotle states that pleasure is essential to life because life itself is an activity, and an activity separated from a pleasure does not function properly at all-thus life devoid of pleasure is not a properly functioning life. Aristotle concludes his treatment of pleasure by pointing out the fact that, so as there are many different kinds of activities, so too are there many different kinds of pleasures. Thus the better pleasures are those that accompany the better activities. The result of this, then, is that the good man will live the most pleasant life because the activities of the good men are the best.

 Though Aristotle has a tendency to fall into complicated digressions, his main view (if it is possible to synthesize the two treatments of pleasure) is that pleasure and an activity are so closely related that they could be viewed as one and the same thing, even though in a certain way they are distinct, and because life requires activity, and the good life requires good activity, the good life will necessarily be pleasurable. A very important distinction must be made, though, between Aristotle’s view of pleasure as the Supreme Good and hedonism, for unlike Aristotle’s view, hedonism is a malady upon mankind which serves no purpose but the destruction of those who faithfully adhere to it.

 Completely antithetical to both Stoicism/Christian Asceticism and Aristotelian ethical theories concerning pleasure is Hedonism. Hedonism, by placing pleasure itself as the Supreme Good, acts as a cancer upon any ethical framework built up either by tradition, religion, parentage, or conscious philosophical adoption by invalidating the need for a framework at all. Akin to pure nihilism, hedonism has no need for ethical guidelines because the only guideline is the maximization of bodily pleasures (whereas in nihilism, the guideline isn’t anything at all). Thus the end, pleasure, is achieved by pursuing anything which brings about a temporary state of the end; sex, alcohol, drugs, and food themselves are the substitutes for virtues such as courage, temperance, magnanimity, or justice. This is due to the fact that, since virtues are the means by which humans mold and guide their lives so that they might achieve their end goal (the good and happy life), no form of molding is needed by the hedonist because the supreme end is almost immediately achievable. Epistemologically speaking, sensation and perception replace reason as primary epistemological tools, sensation and perception being directly correlative to taste and touch (what Aristotle views as inferior sense due to their reliance upon something else, or contact-sight, to Aristotle, requires nothing but the opening of the eyes to actualize the sense, whereas taste and touch require a foreign entity in order to actualize them). Reason and more intellectual pleasures are shunned in favor of bodily pleasures. In discussing temperance at III.xi-xii, Aristotle explains how the licentious man pursues bodily pleasures as opposed to intellectual pleasures because these bodily pleasures are readily available (especially amongst opulent societies) and plentiful. Thus the hedonist approaches and evaluates the world not based upon reason, but based upon animalistic or brutish scales of pleasure-maximization/pain-minimization[4]. Reason then is almost viewed as an enemy, it being the “agent of destruction” which, combined with the inner-voice of traditional morality (a person’s conscious), seeks to destroy hedonism by returning the individual to more normal levels.   

 Even proper states or conceptions of pleasure are destroyed by hedonism, being replaced by range-of-the-moment, whim-based pursuits. In effect, the intellectual is shunned in favor of the physical. To obtain pleasure via the hedonistic virtue of sex, notions of love or meaning (intellectual pursuits) are thrown out in favor of physical pursuits; the aim in the encounter being which partner (or partners) can maximize the amount of pleasure gained. Repetitive encounters with the same pleasure results in diminishing returns, thus making it necessary for the hedonist to seek even greater and more lavish instances of an encounter in order to reach the same level of pleasure as had been previously gained. Thus what once was one sexual partner a month turns into one sexual partner a week; even then, as the pleasure returns from this repetition become diminished, an even larger number of encounters are sought. Eventually, a point will be reached where norm itself is not sufficient (traditional sexual encounters), and thus a new or more obscure encounter is sought (sexual fetishes). This degeneration is not peculiar to sex; in the same way, the glutton increases their normal food intake to the point to where even normal food is insufficient, and thus for different or more rare types of food (eating McDonald’s everyday turns into eating McDonald’s everyday, plus a bag of cookies). Hedonism in this way even works to destroy itself because what once was required to obtain the appropriate level of pleasure is now insufficient to meet the ever-expanding demands of the hedonistic drive. A more proper definition of hedonism might thus be a degenerative motion towards ever-expanding physical pleasures achieved through the sacrifice of the mind to the body.

 The effects of hedonism, of course, are first shown physically as the body is the first area of attack by the cancer. Physical effects of hedonism commonly include such modern day pandemics as obesity and STD’s, though with prolonged continuation, more immediate and serious physical maladies such as liver failure occur[5]. However, as these bodily encounters transform from occasional binge encounters into ingrained habits, the cancer of hedonism begins to spread from the body to the soul or the mind. In regards to sex, the actual meaning of sex itself is destroyed. As a consequence, the sexual hedonist finds himself increasingly unable to have meaningful or long-lasting romantic relationships as he is unable to grasp the principles behind sex and love, instead being able to only view the relationships through the lens of sexual gratification. Other important activities to a romantic relationship, such as deep conversations, cuddling, or spending quality time with one another are viewed as impediments to the actualization of the goal. Where the romantic partner might try and engage in a romantic evening by having a quiet dinner, a glass of wine, and lighting some candles while listening to soft jazz music being played in the background, the hedonist will (not being able to appreciate these details or the higher meaning behind them) become antsy and bored, trying to rush through the “mundane” in order to “get to the good stuff”. Similarly, the hedonist of alcohol tends to ignore drinks of lower alcohol content or more flavorful, expensive drinks in favor of cheaper, more pure alcoholic beverages (the shot of course being a favorite; short and simple, the alcoholic content of one beer is consumed in less than five seconds). Drunkenness is elevated onto a platform, especially when hedonists socialize their “virtues”, creating an arena of competition amongst one another to see who can become the most intoxicated (or who can sleep with the most number of people, in the case of the sexual hedonist). Due to the establishment of these habits within the psyche, the hedonist begins a perilous spiral, racing down the track away from the depression and loneliness within at ever increasing speeds blindly towards the perceived saving grace of greater pleasure. 

 The depression comes about due to the fact that the hedonist never actually achieves anything of value. Since man was endowed by nature with a basic blueprint for proper functioning, though of course volition allows him to discover and follow this blueprint or not, the abdication of this blueprint results in a contradiction between what is and what ought to be, a sort of inner turmoil (the degree to which this turmoil takes place within other systems which, though they do not fully follow nature’s blueprint, maintain a basic level of happiness and success within their life is achieved incidentally to the degree in which the system’s virtues correspond to those set forth by nature). Using modern psychological terms, the hedonist at this point almost gives off the impression of being bipolar due to the rapid fluctuation of emotional/mental states. Having no higher moral basis or intellectual understanding, the hedonist is a slave to whim. Due to the fact that bodily pleasures requires almost no need for teleology, the Supreme Good as bodily pleasure inhibits the growth and development of the psyche, brutishly focusing on the moment-to-moment struggle for gratification. Thus, not only does hedonism replace epistemology and ethics, but it destroys the very framework upon which such a system could be built. Popular hedonists phrases such as, “Live in the moment” and “Live from day to day” exemplify this teleological suicide. Where Christianity places ethics as the ladder to God and Aristotelianism places ethics as the ladder to happiness (each ring of the ladder corresponding to a virtue-though of course, I am not implying that all virtues are equally hierarchical), hedonism does away with the ladder all together, rashly claiming that the end (pleasure) can be found instantly. To the hedonist, the concept of enduring through a trial to achieve better results in the future does not exist because the hedonist has no concept of future. This explains the historical inverse relationship between higher degrees of hedonism and lower production yields or shorter work schedules; the hedonist does not want to work! The problem with the abandonment of teleology all together is that, when the hedonist reaches a stage where he wishes to rise out of his own cesspool, he timidly looks at the ladder of another system, vaguely and childishly attempting to climb seldom tread ground or forgetting how to tread it all together. Thus hedonism entails another danger in that the act of getting out of it is a painful and arduous task. Indeed, unless a Supreme Good has ingrained itself within this individuals mind, allowing them to draw upon the minute yet ever-increasing pleasure gained from striving for said Good, it is very typical that the hedonist either falls back into hedonism or slides into a state of deep depression and turmoil. 

 Very typically, hedonism is not an isolated case within an individual, but exists or comes about in a larger social sphere. In many cases, the hedonist and his friends or social groups resemble a symbiotic mutualism or commensalism. Friendship takes on a new sense as hedonistic individuals aid one another in their quest for ever-greater feats of pleasure. Once traditional acts of friendship, such as bonding time, are redefined in relation to pure pleasure. Though a group of friends might drink such an excessive amount of alcohol that they do not specifically remember what happened or what was said, the event was considered a successful time of bonding (and thus they feel closer to one another) due to the fact that validation (in and of itself a form of pleasure) is received from the other hedonist. This occurrence can even cross over into sibling relationships, where what once was considered bonding between siblings (such as playing a board game, swimming, or drinking coffee and talking late into the night) is transformed into similar hedonistic activities as friends. Indeed, this can even cause strain or damage relationships between a hedonistic sibling or friend and a non-hedonistic sibling or friend due to the hedonistic sibling or friend believing that the non-hedonistic sibling or friend has no desire to bond, and to the non-hedonistic sibling or friend despairing the physical and psychic demise of their loved one. Social stratification then occurs between the hedonist and non-hedonist, possibly explaining the existence of “red-light districts” within larger, wealthier cities; hedonists prefer to associate with other hedonists and tend to despise non-hedonists.

 When one then takes a larger look at the world as a whole, it is apparent that hedonism is more prevalent amongst wealthy and opulent nations or societies, or the wealthy in a nation, than more poor or middle classed nations or people. This is due to the fact that in order to be hedonistic, enough “material” must exist with which the hedonist can indulge. More poor (and even middle class) individuals within a society, or more poor (and middle class) societies themselves occupy a predominant amount of time pursuing the basic requirements of life, leaving very little time to form hedonistic habits and lifestyles. The man who works all day to provide enough to feed his family for that day does not have the time or resources to then indulge himself on the finer things of life. Wealthy nations or individuals, on the other hand, have the resources available to “buy” time and materials. While this is not in and of itself bad, and in many cases it can be a very good thing, the problem lies when the wealthy or opulent individual or society does not have the moral framework to withstand the flashy appeal of hedonism. For indeed, few individuals will deny that if given the choice between a nice cake or a stick of celery, the celery will appear more pleasing. Thus the individual who can afford to buy a scrumptious cake will have little reason not to do so. This brings about a very interesting dilemma: due to the fact that a wealthier society is in ways better for the individual (in terms of abundant food supplies, exceptional health care, technology to allow time for loftier pursuits, etc.) and in ways worse, as has been previously described, it stands to reason then that as the wealth or opulence of an individual or society increases, so too must the strength of and adherence to a proper moral system. This is historically proven by the fact that the fall of some of the greatest empires or societies in the world, from Egypt to Greece, Rome to Venice, France to Victorian England, all witnessed at the moment before their fall an abdication of traditional moral standards or ways of living in favor of hedonism, brought about by the opulence of said societies.

 In summation then, it can be said that hedonism infects all major branches of philosophy. In metaphysics, hedonism replaces God or reality with delusional worldliness; in epistemology, reason or faith is replaced by pure sensation or perception; in ethics, a moral code or teleology is replaced by whim-worship; and in politics (or social ethics), friendships or proper relationships based upon the good or some value are replaced by hedonistic parties of indulgence. If not cured, hedonism in fact will eventually destroy any philosophy at all within an individual, making the adoption of a new philosophy seemingly impossible. The ultimate question, then, is what philosophy is best suited to prevent or cure hedonism?

 Many different philosophies have tried to offer their cure for hedonism. The problem with most philosophies, however, is that their solution to hedonism is to move to the opposite extreme: asceticism or stoicism of some degree. In these philosophies, the individual tends to view the body or world as evil, and thus pleasure as evil. Abstinence from pleasure, or at least the minimalization of pleasure, is the best course of action because it separates the individual from the source of corruption. The problem with these philosophies is that, by going to the opposite extreme, two important things are left out. First, though Aristotle in Book II stated that it is good to shoot for the opposite extreme so that we may properly land in the mean, in actuality shooting to the opposite extreme usually also misses the mark. In addition, by glorifying the opposite extreme, the individual who was not a hedonist tends to fall more easily into hedonism through his natural curiosity at pleasure and thus, being sheltered from it, this individual has no concept of how to properly deal with this pleasure. Secondly, as Aristotle states in Book VII and especially in Book X, pleasure is actually a good thing-it makes life worth living!

 The proper alternative, or cure, is then clear. The proper way to both treat an individual who is a hedonist or to prevent other individuals from becoming hedonist is to adopt the Aristotelian ethical system, especially in regards to Aristotle’s views of pleasure. The individual who properly adopts Aristotle’s ethics will live such a good (moral) life that the “bad” pleasures are not actually pleasures to them, and thus the pleasures that are not bad are relished as an essential aspect to the enjoyment of life.  This transformation not only applies to the noble or intellectual pleasures, but also to the bodily pleasures as well; the man of proper virtue will properly engage in and enjoy alcohol, food, and sex. Thus his life will not display any of the repressive curiosities of asceticism, or the destructive consequences of hedonism, but rather-by properly combining both to reach the mean, lead to a life where both happiness and pleasure coexist in harmony.



[1] NE 1152b1-4

[2] To Aristotle, a process is a type of change which spans a duration of time, changes from something to something else, ie. a it has a starting point and a finishing point, and thus due to the change, the process is never complete in one moment of time but is only complete when finished. An activity, on the other hand, is always complete at any selected moment in time because it has neither a starting nor a finishing point, and it does not require any stretch of time. See Metaphysics Θ.6,1048b18-23.

[3] NE 1172a19-21.

[4] It is worth noting here that very rarely does a person become fully hedonistic, and thus the degree to which they are hedonistic is the degree to which they shun or abandon reason. Similarly, the degree to which the person becomes hedonistic is the degree to which they shun or abandon traditional morality. Very often this process of degeneration takes a considerable amount of time and is usually found within older hedonist. Many people will delve a certain level into hedonism before returning to a normal state due to the strong influence or pull of their traditional morality. Aristotle states that this is especially true within children or youth, who being “young and lusty” will reach levels comparable to a hedonist, yet as they mature grow out of these levels.

[5] These physical problems of course can exist within individuals who are not hedonistic. However, these maladies are more common to or prevalent amongst hedonists due to the excessive exposure of the hedonist to the items or states within which these maladies occur (excessive eating, sex, and drinking).

December 04, 2007

Fall of Rome, Fall of America? I. America: An Empire to Rival Rome

    Just like the Roman Empire fell, so too are we living in an age of darkness where soon we will see the demise of the American Empire.  It's a popular belief, at least amongst non-academics, journalist, non ancient historian academics, or pretty much any liberal (and rarely conservatives) who foam at the mouth at the thought of America crumbling.  So of course, why not smear America by comparing it to an Empire which, though once renowned throughout the world, eventually crumbled to barbarians?  The biggest problem, however, is that these comparisons can not be made!  In fact, I would challenge anybody to find a single, credible, ancient historian who has written a book about the subject (an ancient historian being an academic whose job it is to study ancient Greece or Rome).  Thus I have taken up a new task: the task to examine any article I can find which tries to compare the fall of Rome to the "fall" of America, and show through historical proof why this comparison is invalid.

    The first article I found came from a special six-part series from the BBC entitled, "The Age of Empire". Part one of the series, entitled "America: An Empire to Rival Rome?"  was written by  Jonathan Marcus.  It was difficult to find out any information on Mr. Marcus, except that he is simply either a BBC News Correspondent, a Defense Correspondent, or a Diplomatic Correspondent.  His list of articles include such liberal slurticles as, "A Small Matter of Crusader History" (an attempt at, by semi-reviewing the film Kingdom of Heaven, showing how Islam is justified in its current war with the West because, of course, we started it all), "The Long Shadow of Vietnam" (an attempt to show how the Iraq War is like the Vietnam war, and thus dangerous, wrong, and impossible to win), "The Politics of Missile Defense"   (an attempt to show how the current desire by the US, Britain, and other Western nations to develop a missile defense shield is wrong), and many other articles of such a nature.  With an understanding of his point-of-view, or bias, what exactly does he say about America and Rome?

    After a quote by President Bush, Mr. Marcus states, "But despite his insistence that the US has no imperial ambitions, the word "empire" is increasingly used by academics and pundits alike when talking about America's role in the world."  What academics is he talking about?  If he is talking about Philosophers, English Professors, Sociologist, Political Scientist, or Cultural Anthropologist-of course they would say something like that.  But what about Ancient Historians?  Thus my challenge.  And the pundits, of course, are those to whom I am offering a criticism.  Notice the "weight" he places upon the rest of his article by stating that "academics and pundits" are backing him.

    He continues, "The young British historian Niall Ferguson, for example, had no doubts.'The United States,' he said, 'is an empire in every sense but one, and that one sense is that it doesn't recognise itself as such.' He called it 'an empire in denial.' "  Niall Ferguson-a historian.  Now he cites a source!  But who is Niall Ferguson?  From his own website, Niall states that his, "...research is principally focused on nineteenth- and twentieth-century subjects, with an emphasis on economic and especially financial history. He has subsidiary interests in international relations and military conflict. He continues to be interested in the use of counterfactuals in historical explanation."  Not an ancient historian.  What has he written?  His publications includes works such as "Virtual History" , a hypothetical look at "what if?" scenarios,  "Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power", a work which tries to compare the rise and fall of the British Empire with that of America, "Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire", an attempt to show that America has always been an imperial power "in denial", and "The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West", an attempt to redefine the Twentieth-Century based upon ethnic conflict (The New Yorker even claims: "Unfortunately, the book as a whole is marred by sweeping judgments and jarring contradictions."). Two things are clear from this: the author has a history of trying to discredit America and the West, and he has never written about Rome. Thus Mr. Marcus conveniently wedged this "distinguished" historian in to lend some kind of "credence" to his article.  Let's completely ignore his opinion and move on.

    How could a liberal slurticle be complete without some kind of reference to the Clinton Utopia?  It's funny how Mr. Marcus's next "expert", the "dissenting" voice, still finds a way to slur America.  "Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, found the notion of the US as an empire 'grotesque, bizarre or laughable, depending upon what mood I'm in and who says it'. He said that, if anything, it was an anti-empire. 'There is no interest among American people to set themselves up as an imperial power.'"  It is possible to even gloss over this "counter-example" as well; this "authority" says nothing of value (but hey, he is being fair by offering a "different perspective"...right?).

    Mr. Marcus continues, of course, to "qualify" the authority of both himself and his position by throwing around "experts" who really don't say anything.  Mr. Marcus states, "For others, like Michael Mandelbaum of the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, America's current position is unique - there simply is not an adequate word to describe it. As he put it: 'Empire is not quite right but it seems to be closer than anything else we have in common usage, so we employ it.' "  Translation? "This guy works at the John Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, and even though he doesn't say anything definite, the sheer weight of his authority will convince you that I know what I am talking about".

    Thus, with his "credence" established, Mr. Marcus actually begins to get to the meat of his argument.  His first topic?  Globalization. In this section he tries to prove how and why America is an empire; indeed, his arguments make sense.  After the fall of the Soviet Union, with no other superpower in the world, American Capitalism was spread to all corners of the globe.  However, this hardly qualifies America as an "Empire" in the same way that the Late Roman Empire was (we do not own or govern most of the world; the spread of McDonald's and Starbucks does not equate to the spread of Centurions, Chinese consumers are free to go to Wal-Mart or their local competitor, and French youth have a choice to watch an American or French movie).  So yes, this is a fact that everyone can agree on-American culture is spreading to the rest of the world; Zimbabwean culture is not.  Yet in true liberal fashion, Mr. Marcus takes an established fact and then creates a straw man; the evils of President Bush and the Iraq War.  He "calms" our emotions with his statement, "But it was the tragedy of 11 September which presented America's position in a stark new light.", but then totally disregards this statement by proclaiming, "Many people believe that it was from the rubble of the towers that a more assertive and ideological foreign policy emerged. Afghanistan and Iraq were invaded. President Bush proclaimed a new doctrine of pre-emptive military action".  9-11 was a tragedy-destroying those responsible is pre-emptive military action?  Of course a new ideology arose.  Post 9-11, America abandoned the horrendous insanity of Clinton-era appeasement and began to defend herself against our enemies.  But I forget; to the liberals, we must sit in a corner and beg for mercy while taking as many blows as possible...to defend ourselves is "imperialism" (Interestingly enough, some modern historians cite the rise of Rome, when it was a Republic, due to the exact same means.  The only difference?  Rome kept the land of her enemies while America returned it.  Both, however, sought peace, but defended themselves against any barbarian or semi-civilized society who threatened their way of life).

    And now comes the comparison.  How exactly is America like Rome?  Continuing on from globalization, he states, "The Romans with their language, currency and the spread of Roman citizenship perhaps foreshadowed an early form of globalisation."  Of course it did.  What's wrong with that?  Rome brought peace, stability, sanitation, medicine, technology, philosophy, literature, roads, citizenship, rights, representation in government, and an overall better standard of living to people who once sat around campfires skinning deer and dancing to their mystical deities (in fact, as Thomas Sowell states in his excellent book, "Conquests and Cultures: An International History", it took well over 1000 years or more for Europe to return to the standard of living it enjoyed under Rome's form of globalization).  Similarly, areas which once were the hallowed grounds of Native American tribes who had not even approached the technology or standard of living of ancient Egypt, 5000 years before them, America transformed into highly successful, clean areas to live; in effect, transporting these areas 5000 years into the future.  Ultimately, I buy this comparison, yet still do not see any evidence for the demise of America.

   Finally, at the end of his slurticle, does the bad news appear.  What spells the doom for America?  Unilateralism.  Here he brings up another "expert", Joseph Nye of the Kennedy School of Government.  Who is Joseph Nye?  A liberal foreign policy "expert".  Wikipedia even states that he worked for both the Carter and Clinton Administrations.  His bias then, of course, is to slur and destroy America.  Mr. Marcus states, concerning Dr. Nye, "He argues that in terms of issues like countering transnational terrorism, dealing with the spread of infectious diseases, global climate change, international financial stability, none can be managed by any one country. The message for US policy-makers, he says, is simple. 'We are the strongest nation the world has seen for some two millennia and yet we can't get what we want by acting alone'".  And now we have come full circle.  America is an "empire", leader of the new globalized world, comparable to ancient Rome in her influence, yet must enslave herself to the whims of petty dictators and fading liberal powers.  Yet as any serious historian knows, it was not unilateralism which destroyed Rome, but (among many other factors) appeasement to the "others".  At the end of the Roman Empire, by not following her own best interests, Rome caved in and appeased the marauding barbarian tribes, even allowing them to live within her very borders in exchange for peace (hmm Israel...)! 

  Reaching the end, I was struck with the most bizarre feeling that Mr. Marcus did not say anything at all.  He throws around big-named "experts", briefly speaks of subjects expecting his (assumed) liberal audience to understand, and then comforts them at the end by showing that the liberal position is the only cure for our impending doom. In all fairness to him, though, this is only one article out of a six-part series comparing the demise of Rome to the "end" of America.  So far, however, a few things are clear: his bias is obviously hyper-liberal anti-Americanism, not a single one of his "authorities" are experts in Roman history, the true comparisons are good things (globalization, the spread of freedom and representative government, capitalism), and his solution(s) is a ludicrous call for self-destruction.  Indeed, if one truly were to ring the alarmist bell of comparison between Rome and America, the comparison would not lie with the current trend of American foreign policy or economics, but the self-destructive wishes of the effete liberals.  Yet even then, I have the confidence that the American people and their optimistic, benevolent sense of life, will not crumble under the leadership of the liberals, but will continue to prosper for hundreds of years to come.

December 02, 2007

Creationist "Museum"

I know that this has nothing to do with the Classics, but it definately has something to do with the modern world.  I warn you-heed caution when observing these pictures.  The groups logic is so overwhelming that it may cause you to rethink your position on evolution.

I'm joking.

Pictures of the museum

And here is the museum website.

Enjoy!

November 29, 2007

Plato's Revolution

Plato, Kronos of the philosophical pantheon, completed his magnum opus in 360 BC. It is with irony (and a mistranslation from Cicero’s Latin) that modern readers know it as the Republic. Cicero’s translation meant affairs (things) of the people. Plato, on the other hand, entitled his work the Πολιτεία, which more accurately means the way in which an individual lives and functions within his πόλις. Under the lens of proper translation, it is easy to see that Plato was not writing about a government or a collective, but instead on an individual and the proper way in which he ought to live. This in fact seems more suitable to the ever-questioning, γνθι σεαυτόν Socrates. For indeed, when discussing the issue of justice, happiness, and the good life in the Πολιτεία I 352d-354a, Socrates leads Thrasymachus to an understanding of how best to live ones life in order to arrive at happiness. More abstractly, Plato uses this passage to further demonstrate his idea that everything has a form, that every form has a function, and that the proper state of the form is realized when the function is followed. What is most remarkable about this passage, however, is that it represents the first known case in Western history where ethics became internalized, and happiness could be found within the self.

  Socrates begins the passage by questioning if the good or just life is a happy life, and therefore if the bad or unjust life is an unhappy life. To frame his argument to Thrasymachus, Socrates brings up the issue of work or function. He states that everything has a work, such as an eye, the function of which is seeing. Careful attention must be paid, however, to the original Greek for work. One translation of εργονεργον is, “probably [an] archaic word from ερδο-to work, do, accomplish.” What Socrates is really saying is that an eye has a specific thing which it does, and that in doing this it accomplishes what it was intended to do. He continues that the εργον of a thing is that which it can only do or that which it does best. But everything that has a function also has a virtue of the function, or more properly in the Greek, an αρετη. Thus everything that can do or accomplish something, can either do or accomplish it horribly or excellently (αρετη). If the eyes are blind, then they do not possess the virtue or excellence of the function or work. With this basis, Socrates moves into the realm of human action. He conjectures, then, that the soul too has a function and a virtue. The function of the soul is best summarized as life (though Socrates also uses the terms management, deliberation, and rule). The virtue of the soul would then be justice. The conclusion, according to Socrates, is that the just soul is the soul that lives excellently, and the soul that lives excellently is blest and happy. Therefore, the blest or happy soul is more advantageous than the miserable soul, meaning that justice is always more advantageous than injustice. But in typical Socratic fashion, Socrates stresses that one must know the definition of justice before they may begin to become happy. As Adam states, “Socrates sums up regretfully: until we know what Justice is, we are not likely to discover whether it is a virtue or a vice, and whether its possessor is happy or unhappy.” indeed seems to be work, as in that which a farmer or laborer does. A more proper translation, though, is offered by Liddell and Scott, who state that

One can see in this dialogue the typical way in which Socrates tries to prove something. He begins with a more formal and abstract statement, which could be called point A. Socrates states, “Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it or best with it?” Thrasymachus, as is typical for the victim of Socrates, does not understand. Socrates then clarifies his position with a host of different examples. With the point having been more clearly understood, Socrates again offers a more abstract definition, point B, stating, “Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed?” Again Socrates clarifies his position with countless examples. In his examples, he links point A and point B by stating, “Could the eyes possibly fulfill their function well if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect?” This connection, replete with further examples, allows Socrates to bring the discussion to the core issue of the topic: the work and function of the soul. The abundance of examples combined with a solid grasp of points A and B enables Socrates to quickly wrap up the discussion in his conclusion, proclaiming that, “Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice.” Socrates thus brilliantly led Thrasymachus through his discussion in order to reach what he intended to prove, that justice is profitable.

Though Socrates was only a certain and distinct issue within the realm off ethics, points A and B clearly indicate that Plato was trying to prove something much more abstract. Central to Platonic metaphysics is the concept of Forms, and it is here in this passage that we can see Plato trying to link his metaphysics with his ethics. In points A and B, the idea of forms is presented (and accepted by Thrasymachus) as a fact. This can be better understood in Socrates’ examples of horse and eye. There exists, independently, the forms “horse” and “eye”, unique from any other form. Εργον is the link between Plato’s abstractions and Socrates’ concretes. Plato thus states that every form must have a function, or εργον, and every function may be performed either in a good manner or a bad manner. When the form functions in a good manner, the form is fulfilling its nature. Likewise, when the form functions in a bad manner, the form is rejecting its nature. Thus it seems that Plato offers a way to categorize the forms-by definition. This definition is a collection of the attributes of the form and the function of the form (i.e. for a flower: gain nutrition by water and nutrients via the roots and from the sun via photosynthesis, soft and flimsy, leaves, roots, and the flower). A form acting in contradiction to its nature leads to a termination of that form. Αρετη, then, is the proper functioning of the form that leads it to a state of harmony or well-being.

  Digging more deeply, one can see that an eye does not choose to go blind, but merely goes blind based upon chance. Of interest in Plato’s ethics is the concept of volition. For indeed, it is not Μοιρα who sways men from justice to injustice, but man himself who, via volition, chooses to engage in his function either excellently or poorly. Thus the happy man is the one who engages in his function excellently, of his own volition. Man, as opposed to every other form, must inquire within in order to determine what his function is and how he might perform his function excellently. Man has the tool, philosophy, by which he can inquire first into his nature, or even nature itself (metaphysics), and then use this knowledge and apply it to his life and actions (ethics). Plato proves within this passage that his ethics can indeed be integrated with his metaphysics.

The significance of this passage is far greater than an understanding of justice and happiness (Socrates) or a link between metaphysics and ethics within a philosophical system (Plato). It is that, for the first time in Western history, a philosopher has posited the idea that man can understand his nature by inquiring within, and from this knowledge act in a manner which allows him to attain a state of happiness. Put more simply, Plato internalized ethics. A simple way to prove this is to examine the ethical philosophies of philosophers before and after Plato.

Homer represents the first major work of Greek thinking. In the Iliad, Achilles is faced with a moral dilemma. On the one hand, he can go fight at Troy and receive immortal happiness and renown via his glory and conquests. On the other, he can stay at home and wither away, miserable and unknown for the rest of his life. When he decided to go fight at Troy, Achilles’ mother Thetis cried out to him, “You should be spending your time here by your ships happily and untroubled by tears, since life is short for you, all too brief. Now you’re destined for both an early death and misery beyond compare” (Il. 1-434-437). Clearly she believed that happiness was freedom from fear or imperturbability, and unhappiness was living in a state of fear. Achilles believed the opposite. Regardless, both viewed happiness as attainable externally, be it glory, riches, and fame (Achilles) or imperturbability and tranquility (Thetis).

When Pythagoras was asked by his followers, as recorded by the late 5th century Italian Pythagoreans, “What is most just?”, he supposedly replied, “Sacrificing” (Iamblichus xviii 81-87). Thus the just, or right thing to do, was to sacrifice (be it to the gods in a figurative sense, or to others in an altruistic sense). Once again, happiness was not found internally via actions, but externally via actions.

As recorded by Cicero, the philosopher and “scientist” Democritus supposedly lived his life as he taught, “…to have blinded himself…in search of what else if not a happy life? And although he located such a life in the knowledge of things, nevertheless he wanted his inquiry into nature to put him into a good frame of mind-for the highest good he called contentment and, often, imperturbability” (Cicero V, xxix, 87). Akin to Homer (or Thetis), Democritus stated that the highest good via which the happy life could be found was imperturbability. He even went so far as to detach himself from this reality (in a sense, by removing some of his perception of it) and found happiness by strictly knowing that it was contentment or freedom from fear which led from happiness. This cannot be mistaken with Plato’s internalization for ethics; the teleological end of Democritus’ ethics was imperturbability achieved by means of not perceiving any object of fear, as opposed to Plato’s teleological end of justice or happiness achieved by means of congruence of function to form. Thus, again, a pre-Socratic philosopher sought happiness and ethics externally.

One final example is Thales, man of the water. As reported by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Philosophers, “Supposedly about Thales, when asked, ‘How can we live best and most justly? –If we do not ourselves do the things we blame others for doing. Who is happy? –One who has a healthy body, a well-stocked soul and a cultivated nature’” (1 33-40). To Thales, happiness was found in health and knowledge, or more specifically, to have a “well-stocked soul” (a soul full of lessons from life) and a cultivated nature (knowledge of community and others, of tradition). It is quite apparent, then, that Thales also sought happiness outside of the individual and in the external world.

When Plato wrote the Πολιτεία, he drastically changed the nature of ethics. No longer did man have to be free of fear, have large quantities of glory, be healthy and well cultivated, or sacrifice to the gods or other people. Instead man was free to examine himself (remember, γνθι σεαυτόν), to derive an understanding of his function (who he was, and how was he supposed to act), and then act accordingly in order to become happy. In true Greek tradition (for indeed it was they who first truly anthropomorphisized the gods), Plato made ethics human-centered and individual-centered, allowing mankind finally to begin his quest to understand who he was and how he should act. Ethics was no longer the realm of the king or god, but the individual. This is not to say that every single philosopher after him agreed with him, or that one could notfocus, in the starting point or origin-goods, sacrifice, and the external were not the prime focal point; man was. To further prove and solidify this dramatic shift in Western thought, it would be proper to examine subsequent ethical views. find happiness in the external world. Rather, it was a shift in

Aristotle was undoubtedly Plato’s greatest and most influential student. Almost directly echoing his teacher, Aristotle states in his Ethica Nicomachea:

“Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer  account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the  function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all  things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the  function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function…Now if the function of man is an activity of  soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say ‘a so-and-so’ and ‘a good so-and- so’ have a function which is the same in kind…human good turns out to be activity of soul in  accordance with virtue and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most  complete” (1097 b23-1098 a16).

Ethics, or the pursuit of the good and happy life, was realized when the individual understood his function. Aristotle, like Plato before him, did not view man as a slave to the outside world, suckling the teat of material goods or the gods in order to achieve happiness. When Aristotle paints a portrait of his magnanimous man later on in his Ethics, the image is almost romantic-a strong, bold, independent man who stood on his own two feet, approaching the world confidently with his mind.

In the Roman times, the Stoic philosopher Seneca, in his Epistles, more succinctly stated, “Therefore, man's highest good is attained, if he has fulfilled the good for which nature designed him at birth.  And what is it which this reason demands of him?  The easiest thing in the world, to live in accordance with his own nature” (XLI). As was typical of Stoic philosophy, man had a nature, which when actualized, led to the good life. Though this is more general than Socrates’ judgment, the essence (or formation) of the argument is the same: identify the form, identify the function, act accordingly and reap the rewards thereof.

In more modern times, the philosopher Nietzsche poetically proclaimed in his work Beyond Good and Evil:

It is not actions that prove him [the noble man]-actions are always open to many interpretations,  always unfathomable-nor is it “works”. Among artists and scholars today one finds enough of  those who betray by their works how they are impelled by a profound desire for what is noble; but  just this need for what is noble is fundamentally different from the needs of the noble soul itself  and actually the eloquent and dangerous mark of its lack. It is not the works, it is the faith that is  decisive here, that determines the order of rank-to take up again an ancient religious formula in a  new and more profound sense: some fundamental certainty that a noble soul has about itself,  something that cannot be sought, nor found, nor perhaps lost.

The noble soul has reverence for itself (287, emphasis the authors).

Nietzsche here seems to directly attack Plato’s view; even putting the term works into quotations (Nietzsche himself was a Classical Philologist). But even in his disagreement with methodology (that it is works or function which leads to happiness), Nietzsche still accepts the Platonic view of ethics. His ending statement obviously states that the soul does not find happiness or the good life externally, but instead it is its own source of the good (an internal concept). Ironic it is that in trying to disprove Plato, he accepts the assumptions of Plato in order to disprove him!

Finally, and most recently, the controversial philosopher Ayn Rand even paid homage to the views of Plato. In her work, The Virtue of Selfishness, she states:

The simpler organisms, such as plants, can survive by means of their automatic physical  functions. The higher organisms, such as animals and man, cannot: their needs are more complex and the range of their actions is wider. The physical functions of their bodies can perform  automatically only the task of using fuel, but cannot obtain that fuel. To obtain it, the higher  organisms need the faculty of consciousness. A plant can obtain its food from the soil in which it  grows. An animal has to hunt for it. Man has to produce it” (19).

Here we see a very similar formula to that of Socrates (Plato). Ayn Rand identifies that every organism has a function, and it is that function which leads to the survival (or the good) of the organism. In her terms, to be ethical (to live the good and happy life), man (the organism) must use his mind, or reason (the function) in order to achieve a state of good. As recently as the 1960s, philosophers still debate the nuances of Plato’s historical revolution.

The evidence almost speaks for itself: the pre-Socratics viewed ethics externally, the post-Socratics (or Platonist) viewed ethics internally. Plato’s revolution was ultimately a fundamental shift in thought and focus which allowed all subsequent philosophers to debate the details: Who gave man the form and function? God, the gods, or evolution? (Metaphysics) What is man’s function? Reason, faith? (Epistemology) What are man’s virtues which allows him to act excellently in regards to his function? (Ethics). How ought man to apply these virtues in regards to other people? Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy? (Politics). Plato gave his own view under the name of Socrates.

It is rare, however, when an individual comes along who changes the very basic, fundamental methodology under which every other subsequent person, for thousands of years, operates. But what is certain is that Plato’s method struck such a nerve within the philosophical community that, to this day, philosophers still march and fight under the banner of Plato’s revolution.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

Adam, James. The

Republic

of

Plato

. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1902.

Aristotle. Ethica Nicomachea. Trans. J.a.k. Thomson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1953.

Barnes, Jonathan, trans. Early Greek Philosophy. New York: Penguin, 1987.

Homer. Iliad. Trans. Stanley Lombardo. Indianapolis: Hackett Company, 1997.

Liddell, Henry, and Robert Scott. Greek-English Lexicon. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1891.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.

Plato. Great Dialogues of Plato. Trans. W.h.d. Rouse. New York: Penguin, 1956.

Rand, Ayn. The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: Penguin, 1961.

 

Seneca, Lucius A. Moral Epistles. Trans. Richard M. Gummere. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1917.

Dr Me: Medicine, the Tripartite Soul, and Psychic Health

    Plato’s concept of the tripartite soul has been extensively written about and studied by scholars throughout the ages. It influenced Aristotle (in his De Anima) and all other subsequent Greek and Roman philosophers. Augustine and the Christians cherished it as a means of showing the innate sinfulness (the appetitive) as well as our innate divinity (made in His own image, or the cogitative). Even people as modern as Freud borrowed the tripartite nature of the soul to develop his own theories of Id, Ego, and Supergo[1], as well as modern cognitive psychologist who have taken Plato’s faculty psychology to heart[2]. One possible explanation for the widespread popularity and the everlasting nature of Plato’s theories on the soul lies not as much in the theory itself (for indeed, Plato himself evolved or fixed the mistakes in regards to his concept of the tripartite soul from the Phaedo to the Republic to the Timaeus), but in the very conception of what the soul was or how to interact with it. At times of rapid development in the sciences and technologies, philosophers sometimes tend to mirror their philosophies on these changes (such as Spencer and Social Darwinism). Plato lived not only in a time of rapid philosophical and artistic development, but also in the birth of the scientific tradition. More importantly, this birth and triumph of reason and science took man out of the clouds of the mystical and placed him within the realm of the world, able to be scrutinized and understood by science. This notion was especially true in regards to medicine, where men first began to rationally look at their own diseases and find worldly cures for them. Plato took this rational, scientific, and medicinal optimism and applied it to his own philosophy. For the first time in history, Plato set forth the concept that not only was the soul real, but it also was able to be treated of its illnesses and diseases in much the same was as the body. The wrongdoer was not possessed by demons, but sick, and as such could be cured of his sickness by introspecting and prescribing his own cure or by a doctor (judge) who, if the illness were serious enough, could help him as well. His worldly, medical view of the soul is most evident in the Republic, especially in Book IV, for it is within book IV that Plato fleshes out his idea of the tripartite soul. Yet hidden throughout the book in scattered parts, it is also possible to pick out the proper modus operandi and cure from the Asklepios of the soul himself. For each part of the soul, it appears as if Plato provided a proper medical behavior in response; of course though, like all medicine, these treatments or behaviors could overlap. Nevertheless, Asklepian Plato set mankind down the path to achieve psychic health.

    Though Plato hints at his tripartite division of the soul in the Phaedo[3], it was not until the RepublicRepublic is 435b-441e, as well as a further discussion at 611b-612a5. In sections 435b-441e, Plato divides the soul up into three distinct parts: the appetitive (τό έπιθυμητικόν), the spirited (θυμοειδές), and the cogitative (τό λογιστικόν). His discovery or justification for this distinction is quite unique in the history of Western logical thought. For at 439b5-7, Plato introduced what scholars call the Principle of Opposites[4], stating, “For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing.”[5] Plato used this principle to deduce the differences between the three parts. The logic of this principle, of course, was not fully fleshed out until Aristotle wrote his Metaphysics[6], but nevertheless, the Principle of Opposites allowed Plato to differentiate not between two obvious parts of the soul (the appetitive and the cogitative), but to create or discover the third part which had previously been linked with either the appetitive or the cogitative, or had just been dismissed as madness or possession (the rage of Achilles, the insanity of Medusa, etc.). Thus Plato was also the first intellectual in Western history to fully flesh out an emotional theory. Now with this tool in hand and the three parts identified, Plato was able to flesh out the three parts. that Plato fully fleshed his theory out, describing in detail each of the three parts. The critical section of analysis in the

    The first part of the soul that he identified is the appetitive (τό έπιθυμητικόν), which of course is the most obvious or self evident to humans due to the fact that it is the inescapable natural impulses that we have. Plato himself states at 437d that the most obvious of these desires are thirst and hunger, though Plato also includes willingness or wishing. Obviously a more complete list would include all volitional or semi-volitional operations of human biology (from sex to urination to breathing). The text, however, is ambiguous about biological needs that are out of our ability to control. It only states at 437e3-5 that, “That is so…each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is in its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality-such or such.”[7] It is safe to assume, however, that in a work of an ethical nature, as well as in such a primitive state of the development of psychology, Plato was only speaking of those things which our body desires which are in our control to pursue or not. For example, we are not able to stop our body from digesting food, but we can choose whether to eat or not; or, we are not able to stop our body from processing oxygen, but we can hold our breath underwater and choose not to allow oxygen into our system. This means that, of the elements of our body which we have the ability to control, these elements desiring a certain thing, we have the ability to give in to said desire or not (this choice is fundamental to the tripartite soul). The combination of these desires forms the first part, the basis of, and indeed the largest part of the soul.

    The reasoning behind the appetitive being classified as the first or base part of the soul is quite clear. When the hierarchy of life is observed, one can see that from the very basic living organisms, including plants (though these are not volitional beings), to the more advanced living organisms such as animals (though once again, these are not volitional beings), to man, the appetitive element is a common element. A tree, a dog, and a human all desire water and food. Freed from the shackles of the supernatural unknown, Plato was able to see the common element amongst all living organism (though it was not until Aristotle that the science of biology exploded in the ancient world). Thus the appetitive element of the soul is purely corporeal and purely animalistic. The proper functioning of every living organism requires a fulfillment of the appetitive desire. Plato, however, understands than man has the ability to choose the object that relinquishes his desire. At 438a-438d Plato brings up that others might state that the desire of denotes the desire of something good and spends a considerable amount of time defending this position. His response, tersely, is that the desire of something is just the desire of that particular entity, good or bad and much or less being mere attributes of that entity. With this view of the appetitive, it is clear why Plato placed so much emphasis on the cogitative. The appetitive desires drink: what to drink or how much of something to drink (drunkenness versus teetotalism); the appetitive desires sex: with whom to have sex or in what way (sexual monogamy versus sexual orgies); it is the cogitative which directs and guides the appetitive into the proper venue of action.

    It is clear, then, that the appetitive can be either healthy (desiring the right things, at the right times, for the right reasons) or unhealthy (desiring the wrong things, at the wrong times, for the wrong reasons). It is also evident that the cogitative guides the appetitive to a proper course of desire. What is not evident, however, is the relationship between the appetitive and the cogitative, or more specifically, how the cogitative guides the appetitive to a proper course of desire. Plato does not truly give an answer, merely stating at 439b that the cogitative merely pulls the appetitive back from its desires. It would be possible, however, to look ahead to Plato’s prescription for the cogitative and trace it backwards to the appetitive: or, it is also possible that the answer lies before the very discussion of the tripartite soul. Either way, the answer remains the same: education. Yet it is outside of the nature of the appetitive to be educated, for education lies within the realm of reason. A closer examination of how education is a therapy for the mind reveals the key: it is not so much the discovery of the new that is important here, but the affirmation of the tried and true. Or put more simply, it is through overwhelming evidence that the mind takes an idea and turns it into an educational law, staying with the individual as if it were permanent (notice how, through a change in modern values and the modern education system, Rome is thrown out as a copycat empire of engineers as opposed to the more ‘sophisticated’ Greeks-a view quite modern indeed![8]). Translated into the language of the appetitive, education would be better understood as habituation. The cogitative simply directing the appetitive to not have a desire for drunkenness may be powerful enough one time, or a few times; it is not powerful enough, however, to curb the impulses. To curb such an impulse, an individual must create a habit of not drinking to get drunk by repeatedly, over a long period of time, guiding the appetitive away from five drinks, to four, to three, to two, and eventually reinforcing one as a proper modus operandi. Akin to training a dog, this action repeated over and over and over again will eventually yield a habit of drinking in moderation. Though this does not eradicate the impulse itself (one could argue that it is impossible to eradicate impulses), habituation serves as a very powerful tool of the cogitative by which, in most cases, it can easily overcome an impulse. From this it is also clear that the stronger the impulse, the more diligent the cogitative must be in creating habits (walls) strong enough to withstand the onslaught of impulse. Clearly, then, a healthy appetitive can be attained through a proper creation of good habits.

    Plato then brings back the Principle of Opposites in order to reveal the spirited part of the soul (θυμοειδές). At 439E, Plato brings up the issue of the temper or the high spirit. To help explain the difference between the cogitative and the spirited, he introduces the story of Leontios. The man Leontios was supposedly torn between his desire to see a pile of dead bodies and his disgust at the bodies and at such an action. Thus we see a conflict between the innate appetitive desire to see the bodies and the spirited, emotional disgust at such an action. Since it is clear that such an emotional reaction is not a part of the reasoning element (for Leontios did not sit down upon a rock and muse for a few minutes as to how to feel or respond to this action), the Principle of Opposites requires that this indeed be a separate element of the soul. Plato thus called this the spirited element (θυμοειδές). The spirited is seemingly problematic, however, due to the fact that it seems as if Plato had begun a theory of emotions, yet stopped after just a few. Nowhere does Plato incorporate sadness or happiness or any other emotion into the spirited. It seems as if the spirited has its special place as temper or anger. Plato even offers two other examples; one of Odysseus restraining his anger upon site of the suitors at his house; the other of an infant born into the world containing the appetitive and the spirited (a temper, as Glaucon says; an anger). A possible solution lies in the correlation between the purpose for which a just spirited part acts. The spirited element is supposed to be the “soldier” as opposed to the “general”, the cogitative, aiding it in whatever it needs aiding and reinforcing the cogitative in its battle with the appetitive. Regardless, what is evident is that there is a second element of the soul, the spirited, and that its function is to assist the cogitative.

    The health of the spirited at first glance seems quite elusive. It is truly not possible to form a habit from the spirited, because the spirited has more of a reactionary nature (by reacting to something, the spirited is ultimately dependent upon that with which it reacts, and because each incident for which the reaction occurs will be different, the spirited in turn will act in a differing manner, being only related by the common element of anger or temper). The answer to the problem of spirited health, it seems, lies in two elements of Platonic education: music and gymnastics. Music especially plays a key role in relation to the spirited element, and it is possible that a deeper understanding of this connection could further elucidate the shadowy figure of the spirited part of the soul. In a later commentary on the Republic by the Muslim scholar Averroes, the image of war in regards to the spirited element is brought up:

    “It is also evident in that spiritedness often wars against desire and rules over it as though it were  an instrument of ascendancy         [by] which it rules over them. Hence it is that we frequently grow angry at what the desires bring [us] to thoughtlessly…And the         spirited kind will obey and submit to it, heatedly arouse by it [and] battling with the other kind. This harmony in the individual         soul is achieved through music…music renders it disciplined, submissive to cogitation.”[9]

According to Averroes, music then is the tool by which the cogitative forces the wild spirited part into submission (even in the Phaedrus, Plato uses the image of horses to describe the appetitive and spirited, with the cogitative charioteer rearing in and steering the wild beasts). Though Averroes uses a more war-like vocabulary than Plato (understandable), the element remains the same: the relationship between the different parts of the soul is a relationship of tension, much akin to the relationship between the different notes in a unified chord. Plato himself hints at the link between music and the spirited at 411d, when he states:

   “But what if he does nothing but this [gymnastics] and has no contact with the Muse in any way, is not the result that even  if             there was some principle of the love of knowledge [the cogitative] in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry         and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not              aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened…and so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologist and stranger         to the Muses.”[10]

As well as at 441e-442a:

     “Then is it not, as we said, the blending of music and gymnastics that will render         them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with fair words and       teachings     and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and       rhythm?”[11]

Music thus plays two roles: it unifies or brings into harmony the tension between the different parts of the soul, as well as soothes or guides the spirited element, aiding it in its purpose. Speaking more broadly, the spirited element is not only the aid of reason, carrying out its commands in directing the appetitive, but also it enjoys a seeming symbiotic relationship with the cogitative in that it fuels the fire, so to speak, culturing or refining the intellect and grounding it into this world. Plato hints that the person who does not listen to music, and thus does not cultivate the spirited within him, will not have the proper link between his appetitive, corporeal, worldliness and his cogitative, incorporeal, divineness.[12] What one can see, however, in the evolution of or the change in Plato’s beliefs regarding the soul from the Phaedo to the Republic and Phaedrus to the Timaeus is a distinct break from the pre-Socratic view of Pythagoras and Heraclitus concerning the soul and harmonia to a more modern, medical view of the soul, begun in the Republic and finished in the Timaeus. Ironically, it appears as if Plato is stating that, were the spirited ever to become diseased, the answer would lie in a deep immersion into proper music (for of course, like habituation and education, these healing processes take time). Nevertheless, the importance of the spirited in controlling the appetitive and in nourishing the cogitative is undeniable.

The highest part of the tripartite soul is the cogitative (τό λογιστικόν), the lofty seat of reason reigning supreme above the more barbaric appetitive and spirited. Unlike the largest section, the appetitive, or the middle section, the spirited, the cogitative is the smallest element within the tripartite soul. Plato speaks very briefly of the cogitative, in part because most Greeks at the time would have been very familiar with reason (it was indeed the new religion), and also in part because he had written about it so extensively before. Thus the cogitative did not need much explanation because it was taken as self-evident or repetitive. What he does say of the cogitative part in terms of explanation he reveals in a very peculiar fashion. At 439b, Plato states that if there is something within the soul that pulls back a man from his natural impulse for water, this thing that is pulling back must indeed be a distinct entity from the impulse for water. He uses this as a preface for the Principle of Opposites, but also, taking volition as self evident, states that if you have the choice to do something contrary to an impulse, this must be the cogitative part which is doing the pulling away (by aid of the spirited).

The cogitative soul thus has only one function: to rule via reason, or more appropriately, to use its power of reason to calculate out the best venue to pursue within the appetitive via the spirited.[13] The cogitative soul is the last part of the soul that is developed (Glaucon even remarks that some people never develop it), and is particular to humans. In the Republic, however, Plato depicts a cogitative that is not as much the charioteer as in the Timaeus, but rather is more of a lighthouse that, through education, guides the appetitive and the spirited to the right path. Indeed, the cogitative could actually be likened more to the legislative branch of modern democracies, which discovers and debates what the laws should be, and then passes them into effect; by listening to the other parts, as well as listening to and learning from education, the laws of the body are put in place. The spirited could be seen more as the executive branch; the enforcer of the laws that the cogitative has put into place. Though this comparison may sound antithetical to Plato, it is not to be taken literally. Rather, one must look at the function of the guardians, or the spirited, and see that this can be compared to what now is our leader today (which indeed could be a fascinating area of study: if the executive is meant to be the head of the state, or the legislative, especially in regards to the Platonic theory of the soul or individual and the polis or the state). Perched atop its throne, the cogitative guided or negotiated with the other parts of the soul in order to lead the body as a whole to its proper course.

The health of the cogitative has been discussed in short earlier. The modus operandi of the healthy soul would be a dedication of its reasoning powers to education. Indeed, in many places in the Republic, Plato stresses the importance of education and learning. Beginning at section 376c-414a, Plato discusses the proper education for a guardian in the Republic. He includes music and gymnastics and later on, at 503b, includes knowledge of the “good”. His description here of music is different than his descriptions of music earlier; it seems as if Plato, by including story telling, was accepting the bard tradition of poetry and incorporating it into his music. This would indeed make sense due to the fact that Homer, a bard whose poetry was recited to music, would have been the standard fair education of most boys in Greece. But what would Homer and Aesop (another standard faire story teller), and much later on, the Seven Sages and philosophy do for the cogitative? Both Homer and Aesop wrote their literature in such a way that they could be used as a guidebook for moral action. As it is today, that children find the stories of Aesop and Homer fascinating, so too in the Greek world. Children would probably have picked up sticks trying to gorge the eye of the evil Polyphemus, while parents at home would quote lines from Homer as moral lessons for the children to remember. At 395d, Plato states, “Imitations, if they are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as habits and nature, in body and in thought.” Thus it is evident that education is the means by which the mind is molded, shaped, and strengthened to become the master of the other parts of the soul.

Whether Plato began the medical view of the soul movement or not is unclear. It is known that, after Plato’s death, many schools of philosophy (the Stoics and Epicureans especially) had a belief in pneuma, the Greek word for breath. In the views of these schools, pneuma was actually a physical organ within the body that contained the elements of the soul.[14] What this belief makes clear, though, is that the Greeks had certainly brought the soul out of the sky as some mystical entity and placed it within the realm of the world, free to be observed, diagnosed, and treated. Any vice, or disease, could find its appropriate cure in order to achieve a state of absolute health, or virtue. In addition, Plato laid out in his Republic the proper means by which each element of the tripartite soul should act in order to maintain a healthy course. Plato’s ideal city was not only ideal but also real. His prescription for a healthy soul was taking place every day all over the Greek world (music and Homer were even elements of the education of children in Sparta, a city known for its disdain of philosophy and the arts). Growing up around Plato were bright and healthy men of the soul who would continue the world down a path of amazing intellectual and technological advancement. Plato was the first, however, to begin the philosophical analysis of the soul in a non-mystical or religious way. His division of the soul into three parts could be considered the first psychological theory in human history. Thus it is Plato whom we have to thank for freeing us from the shackles of religion and allowing us to introspect within ourselves, to observe and understand ourselves, and to realize what is needed in order to overcome and cure the diseases of our own souls.

 


Works Cited

 

Annas, Julia. Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Berkeley: University of California P, 1992.

 

Averroes. On Plato's Republic. Trans. Ralph Lerner. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1974.

 

Blossner, Norbert. "The City-Soul Analogy." The

Cambridge

Companion to Plato's Republic. Ed. G.r.f. Ferrari. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. 345-385.

 

Ferrari, G.r.f. "The Three-Part Soul." The

Cambridge

Companion to Plato's Republic. Ed. G.r.f. Ferrari. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. 165-201.

 

Finamore, John. "The Tripartite Soul in Plato's Republic and Phaedrus." History of Platonism: Plato Redivivus. Ed. John Finamore and Robert Berchman. New Orleans: University P of the South, 2005. 35-52.

 

Gruber, Gwen. "Immortality Vs. Tripartition: the Soul in Plato." History of Platonism: Plato Redivivus. Ed. John Finamore and Robert Berchman. New Orleans: University P of the South, 2005. 19-34.

 

Hall, Robert W. "Plato and Totalitarianism." Plato. Ed. John Dunn and Ian Harris. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997. 378-387.

 

Hampshire, Stuart. Justice is Conflict. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000.

 

Kenny, A.j.p. "Mental Health in Plato's Republic." Plato. Ed. John Dunn and Ian Harris. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997. 342-366.

 

Martin, Raymond, and John Barresi. The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self.

New York

:

Columbia

UP, 2006.

 

Nettleship, Richard L. Lectures on the Republic of Plato. London: MacMillan and Co, 1963.

 

Parry, Richard D. "The Unhappy Tyrant and the Craft of Inner Rule." The

Cambridge

Companion to Plato's Republic. Ed. G.r.f. Ferrari. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. 386-414.

 

Shields, Christopher. "Simple Souls." Essays on Plato's Psychology. Ed. Ellen Wagner. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. 137-156.

 

Smith, Nicholas D. "Plato's Analogy of Soul and State." Essays on Plato's Psychology. Ed. Ellen Wagner. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. 115-136.

Taylor, C.c.w. "The Arguments in the Phaedo Concerning the Thesis That the Soul is a Harmonia." Essays on Plato's Psychology. Ed. Ellen Wagner. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. 51-68.

 

Vlastos, Gregory. "Justice and Psychic Harmony in the Republic." Plato. Ed. John Dunn and Ian Harris. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997. 367-385.

 

Wagner, Ellen. "Supervenience and the Thesis That the Soul is a Harmonia." Essays on Plato's Psychology. Ed. Ellen Wagner. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. 69-90.

 

Williams, Bernard. "The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's Republic." Essays on Plato's Psychology. Ed. Ellen Wagner. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. 157-168.

 

Woods, Michael, and Ian Harris. "Plato's Division of the Soul." Plato. Ed. John Dunn. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997. 353-377.

 


[1] The comparison between Plato’s tripartite soul and Freud’s Id, Ego, and Supergo was discussed in Ferrari, 176-178.

[2] Martin and Barresi, 18.

[3] Some scholars argue that the Phaedo depicts a unified soul, and it was not until the Republic and the Phaedrus that Plato fully fleshed out his tripartite model. See Martin and Barresi, 17.

[4] For a more detailed discussion of the Principle of Opposites, see Woods, 360; Nettleship, 155, though he identifies this as the Law of Identity and Contradiction.

[5] The text reads, “Ού γάρ δή, φαμέν, τό γε αύτό τώι αύτώι έατου πέρι τό αύτό ‘άμ’ ‘ά<ν> τάναντία πράττοι”.

[6] Aristotle states in his Metaphysics, 1005b12-20: “He who examines the most general features of existence, must investigate also the principles of reasoning. For he who gets the best grasp of his respective subject will be most able to discuss its basic principles. So that he who gets the best grasp of existing things qua existing must be able to discuss the basic principles of all existence; and he is the philosopher. And the most certain principle of all is that about which it is impossible to be mistaken... It is clear, then, that such a principle is the most certain of all and we can state it thus: "It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect."

[8] See the book, The Culture of Classicism by Caroline Winterer (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2002) for a more detailed description of this fundamental shift in thought. For a more general account of the decline in the Classics in education, see Who Killed Homer by Victor Davis Hanson and John Heath (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 1998).

[9] Averroes, 51.20-52.28.

[12] Many scholars, however, have debated this due to Plato’s ever-changing description of the soul. In the Phaedo, Plato depicts a uniform soul, existing in a state of harmonia. See Finamore, 48; Taylor, 51-68, who discusses more about the concept of harmonia and its relationship to Pythagoreanism and music; and Wagner, 69-90 for a more detailed discussion of harmonia in the Phaedo and the unified soul. Plato seems to have found it difficult to rectify his belief in the immortality of the soul and the tripartite nature of the soul. For more on this, see Gruber, 19-34.

[13] Ferrari, 175, likens the cogitative to a negotiator who in fact has to take the demands of the appetitive and the spirited and negotiate a solution based upon its acculturation or education. This leads him to believe that the cogitative is in fact very weak, being only strengthened by education, which could explain Plato’s heavy emphasis upon education.

[14] See Annas, 20-33 for a discussion of the origins of Pneuma.

I'm coming back...

That's right.  I'm coming back for good, and lots of changes are on the way (I know, I know-I've said that before).

This time though, I'm sticking to the blogging-no .Mac, no Website, no Media (for now at least).

I'd always wanted to return, but my life has been quite hectic for about 2 years.  Now, however, I feel like I have the time and energy to return.

I'll kick things off with two articles I wrote concerning Plato and his influences upon the world.  Hopefully you guys will like them :).

February 17, 2006

Pluck the Day?

    Probably the most commonly used and well known of Latin phrases is Carpe Diem, which everybody translates as, "Seize the Day!".  The 1989 movie "The Dead Poet's Society" has the charismatic teacher tell his students, "But if you listen real close, you can hear them whisper their legacy to you. Go on, lean in. Listen, you hear it? --- Carpe --- hear it? --- Carpe, carpe diem, seize the day boys, make your lives extraordinary."  Rightfully so, this phrase has been a positive, motivating factor in the lives of millions of people.  But in truth, this phrase has been misrepresented!  "Carpe", in fact, does not come from the Latin word "Capio", which means to seize.  It comes from the Latin word "carpo", which means to pluck.  Carpe is the second person singular command form of carpo, meaning essentially, "You, pluck!"  Diem is the English Objective case for day, meaning that it is the object of the verb carpo.  So in effect, the saying really means, "You [there], pluck the day!".  How can someone "pluck" the day?  And furthermore, where does pluck come from?
    Horace is a famous Latin poet (Horatius) who lived at the end of the Republic and the beginnings of the formation of the Empire (65 bce-8 bce roughly).  His most famous poem is Ode I-XI.  Translated into english, it is:

     "Ask not - we cannot know - what end the gods have set for you, for me; nor attempt the Babylonian reckonings Leuconoë. How much better to endure whatever comes, whether Jupiter grants us additional winters or whether this is our last, which now wears out the Tuscan Sea upon the barrier of the cliffs! Be wise, strain the wine; and since life is brief, prune back far-reaching hopes! Even while we speak, envious time has passed: pluck the day, putting as little trust as possible in tomorrow!"

    A major element of this poem centers around the Classical belief in Fate (which truly does not contradict volition).  Fate was considered to be everything outside of an individual's control.  For example, regardless of one's hopes or wishes, it will rain.  That it rains or does not rain is considered fate. The first part of the poem, up to the sentence beginning with, "Be wise...", states in essential modern terms, "Whatever happens by fate, happens.  Therefore, it's better to endure these things and overcome them, as opposed to constantly standing in fear of them."
    It is in the seond part of the poem that the famous carpe diem enters the stage.  From the line, "Be wise, strain the wine;" we can finally understand (due to the constant weather references) that Horace is singing about farmers and agriculture.  Continuing with his agricultural motif, he says, "Even while we speak, envious time has passed: pluck the day, putting as little trust as possible in tomorrow!"  Horace is thus saying that, though the rain clouds may be coming in, though the summers heat may show no sign of wavering, or though tomorrow might bring record low temperatures, we have before us right now a task (a field).  Instead of fretting over fate, we must produce as much as we can today.  To pluck the day really means to harvest as much from the day as we can.  Or put more simply, to work as hard as we can to produce as much as we can...today, right now, with no delay.
    This focus on production is the key distinction between the more unspecified, often hedonistic "Seize the day!" and the specified, hard working "Pluck the day!"  It might sound better, however, to say "Produce today!"  Nevertheless, this once inspiring phrase should have a more dear meaning to all Americans.  That famous Yankee Ingenuity is in fact the same thing as "Carpe Diem!".  And just like the Romans, it is now the Americans who dominate the world; not because of Imperial might, but because of Productive Ability.  To put it more simply, Americans are just damn good pluckers.

-----Jason Roberts

February 08, 2006

Life's Lessons Vol. 6

Here related is the story of the flea and the man:

"Once, a flea was irritating a man relentlessly.  So he caught it and said to it:
    'Who are you, who makes a meal of all my limbs, biting me all over at random?'
    The flea answered:
    'That's the way we live.  Don't kill me, for I can't do much harm.'
    The man started to laugh and said:
    'You're going to die now, and at my hands, for however great or small the harm it is imperative to stop you from breeding.'"

    The attitude of this man may catch the modern man off guard.  The modern attitude would call this man, "cruel" and state that he should simply "swat the flea away".  But to the Greeks and Romans, justice was about doing what is right and not about being attentive to the feelings of your enemy.  Ayn Rand once spoke of how the clemency given to the guilty is treason to the innocent.  Similarly, any clemency given to a threat is treason not only to your own future innocence, but to the innocence of anyone else upon whom the threat is released.

    The statue of Lady Justice displays a blindfolded woman holding a system of weights.  In our day-to-day dealings with reality, we must face each problem rationally and free from our passions (blind-folded), weighing the evidence to make a decision.  Only in this manner may justice be served.  Anything else is treason.

-----Jason Roberts

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Hellenikoi We Are

    Herodotus was one of the first Greek intellectuals to distinguish the hundreds of city states in Greece from the rest of the world.  In effect, though Sparta and Athens represented two different governments with sometimes drastically different views, there was one common thread that united these two and distinguished them from the 'barbaroi'.  Victor Davis Hanson, in his book, "Who Killed Homer?", noted that to be Hellenikos was to believe that, "Science, research, and the acquisition of knowledge itself are to remain apart from both religious and political authority," (29); that, "Military power operates under and is checked by civilian control," (30); that a government should be constitutional and consensual; that, "Religion is separate from and subordinate to political authority," (31); that the average citizen, the middle class, should form the backbone of society; that, "Private property and free economic activity are immune from government coercion and interference," (33); and that, "Dissent and open criticism of government, religion, and the military," are inherent in free societies.

    We in America may argue with Europe.  We may change the name of "French Fries" to "Freedom Fries".  We may laugh at Italian fashion or mock German politics.  But what many do not understand is that these are the actions of brothers, which indeed we are.  And in such a time of crisis, now more than ever we should affirm that brotherly bond.  One of the greatest influences upon American Politics was John Locke, an Englishman.  Victor Hugo stands with Alexander Dumas, both Frenchmen, as Classics taught in every High School in America.   The music of Beethoven and Mozart, a German and an Austrian, still play in Concert Halls, on television, and in movies across America.  And where would Pizza Hut be without Italy?  Seriously though, Victor Davis Hanson's description of what a Greek was can just as easily be applied to what an American or a European is today.  Indeed, the Danish Prime Minister has said:

"Danes have for generations fought for political liberty, human rights and democracy and for economic freedom, free trade and a free and civilized world. We will continue to do that. It is a part of our history and a fundamental part of our society today." 

   

Clearly America and Europe share one very important, indeed the most important, connection: we are Western.  And to be Western is to be Hellenikos.

    In light of the recent outrage across the world over the Danish Cartoons, (which can be found here), the issue of Hellenikoi vs. Barbaroi is once again at stake.  Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Corinth, and the rest of the Greek Poleis argued and fought constantly.  But when two million Persians threatened freedom itself, the common bond of Hellenikos allowed the Greeks to overcome the seemingly impossible.  In 2001, a new Persia crossed the Hellespont.  And though we survived that Marathon and have inflicted heavy damages, this enemy is far from dead.  Now more than ever, we should extend our support across the pond and stand by Denmark.

"I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."
-Voltaire

-----Jason Roberts

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February 01, 2006

Virtue in Acting

    The most dominant Christian Protestant theme of redemption in today's world is, "Saved (assured a spot in heaven) by grace (the grace of God) through faith."  They affirm that belief in Jesus, both inwardly and proclaimed, will lead to a morally upright life.  Sin, then, is an inherent part of every human that is impossible to ignore or overcome on one's own.  Therefore, it is not by one's own actions, but by the grace of God and the affirmation of the believer that a person obtains a permanent place in eternal glory.  What a radical departure from the Greeks and Romans (and even the Catholic Church)! 

    In the New Testament, the word for sin is ἁμαρτάνω (hamartano). To the Greeks, this word's unpolluted meaning was, "To miss the mark, to make a mistake, to err...".  It implied a teleological end that one was missing.  To "miss the mark" was to do something that did not lead you to the goal you were trying to achieve.  This is reflective of the Greco-Roman concept of ethics; that everything we do aims at some good, that the ultimate good is happiness, and that ethics is the means by which we obtain that good.  Unlike the later Christians, the Greeks and Romans did not believe in "original sin", man's "fallen nature", intrinsic evil, or even intrinsic ethics.  In fact, Epictetus said, "As a mark is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world."

     The intrinsic ethics of Christianity leads ultimately to one thing: guilt.  If man is by nature evil, and if  he himself is unable to overcome this evil, and if the only way to overcome it is to go outside one's self and proclaim belief in a supernatural force, then man  has no hope of earning  virtue of his own accord, and becomes a spiritual slave to the non-existent being who "saves" him by "grace".  Ultimately, life is not worth living, all men are bad, and the universe is malevolent.  No wonder the  Romans and Greeks  were disgusted by the Christians.  A culture that believed,  "...the whole glory of virtue is in activity..."  (Cicero),  is a culture that believed that this life is worth living, man by nature has the potential to do wonderful things, and this universe is truly benevolent.

     Sadly, Christianity's almost 2000 year domination of ethics has led to a moral belief, even by non-Christians, that ethics is an absolute and intrinsic entity.  A person who utters one lie is a liar (forget context).  A person who shakes before his first battle is a coward.  A person who becomes drunk once is an alcoholic.  The person who lied once feels guilty because he is now a liar.  The person who was afraid before his first battle feels guilty because he is now a coward.  The person who became drunk once now feels guilty because he is an alcoholic.  And in a typical, intrinsic style, the solution to this problem (even to many Christians) is to head far in the opposite direction.  The person who lied once now will never lie, even if the reason is just (it's just to lie to an enemy wishing to harm your family).  The person who  was afraid before his first battle is now  overtly rash, putting himself in unnecessary danger in order to be "brave".  The person who became drunk once now will never drink alcohol again.

    But we must remember the second part of the equation.  Aristotle said that  "Arete (moral excellence), then, is not an act, but a habit."  The man who aims at being honest, and continues to deal with life in an honest manner, but misses the mark and lies once, is not a liar.  The alternative is not a radical departure,  is not to feel guilty, or to proclaim that  one need's a Savior.  The alternative is to recognize one's fault and move on; to continue  telling the truth.  That lie ends up becoming, not a roadblock to virtue, but a stumbling point.  And instead of turning around, the mistake turns into a lesson from which virtue can be more easily  obtained.   Ultimately, ethics is not an intrinsic  field where "sin" is a stain upon the soul.  Instead, ethics is an organic and dynamic field where "mistakes" are merely us falling off the bike.  And what do we do when we fall off the bike?  We get back up, dust ourselves off, and  get back on the bike.  There's no time for guilt when there's a life to live and a world to conquer.  Leave that to the Christians.

-----Jason Roberts (Crossposted to the Egosphere)

January 26, 2006

Where Have All The Cowboys Gone?

  Demosthenes, a 4th century b.c.e. Greek Orator, advised that young men, "...possess beauty in respect of person, self-discipline in respect of soul, and manliness in respect of both...".  Cicero, a 1st century b.c.e. Roman Orator, advised us that fortune, or the random events of reality outside of our control, "…ought to be beaten back by a strong and manly soul, as a wave is by a rock."  In fact, our modern word for virtue comes from the Latin word virtus, which means courage, excellence, or manliness (virtus itself comes from the Latin word vir, meaning man).  The ancients were obsessed with the concept of manliness.  A man, according to Aristotle, is one who is confident in the face of danger, moderate in his use and enjoyment of opulent things, magnanimous in estimation of his own worth, ambitious in his desire of honor, patient in response and dealings with his passions, truthful in his life and dealings with others, righteously indignant when done wrong, and just towards himself and others.  He paints a beautiful portrait of this person, saying that this man:

“…does not take petty risks, nor does he court danger, because there are few things that he values highly; but he takes great risks, and when he faces danger he is unsparing of his life, because to him there are some circumstances in which it is not worth living…He is bound to…speak and act straightforwardly…and he cannot bear to live in dependence upon somebody else…He does not nurse resentment…In troubles that are unavoidable or of minor importance he is the last person to complain or ask for help…his gait is measured, his voice deep, his speech unhurried.” (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics)

  One familiar with the writings of Ayn Rand will find an illustration of this definition in the characters of John Galt, Hank Rearden, Francisco d’Anconia, and Howard Roark.  Many of these virtues are shared with women. The major difference, however, between the manly John Galt and the womanly Dagny Taggart was Galt’s supreme confidence in dealing with reality (other Objectivist women have stressed similar themes).

   To the ancients, it was manliness that defeated the Persians at Marathon. It was manliness that allowed the Spartans to fight at Thermopylae. It was manliness that caused Xenophon and his 10,000 to return from the depths of the Persian Empire to Greece. Manliness was one of the key distinctions the Greeks and Romans saw between themselves and the Barbarians, be they the effiminate and opulent Persians or the unbalanced and barbaric Celts.  Manliness was the attribute that protected the West's birth of Freedom and Thought.

    But today, every single element of manliness that Aristotle described is under attack.  The 1960's ushered  in the era of the Feminists.  Unlike intellectual trends, feminism became a cultural trend.  But not only was their view of womanliness skewed, their view of manliness was also dangerously wrong.  Sadly, this view has come to dominate our culture, beit in the form of the metrosexual, the effeminate man, or the man in touch with his feminine side. Instead of a man who is courageous and confident in facing reality,  men are now told that it is okay to be soft and cowardly.  Instead of a man who is moderate, men are now told to indulge themselves in the luxuries of life; to spend huge sums on fashionable clothes, stylish haircuts, and manicures.  Instead of a man who is magnanimous, men are now told to be pusillanimous; to apologize for their greatness and expound upon their defects.  Instead of a man who is ambitious in his desire of honor, men are now told to seek the lowly and to be meek.   Instead of a man who is patient in response to his passions, men are now told to cry uncontrollably, to let their emotions pour out. Instead of a man who is truthful, men are now told that white lies are okay, and that it is better to flatter than to "offend".  Instead of a man who is righteously indignant, men are now told to turn the other cheek; to forgive and forget; to be compassionate to our worst enemies.  And instead of a man who is just, men are now told to trade favors, to barter for social acceptance, to achieve by means of social connections, to be tolerant of all opinions, and to love thy neighbor as thyself.

    What are the consequences of the destruction of manliness? The bird flu has not even killed 60 people in the entire world (or 0.00000001% of the world's population).  But we are bombarded with cries of fear and panic, told to stay away from chickens and other birds, to keep our children out of the parks where birds are, and prepare for the worst pandemic the world has ever seen (remember, it's wrong to be confident in the face of reality). 50 years ago, Americans were fit and trim.  But now, obesity is sky-rocketing and quickly becoming the greatest health risk in America today (remember, it's wrong to be moderate).  To your average American in the mid-20th century, depression was an emotional state that could be overcome on your own and ADD/ADHD was unheard of.  But now, 18.8 million people are depressed, and 1 in 8 adolescents are depressed (remember, it's wrong to keep your passions under control and deal with them patiently).  Before the 1960's, Americans generally trusted their government.  But ever since Richard Nixon, a chronic distrust has grown throughout America; not only for politicians (Bill Clinton), but for husbands and wives (divorce), children and school (cheating), the media (Rathergate), and even science (Faked Cells) (remember, it's okay to tell a white lie...).  September 11th rekindled the fire of manliness.  But five years later, we are told that the Iraqi war was a mistake, that we should withdraw our troops, and that we should enter into more "diplomatic talks" with a soon-to-be nuclear Iran (remember, it's wrong to believe in righteous indignation).   

    Even a few women have noticed the disappearance of the manly man.  Bonnie Tyler's song, "Holding Out for a Hero", says:

"Where have all the good men gone
And where are all the gods?
Where’s the street-wise Hercules
To fight the rising odds?

Isn’t there a white knight upon a fiery steed?
Late at night I toss and I turn and I dream of what I need

I need a hero
I'm holding out for at hero 'till the end of the night
He's gotta be strong
And he's gotta be fast
And he's gotta be fresh from the fight

I need a hero
I’m holding out for a hero 'till the morning light
He’s gotta be sure
And it’s gotta be soon
And he’s gotta be larger than life." (bold mine)

Paula Cole asked:

"Where is my John Wayne
Where is my Prairie Son
Where is my happy ending
Where have all the cowboys gone

Where is my Marlboro man
Where is his shiny gun
Where is my lonely ranger
Where have all the cowboys gone?"

    Both of these women, in a nostalgic tone, are seeking the strong, proud, and confident man of the past.  Even Neo-Con Ann Coulter has voiced similar desires.

    For centuries, philosophers have attacked our ability to comprehend reality via reason.  But now, the very ability to exist in and deal with reality is under attack.  The loss of manliness has not come about because of a small philosophical movement, generally detached from our culture.  This loss has come because the culture itself, your average American, has accepted as true the feminist’s doctrines. From Hollywood to Washington, from Chicago to Houston, men are abdicating that most sacred of Western weapons, the shield of manliness that has allowed our society to exist for over 2.5 thousand years.  And because this is not an intellectual movement, but a cultural movement, this trend must be fought, it must be stopped, and it must be stopped now.  Philosophers will not be able to reverse this trend.  Only your average American can.  And may the rallying cry be the advice of Plato, that men be, "...not only wise but manly, with [the] ability to carry out their purpose to the full; and who will not falter through softness of soul."

-----Jason Roberts (Crossposted to the Egosphere)

Life's Lessons Vol. 5

   

Here related is the story of the ass bought at a market:

"A man who intended to buy an ass took it on trial and led it to the manger to mix with his others.  But the ass, turning its back on the others, went and stood beside the laziest and fattest of the lot.  As it stood there and did nothing, the man put a halter on it and led it back to its owner.  The owner asked the man if he had given it a fair trial, and he replied:
    'I don't need any further trial.  I am certain of what he's like because of the companion he chose among the lot.' "

    That human beings have volition is a fact of nature not to be disputed.  But something many people forget, especially those firm believers in volition, is how one's friends, society, and environment influences them.  Usually the influences are very subtle, including the way a person speaks (including slang phrases) and certain mannerisms. But slowly, these small and seemingly harmless things translate into much larger and deeper problems.  A cynical, joking attitude between friends, over time, translates into a cynical view of life.  Listening to nothing but foul-mouthed language slowly turns into a brutish way of speaking.
    The ancients taught us that, in the words of Aristotle, "We are what we repeatedly do."  Habits form the basis for our character, no matter how big or small.  Knowing this, the man chose not to buy the donkey based upon the sloven crowd that he associated with.  Sloven friends leads to a sloven life.  The moral then?  For positive results, surround yourself with positive things, positive environments, and positive friends.

-----Jason Roberts

January 25, 2006

Great Quote

I stumbled upon a great quote from Theodore Roosevelt:

"The Roman Republic fell, not because of the ambition of Caesar or Augustus, but because it had already long ceased to be in any real sense a republic at all. When the sturdy Roman plebeian, who lived by his own labor, who voted without reward according to his own convictions, and who with his fellows formed in war the terrible Roman legion, had been changed into an idle creature who craved nothing in life save the gratification of a thirst vapid excitement, who was fed by the state, and who directly or indirectly sold his vote to the highest bidder, then the end of the republic was at hand, and nothing could save it. The laws were the same as they had been, but the people behind the laws had changed, and so the laws counted nothing."

And how true it is!  He captured something very important that we Americans must always consider (this will also be a recurring theme of mine).  America will not fall because of a bad President, or a corrupt government.  It will not fall because of a mixed economic system or a Welfare state.  It will only fall if the once great American worker, the American middle class, changes their values from one of rugged independence to sloven and opulent dependence.  Rome fell by an abandonment of morality.  And so can we.

-----Jason Roberts

January 21, 2006

It's that Time again

Well, I'm back.  Between my father having a stroke, moving, college (with intense studies in Greek and Latin), and the Military, I've had very little time to write.  But it seems that I have now found a few spare minutes to share my experiences in the Classical World.  I will probably stick mostly to short little excerpts of Classical Wisdom, and hopefully I'll bring back some more of that good old man named Aesop.

I'm currently re-studying the history of Ancient Rome, with an intense focus right now on the Kings (prior to the Republic).  I've already shared a bit about Servius Tullius.  There are also other kings who have many wonderful traits of their own.  So be on the look out for something on people such as Numa.

For those of you who have continued to come back all of these months that I've been gone, I thank you.  Hopefully I'll be able to bring you all many more valuable things.

-----Jason Roberts

August 18, 2005

Leonard Peikoff and The Greeks

    On a ship in 1997, Dr. Leonard Peikoff delivered a very personal speech in front of a group of Objectivist entitled, "Why Ancient Greece Is My Favorite Civilization". What sets this lecture apart from others given by Objectivist (such as Gary Hull's "The Brilliance of Ancient Greece") is how personal the lecture is.  At one point, Peikoff states (note: I transcribed this from the video.  Any error should be directed towards myself):

". this ship's journey is the closest I can ever get now to the spirit that I saw for three decades in the person of Ayn Rand.  And I wanted to experience that feeling one more time as fuel: the feeling I had known with her, and is possible outside of her and the world she created, only in contact with Ancient Greece."

    During the question and answer period, Gary Hull (the same man who gave the lecture, "The Brilliance of Ancient Greece" after the trip) asked Dr. Peikoff if he would prefer living in Ancient Greece instead of modern times.  He used plumbing as an example of the modern amenities our society has.  Dr. Peikoff said in response (once again, transcribed):

"Oh absolutely, are you kidding?
[...]
I'm not putting down technology.  But I'm saying that if I had a choice of living in a culture that is utterly barren and void but technologically still the way it is today, or completely backward, non-technological culture such as Ancient Greece -- I would, without hesitation, go back to Ancient Greece. Now I'm sure I would miss the plumbing there, and that it would be a big problem on this ship [laughter from the audience], [...] but that still does not mean that my choice of life would be made on that grounds.

I would much rather the intellectual life of that kind of society and the potentialities of the future, rather than live in a society which... Remember, you're free to take a different opinion; this is, in my opinion, an optional issue. I'm not here trying to prove that anybody who is happy in the world today has something wrong with them. [laughter from the audience] It's an optional issue.

Look, I've been fighting the trend in the world for 45 years, and it's gotten worse for 45 years. I've become very bitter in my old age, and I've found a lot of solace in the fact that people used to be a lot better than they were, in reading literature from the past and considering past civilizations.  That's one of the things that keeps me... sane."

    Not only is this lecture highly enlightening, it is a unique glimpse at the personal values of Dr. Peikoff.  And at $19.95, it's a steal.

---Jason Roberts

Life's Lessons Vol. 4: The Eagle and the Arrow

    Here related is the story of the Eagle and the Arrow:

An Eagle was soaring through the air when suddenly it heard the whizz of an Arrow, and felt itself wounded to death. Slowly it fluttered down to the earth, with its life-blood pouring out of it. Looking down upon the Arrow with which it had been pierced, it found that the shaft of the Arrow had been feathered with one of its own plumes. "Alas!" it cried, as it died,

"We often give our enemies the means for our own destruction."

    As reader Bryan pointed out, this fable is a perfect illustration of how the West has been acting recently, in terms of foreign policy.  From 1980 to 1988, the United States sent money and materials (including weapons) to Iraq, aiding them in their war with Iran. Also in the 1980's, the United States sent a couple of billion dollars in aid to Afghanistan in order to fund their operations against Soviet Russia.  This is the same Soviet Russia that the United States kept alive during both World Wars, sending food, money, and weapons over.  All three turned out to be enemies of the US, and two of the three have fought a war against the US.

    The moral, then, is obvious.  An enemy of your enemy is not your friend.  A friend is only one who agrees with you on a moral level.  It was not wrong in World War 2 for the United States to send aid over to Great Britain.  It was wrong to send aid to the Soviet Union.  It is not wrong today for the US to send aid over to Israel.  It is wrong to send aid to nations such as Saudi Arabia.

    What we need is a return to a Foreign Policy of Self-Interest.  Actions should be made on principle, and that principle is clear: love thy ally almost as thyself, and kick the hell out of thy enemy.

---Jason Roberts

August 17, 2005

"Axiomatic"

Don Watkins at Anger Management has begun a new project.  I suggest you check it out:

I am pleased to announce that I’m currently developing an online magazine, Axiomatic.

Since The Intellectual Activist became almost exclusively a current events publication, there has been no place for Objectivists to publish or read articles that analyze Objectivism, apply Objectivist principles to other fields of study, or help readers integrate Objectivism into daily lives. I’ve decide to create such a forum.

Axiomatic is a publication for Objectivists who wish to write seriously about Objectivist topics that are inappropriate for mainstream publications, and who do not wish to write for anti-Objectivist publications. (We will also welcome authors who wish to publish anonymously in order to protect their identity – especially individuals pursuing careers in academia, a world often hostile to Objectivists.)

As this project moves forward, I will keep you all informed of its progress. For people who are interested in receiving regular updates by email, please send me an email with the subject line, “Axiomatic: Reader.”

To those interested in writing for us: Axiomatic is not affiliated with any other organization or publication, but it is committed to Objectivism and therefore will not publish works by enemies of Objectivism or of Ayn Rand – this includes but is not limited to libertarians, anarchists, "tolerationists," people Ayn Rand condemned or who've condemned Ayn Rand, and anyone who sanctions members of the aforementioned groups.

Additionally, Axiomatic will only publish works that demonstrate a thorough, sophisticated understanding of Objectivism. Anyone may subscribe to and read Axiomatic, but in order to adhere to the highest standards of quality, we ask that those best described as “students of Objectivism” not submit anything for publication.

That said, if you are interested in writing for us, send me an email with the subject line “Axiomatic: Writer,” and I will send you a copy of our submission guidelines.

I am also looking for one or two advanced Objectivists who would be interested in a role either as a senior editor or as consulting editor (this latter position would involve intellectual consultation rather than copy editing), so if that interests you, let me know as well.

This is a for-profit venture, so all participants will be paid for their efforts.

One final note: no one is authorized to speak for Ayn Rand or Objectivism – certainly not I. Every author will speak only for himself, and although it is our policy not to publish anything that isn’t congruent with Objectivist principles, each reader will have to judge for himself whether we’ve succeeded at that task.

Thank you all!

Don Watkins

egoist(at)gmail.com

---Jason Roberts

August 15, 2005

Heroism in Farming

    Anyone who has read "Atlas Shrugged" understands the virtue of the Industrialist.  But what about farmers?  While the true, agrarian lifestyle may seem foreign to us in the modern, industrial world, agrarianism was an ideal from ancient Greece and Rome up to the Founding Fathers.  It was not considered arbitrary when the Founding Fathers envisioned a Republic of Farmers.  Quite the contrary, they believed that the greatest way to ensure a virtuous population was to maintain the spirit of a farmer.

    But we don't know what that is today; those of us who actually do live near "farmers" witness hundreds of acres run by machines and government subsidies.  Very few farmers farm the way they did hundreds of years ago.  Luckily, Victor Davis Hanson was one of those farmers.  When he left farming to become a professor of Classics, he left behind an ideal that is all but dead now.  Realizing this, he wrote, Fields Without Dreams: Defending the Agrarian Idea. I am about 1/4 of the way finished right now, and already am very much impressed with this book.  Instead of an abstract book, it is a memoir about his days at the farm and how it taught him many lessons.  By reading this, you begin to see "firsthand" why farming is a virtuous endeavor.  When I finish, I'll post a review as well as a more in-depth look at Farming in general.  For now, I'll end with this from the book:

"Farming is heroic, a midnight dash to get water on blooming fruit trees when the spring nights plunge below freezing.  Farming as a natural enterprise is tough, the need to disk and harrow with the flu, prune with the sprained ankle,pick overripe fruit with the stones in the kidney.  Farming involves deed, not mere word, reality over theory, substance over brag and big talk, for ugly trees can produce beautiful fruit, rain comes when it should not, and kindly neighbors will press you until stopped."

---Jason Roberts

What's Been Said About History

Thanks to reader Janet Busch, in the process of looking for the precise wording of a quote, I stumbled upon a treasure trove of history quotes.

David Ben Gurion, first Prime Minister of Israel, stated: "Anyone who believes you can't change history has never tried to write his memoirs."

Edward Gibbon, author of "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire", and considered by many to be the greatest historian of all time, said: "I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience. I know no way of judging of the future but by the past."

Etienne Gilson, a French Historian and Philosopher, said of history: "History is the only laboratory we have in which to test the consequences of thought."

American Philosopher George Santayana said: "Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it."

American humorist and writer Mark Twain said: "To arrive at a just estimate of a renowned man's character one must judge it by the standards of his time, not ours."

This quote is attributed to Thucydides, though I believe the website to be false (I'm pretty sure that Dionysius of Halicarnassus said this): "History is philosophy teaching by examples."

While I may not agree with the personal philosophies of many of the people who said these things, I can agree with the essence of what they said.  I cannot emphasize enough the importance of learning history, of understanding history, and of living by the principles taught via history.  Janet Busch, however, can:

"...it struck me how important it is to have intellectuals who are able to bring past experiences in human ways of life to light, especially at critical times (like now). I have certainly felt the lack of it these days. It is easy to see how Americans, generally speaking, have become unarmed against enemy propaganda; we have stopped teaching history and replaced it with "culture studies." Learning about the particulars of tribal dancing or food preparation doesn't tell you anything about the ideas that rule the culture, nor does it teach you how to make a judgment about it. It is a stark lesson (and a really good reason to have this site!)"

Amen.

---Jason Roberts

August 12, 2005

Update

    After being busy/gone for a week and posting, I was once again busy for another week!  I agreed to work a double-shift for over a week, so I have in essence been at work from 5 am-11pm every day with a few breaks in between.  Needless to say I was really tired!

    I still have 2 articles planned out and intend to write them (I spoke of them in my last update).  I also plan on writing a new Life's Lesson, suggested by a reader, and a Virtue in Action about Leonidas, the Spartan King at the battle of Thermopylae.

    I also am reading a very good book called, Fields Without Dreams.  It is a book that discusses Agrarianism as an ideal; I'll be providing commentary, and finally a review, as I finish it up.

--Jason Roberts

Apple

    I know that I have a certain "area", or "angle".  However, I've come across such a value that I can't help but share it!  As quoted, by me, on The Forum:

"I just recently bought an Apple laptop for School. I have been a PC user all my life, and since a very early age was taught that Apple was the "other computer" that we didn't buy. However, I have a few friends who have Apples and was also offered a great deal if I bought it. So I did.

What struck me at first (and has for awhile) is the esthetic beauty of Apple. Their love of simplicity and whiteness makes their computers very elegant. It turns out that this idea is the Theme of Apple: Simplicity, Integration, Harmony, and thus...Power. PC's have always seemed cluttered to me. They were like buying a car engine and frame, and then everything else is seperate and must be added. The result? A weird looking, multi-colored, odd-shaped car. But when using my apple, I feel like every single thing was done for a purpose. Every program relies upon and builds upon the other. Thus every program is nicely connected, purposeful, and destinguishably Apple. There is a nice ease-of-mind when using an Apple, one that makes me want to shout, "But of course!"

I am also impressed by Apple's ingenuity. There are many features in both their laptop and Operating System that blow my mind (and I'm still discovering many of them!). Some examples:

-Hot Corners: move your mouse to a corner of the screen, and an action will happen (such as automatically start your Screen Saver)

-Stickies: for all those tiny notes you take (such as a telephone number), stickies are basically virtual post-it notesin multiple colors. Much better than using MSword/Notepad

-Expose: allows you to focus on one application, or multiple.  Great program when you have multiple windows/programs open.

-iChat: AOL Instant Messenger with upgrades. It includes an automatic LAN feature that allows you to see/communicate with anybody in your network. CNN has just started using it to conduct interviews via its powerful audio/video chat software.

-Spellcheck: Many programs have spellcheck built in. iChat, for example, spellchecks everything you type. Why hasn't somebody thought of this before?

All in all, I'm converted. It reminds me of what Howard Roark stated about Architecture; and believe me, I feel like I'm using a computer that has integrity."

User and friend Carlos E. Jordan also had this to add:

My favorite application has to be Sherlock, with one application I can:
use an online Yellow Pages to find virtually any business, nearly anywhere;

use a program to search literally over a hundred airlines, checking their arrival times, departure times, status, etc;

use a pictures application to search for pictures on the internet;

use Stocks to keep track of companies on the stock market;

use Movies which allows me to search for theaters by zip-code, see what movies they are showing, what time, and watch previews;

use a dictionary;

use a language translator;

and use the program AppleCare.

When I was going to a Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu tournament in Dallas Texas, I was looking for a Hotel as close to the location of the event as possible.

Using Yellow Pages on Sherlock, for some reason I could find the school the event was happening at on a map, get directions to it, then use Yellow Pages to find the nearest Hotel along with its phone-number cool.gif


Apple

wub.gif

I still have my desktop PC, but from now on it looks like I'll be typing on my Apple!

---Jason Roberts

August 08, 2005

Alexander the Movie

    I saw the movie Alexander when it came out in theaters.  The entire movie was a let-down.  In response to this flop, Director Oliver Stone "remade" the movie and released it on DVD.  I decided to give it a try, and found that it is still bloated with three main problems (Think of one as a fat, and the other as 'fat-free' fat.  You can say it is something different, but unless you change the nature of the entity, it will remain the same).

I encountered three main problems:

1.) Homosexuality: Homosexuality in and of itself does not bother me.  Nor does two men kissing (like they did in the movie), speaking to each other romantically, etc.  My problem with Alexander is that Oliver Stone took a theory (that Alexander may have been bisexual), and blew it up to such a giant sexual conflict within his character.  Instead of homosexuality being a part of Alexander's character, it became almost his defining characteristic.  I felt smothered by Stone; it was too much to handle.  Had they cut back on the homosexuality image and made it a part of his character as opposed to "him", the new Director's Cut would have been decent.  But they didn't, and thus it isn't decent.

2.) His Mother: In order to heighten the conflict, Stone portrayed Alexander's mother Olympias as this psychotic witch who used her words to poison the mind of Alexander.  Instead, it poisoned the movie.  While Angelina Jolie's acting was actually very good, the character she played was overbearing in her violence, outrage, darkness, and manipulation.  Instead of a strong and manly Alexander, we get a weak and torn, slavish Alexander chained to the whim of his mother.

3.) Lack of Battles and Military Conflict- This is a movie about Alexander, the greatest conqueror in history.  You would expect that a movie about him would show why he is so famous.  Besides one good battle scene and a psychedelic battle scene in India, the movie lacks battles and warfare.  The reason? It spent too long talking about his homo/bisexuality and his overbearing mother.  What battle scenes I saw, I liked.  I was expecting more of a "Troy" than a psychological film about a deranged homosexual.

Though these faults are enough to ruin the film, it does actually have value.  What I enjoyed most about this movie was the constant reference to "Greekness".  In fact, I would call this movie more Greek than any Greco-Roman historical film I've seen.  Stone seems to have gone to great lengths to add many features of Greek life, such as birds before battle (good omen) to Aristotle's lectures on moderation and temperance.  These elements are very ingrained into the movie however, and only somebody familiar with the Greek world will be able to pick up these treats (it doesn't say that eagles are good omens, it just expects you to know).

Overall, I'd say, "Don't watch it."  It's a waste of your time unless you have a serious interest in the Greek world.  Then again, I should have expected as much from Oliver Stone.  Let's hope that his next movie (about 9/11) is decent enough to not be an insult and mockery.

-Jason Roberts

July 31, 2005

Virtue in Action: Aristides and the Illiterate Man

    A certain incident in the 1990's serves as a perfect example of politics today.  No, I'm not talking about politicians having elicit affairs with random workers; instead, I am talking about the trend of politicians to do whatever it takes to remain in power.  Instead of politics and government being a tool intended to serve the people, it has become a tool intended to serve the politician.  If this requires giving up truth, integrity, honesty, and justice, then so be it.  The power of government seems to have a corrupting effect, whether you are Adolf Hitler seeking absolute rule or Ted Kennedy seeking eternal Senatorship.  George Washington noted the dangers of government when he stated, "Government is not reason; it is not eloquent; it is force. Like fire, it is a dangerous servant and a fearful master."  It is for this very reason that being in a position of power requires the utmost degree of virtue.

    The Persian Wars thrust Athens into a very prominent position after the battle of Marathon, making it a rival to Sparta as one of the great Greek city-states. Aristides was an Archon, or leader, of Athens during the Persian wars.  He was elected by the people to lead them through this difficult time. 

    It is stated of Aristides that:

"In all the vicissitudes of public affairs, the constancy he showed was admirable, not being elated with honours, and demeaning himself tranquilly and sedately in adversity; holding the opinion that he ought to offer himself to the service of his country without mercenary views and irrespectively of any reward, not only of riches, but even of glory itself." (Plutarch)

For this reason he was known as "a most determined champion for justice".  His fame and power did not come unattested.  Themistocles was the rival of Aristides, a rivalry that began in their childhood.  Themistocles was equally loved by the people, especially because of his brilliant victory at Salamis.  Thus Aristides found himself in a most chaotic time.

    There was a practice in Athens called Ostracism.  This practice allowed the Athenians to banish, by means of voting, any citizen they deemed a hazard to their city-state.  The practice is described as follows:

"In January of each year, the assembly took a vote on ostracism. If at the designated assembly meeting there were at least 6,000 ballots cast, whichever citizen received a simple majority of the votes was exiled for ten years, under which he could not return to [Athens] under penalty of death . The citizen lost the right to participate in politics by virtue of his absence, but his property was not confiscated, and he could appoint a manager to deal with his affairs and forward any income." (a correct description from Wikipedia).

The Athenians would ostracize any person they considered a threat to Athenian democracy.  Slander from Aristides' arch-rival Themistocles led the Athenian citizens into believing that Aristides was for dismantling the democracy in favor of an aristocracy.  Thus the people put Aristides up for ostracism.

    Because he was Archon, it was Aristides job to oversee the Ostracism and tally up the votes.  Plutarch states that:

"As therefore, they were writing the names on the sherds, it is reported that an illiterate clownish fellow, giving Aristides his sherd, supposing him a common citizen, begged him to write Aristides upon it; and he being surprised and asking if Aristides had ever done him any injury, 'None at all' said he, 'neither know I the man; but I am tired of hearing him everywhere called the Just.'  Aristides, hearing this, is said to have made no reply, but returned the sherd with his own name inscribed."

When the votes were tallied, Aristides held the majority of votes.  He gathered up some of his belongings and complacently left Athens. He gave up his land and power for the good of the State (only to be recalled later on).

    What is amazing about this action is the justice and honesty that Aristides displayed.  He could have written any other name to save himself from a 10 year banishment and loss of all power.  Instead, Aristides remained true to what was just and wrote his own name.  In essence, he aided in his own banishment; he helped in dissolving his own power.  It was men like Aristides that Washington sought to emulate when he stated, "I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am unambitious of honors not founded in the approbation of my Country."  What a shame that our modern politicians don't exhibit such virtue.

-Jason Roberts (Crossposted to the Egosphere)

"The Culture of Classicism"

    Just recently, I finished "The Culture of Classicism" by Caroline Winterer.  I thoroughly enjoyed reading this well-crafted book.  It discussed the role of Classics and Classicist in the Universities of the United States from 1780-1910.  Unless you have an interest in the history of the Classics as a field of study in the Universities, this book will not be of interest to most people.  However, it did have a few interesting descriptions of the influence of Classical works and the Classical world on early American society.

    In today's world, Greece stands as the most well-known civilization in the Classical world while Rome is viewed as the Imperial power that defined it from Caesar onwards, with most people in ignorance of Republican Rome.  However, in early America, (Republican) Rome took precedence over Greece.

   "The overwhelming preference for Rome over Greece in the American imagination of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries rested on this imagined affinity between antiquity and modernity.  Americans found a number of interlocking features in republican Rome congenial: the Senate as a guarantor of liberty and stability; the ideal of the cultivated, virtuous Ciceronian orator; and agriculture as safeguard to civic virtue.  William Smith...noted that in American studies of ancient history 'everything between Augustus [first Emperor of Imperial Rome] and the beginning of the sixteenth century is past over.' Moreover, Rome's descent into corrupted empire supplied Americans with cautionary tales about the fragility of civic virtue."

As opposed to the fractured city-states of Greece, Republican Rome was a stable nation of virtuous citizens that early America modeled themselves after.

    The Classical world also had a profound effect upon early American women.  Unlike the meek and "behind-the-scenes" women of the Christian era, Greek and Roman women were proud, intelligent, and influential.  Around the time of the American Revolution:

"Abigail Adams styled herself as Portia, the long-suffering but wise wife of the Roman statesman Brutus, and when her husband was away she encouraged her son John Quincy to read passages from Charles Rollin's Ancient History to her.  Her friend Mercy Otis Warren, the historian, answered Abigail's letters as Marcia, the wife of the Republican orator Hortensius. Judith Sargent Murray looked to Helen of Troy and Penelope to argue for greater utility in women's education..."

    It was not only women who used Classical pseudonyms.  Open up any copy of The Federalist Papers and, at the end of many of them, you will find the name Publius.  This was a reference to Publius Scipio Africanus, the general who defeated Hannibal and saved Rome.

    In general, the American people felt a relation to the Classical world.

"...they had also been convinced that the great actors of antiquity were somehow also their contemporaries, a mirror for their own selves, a font of morals, a template for virtuous statecraft and peerless expression.  Cicero was as relevant to the American Senate as he was to ancient Rome."

    The 20th century, and especially the later half of the 20th century, witnessed the decline and final abandonment of the Classics as a major driving force of American virtue.  In its place we are left with postmodernism, multiculturalism, moral relativism, and an esoteric intellectualism.  Instead of the superiority of Greece and Rome, we are taught the "equal" value of the Native Americans, the early African Tribes, modern Amazonian Cannibals, Communist China, and Islamic "moderates".  I think that the facts are proof enough: "As goes the Classics, so goes America."

-Jason Roberts

July 29, 2005

Excellent Article from Victor Davis Hanson

    I suggest War and the West, Then and Now to everybody; especially because it will provide great context for what's to come from me.

A few gems:

"There was a greater propensity in Western armies for the individual to feel that he had a stake in his army. Nothing provides a better or more clear illustration of this than Herodotus’s description of Thermopylae, where [soldiers] in the royal army of Xerxes were being whipped to fight, whereas Leonidas and the Spartans said they were there because they were following the law that they themselves had created. What kind of army, ancient or modern, would name their triremes “Free Speech” or “Freedom” like the Athenians did at Salamis, or have a play by Aeschylus that says, “We rowed into battle saying ‘freedom, freedom, freedom.’” It is very strange in comparison to what motivated other armies of the era."

"In the West it means that as a Macedonian professional soldier, you can be playing kickball alongside Alexander the Great, even though you are merely one of the Macedonian phalangites, and be a quasi-mercenary, and have destroyed constitutional government. Still, you probably have a greater degree of freedom than someone in the imperial army of Darius."

"There seems to be a morality in the West that says that how one makes and creates capital is not necessarily at odds with religion. There are no cultural prohibitions in the West, like there are in Islam, against charging interest. Whether such gain usury or not is highly controversial, but in the pre-Christian West people felt that that making money was not at odds with pagan religion, and Christianity very quickly adopted an idea that even though the poor were “blessed,” people might even be more blessed if they were wealthy. The battle of Lepanto, for example, was a very instructive reflection of 16th-century Italy. Venice probably had no more than 200 square miles and 100,000 people within the confines proper of the city — I imagine it was much bigger than today; I think there are only about 50,000 people there today, and yet they were fighting an empire that had 20 million people and probably almost a million square miles in the Ottomans. And yet the arsenal at small Venice, if it had to, could turn out one galley per day, and they could create more galleys and more quality artillery than could all of the states under the Ottomans combined."

Though the three parts constitute a decently long read, it is well worth it!

-Jason Roberts

July 28, 2005

Update

I've been absent for awhile, so I thought I would post an update (explanation and "what's to come").

I have spent the past week intensively finishing Herodotus.  I also have been pouring over many of the Lives from Plutarch.  Reading these gave me the idea to post up small anecdotes from the lives of these great men; they are amazing!  I have also just begun (and am almost finished) with the new book I ordered, entitled "The Culture of Classicism".

Coming Soon:

An anecdote from the life of Aristides (if only our politicians today could act as he did!)...
An article about Civic Militarism and modern Vice (in thanks to Victor Davis Hanson)...
A philosophy article from me (a new venture!)...
And a review of the play Cato, courtesy of Jeff.

Lot's to come before the week is out!  For now, I will leave you all with a beautiful quote from Cicero:

"Not to know what has been transacted in former times is to be always a child. If no use is made of the labors of past ages, the world must remain always in the infancy of knowledge."

-Jason Roberts



July 26, 2005

Life's Lessons, Vol. 3

Here related is the story of the man and the fox:

"There was a man who had a grudge against a fox, for the fox had caused him some damage.  He managed to seize it, and in order to take his full revenge, he tied a rope which had been dipped in oil to his tail.  He set fire to the rope and let him go.  But, prompted by some god, the fox ran into the man's fields and set fire to all of his crops, as it was harvest time.  The man ran after him helplessly, lamenting his lost crops."

Our passions can be a good thing, if directed towards the Good (such as love).  Oftentimes, however, we fall prey to our passions.  The Farmer in this fable had indeed suffered injury from the fox, but it was his emotions that, clouding his rational judgement, caused him more damage.

But more importantly, this fable discusses the nature of justice.  While it is true that the Farmer deserved justice for his loss, the farmer went about enacting justice in the wrong way.  Justice clouded by emotion is revenge; it was revenge that the Farmer sought, not justice.  Ironically, he who could not properly enact justice was justly reciprocated.

In the post 9/11 era, it is important for us  to think about the nature of justice.  John Galt, a character in Ayn Rand's novel "Atlas Shrugged", describes justice as:

"...the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake the character of men as you cannot fake the character of nature, that you must judge all men as conscientiously as you judge inanimate objects, with the same respect for truth, with the same incorruptible vision, by as pure and as rational a process of identification...that to place any other concern higher than justice is to devaluate your moral currency and defraud the good in favor of the evil..."

I will let Ayn Rand's words stand on their own as a testament to the importance of justice guided by reason.

-Jason Roberts

July 19, 2005

There is not so much Gold in the World

    When faced with destruction and disaster, most fear finds consolation in strength and stability.  The desire, it seems, is to sacrifice almost anything in order to return to "the good old days".  While in some cases this may be the proper course of action, in cases involving the loss of liberty this course is dangerously fatal; indeed suicidal.  It is this suicidal course that the Russian People are taking now; some conscientiously, others blindly.  Yet both parties are trading their new and holy liberty for a "momentary stability" in Putin that can lead only to another Authoritarian, repressive regime.  Around 480 bce, the city of Athens received an offer from Persia.  After enduring terrible losses from the Persians, the Athenians were offered peace, stability, and strength.  Athens response to Persia is an invaluable lesson; one that the Russian people should take to heart.

    After subduing Ionia, Xerxes continued his conquest into Greece itself.  He reached as far as Thermopylae before encountering any Greek resistance.  Facing over 200,000 Persian forces, the 10,000 strong Greek contingent inflicted immense casualties upon the Persians before finally being betrayed and defeated.  It was a major wound that the Greeks inflicted upon Persia's armies (and one of the most heroic battles of all time).  Soon after the battle, the Persians continued on towards Athens.  After inflicting immense damage to the Greek towns and countrysides, they reached Athens.  Because the Athenians had fled to their ships, the Persians met little resistance.  They destroyed the town and burned the crops around Athens.

    Soon, another major battle was fought at Salamis. This naval battle witnessed the victory of the Greeks over the Persians and the crippling of the Persian navy.  Afraid of what an uncontrollable Greek navy could do, Xerxes "gracefully" departed from Greece with a large part of his army, leaving his general, Mardonius, and a force of 300,00 Persians behind to finish the conquest of Greece.  This retreat allowed the Athenians to return to their city and begin the process of "rebuilding".

    Greece was not yet safe from Persia.  After wintering in Northern Greece, Mardonius prepared to conquer the remaining Greek States.  Before doing so, he sent a diplomat to war-torn Athens and, in exchange for submitting to Persia, offered Athenian land restored, the ability of the Athenians to take whatever land in Greece they wanted, the 'ability to be self-governed', and the rebuilding of all Athenian temples at Persian expense.  This offer would have given the Athenians peace and stability.  The Athenians, however, valued liberty above all else.  Their brilliant response was:

"We know...as well as you do that the Persian strength is many times greater than our own: that, at least, is a fact which you need not rub in.  Nevertheless, such is our love of freedom, that we will defend ourselves in whatever way we can.  As for making terms with Persia, it is useless to try to persuade us; for we shall never consent.  And now tell Mardonius, that so long as the sun keeps his present course in the sky, we Athenians will never make peace with Xerxes.  On the contrary, we shall oppose him unremittingly, putting our trust in the help of the gods and heroes whom he despised, whose temples and statues he destroyed with fire.  Never come to us again with a proposal like this, and never think you are doing us good service when you urge us to a course which is outrageous...there is not so much gold in the world nor land so fair that we should take it for pay to join the common enemy and bring Greece into subjection...we would have you know, therefore...that so long as a single Athenian remains alive we will make no peace with Xerxes." (Herodotus, 8.143)

So strong was their desire for liberty that the very idea of giving in to the stability that Persia offered was "outrageous"!  Their eloquent response is a testament to the greatness of liberty, no matter the cost.  Eventually, the Greeks defeated the Persians at the battle of Plataea, and soon the Persian wars were over.  Greece had won her freedom, and had saved Western Civilization.

    The year 1991 witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union.  Russia endured many trials in order to become a free state.  However, in 2000, Russia elected Vladimir Putin as their leader.  It is Putin that has, through many means, sought to destroy Russian Liberty.  According to Ariel Cohen, "...the Russian oil and gas sector’s new paradigm can be summarized in two words: 'state domination'".  He goes on to explain how Putin's government has begun to centralize the Russian energy sector by finding obscure faults with the companies and then nationalizing them.  Putin's efforts in nationalization are backed by funds from the Chinese government!   Ariel Cohen also mentions how the Russian government has been, "...buying up strategic infrastructure companies, such as pipelines, refineries and electric grids, as well as ports in Georgia, Hungary and Ukraine...".  These transgressions of individual liberty in favor of state ownership are not the only examples of Putin's move to Authoritarianism.

    According to the Washington Post, Putin has also, "...limited the power of regional governors, who often defied Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. In 2000, Putin removed the governors from the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Parliament. He then undercut their power by creating seven presidential envoys to supervise them."  The article continues with:

"Putin announced a new plan that would appoint regional governors with the approval of regional legislatures, thereby ending the popular election of regional governors and independent legislators. In addition, Putin’s plan would abolish elections of legislators in individual constituencies to the lower Russian legislative house, the Duma, and instead elect all members of the Duma on party lists, by proportional representation. As of now, half of the deputies are elected in constituencies and half by party lists."

This is a disturbing trend away from direct election via the people, and towards appointment via the President.  In effect, Putin is taking away the power from the Russian People and handing it to himself. What is more disturbing, however, is that the Russian people reelected Putin by a landslide in 2004!  Clearly working against liberty, the Russian people (like the Germans of Hitler's time) are voting into power their own destruction.

    In the last decade, Russia has been beset with difficulties.  Extreme poverty, rebellion (Chechnya), terrorism, hunger, and many other transitional difficulties have plunged the Russian people into despair.  Similar to Athens, the Russian People are faced with the horrible prospect of "rebuilding through the rubble".  And just like Persia, Putin has offered them strength and stability in exchange for ceding over their liberties.  What the Russian People don't realize, however, is that they are being herded into a trap; a trap that will ultimately take away the very freedom that they so recently won, and in exchange give them a "leader" with the power to send them back to Siberia.

    It is time for the Russian people to remember the words of the Athenians when faced with such a prospect.  They should realize just how precious a thing their freedom is; how wonderful it is to be a human as opposed to an animal.  They should remember what life was like in the Soviet Union, an authoritarian regime that killed over 30,000,000 of its people.  They should remember what it was like to be denied freedom of speech, or freedom of religion; to have to wait in line for hours to receive bread; to wear faded clothes and drive broken cars.  They should remember that they won their freedom in 1991, and they should stand boldly and proclaim that Putin's actions are not only immoral, but an outrage!  It is time for the Russian people to say that, "...there is not so much gold in the world nor land so fair that we should take it for pay to join the common enemy and bring [Russia] into subjection...we would have you know, therefore...that so long as a single [Russian] remains alive we will make no peace with Putin."  It is time for Putin to go, and may the next election halt the wave of authoritarianism in Russia; may the next elections be a victory for liberty.

-Jason Roberts (Crossposted to the Egosphere)

   

   

July 18, 2005

An Aristotelian Foundation for Objectivity

    And here, ladies and gentlemen, is the second of today's Featured Articles by H. Acstonus.  This brilliant article discusses Objectivity in today's world:

    Objectivity has been under attack for generations. Today, it’s under a particularly destructive assault. Postmodernists reject the very notion of objective truth, and many hold that there are separate realities-as well as truths-for separate groups based of such things a economic status, gender, race, and culture. This approach is self-contradictory, and if taken literally would amount to the complete destruction of all knowledge. It has come to the forefront because of epistemological confusion: the concept of objectivity has not been properly understood, and is consequently in danger of being abandoned. This confusion is the fault of the philosophers.

     Rather than showing the other disciplines proper methods needed to acquire knowledge, philosophers for the last two hundred years have been proclaiming that knowledge is impossible. Kant, one of the most influential philosophers in history, proclaimed: “All attempts which have hitherto been made to answer natural questions … have always met with unavoidable contradictions, we cannot rest satisfied with … the pure faculty of reason itself.” Once the possibility of real knowledge is rejected, only subjective or social “reality” is left standing. The world becomes an arbitrary social construct. Truth becomes mere fiction.

     Most of humankind’s past has been spent mired in supernaturalism, faith, and tradition. For brief periods, like sparks in a sea of darkness, limited progress in epistemological methodology was made. But the Enlightenment changed everything-for the first time since Ancient Greece a rational outlook on the world became widespread. Rather than being a brief spark, the Enlightenment set the world afire. It seemed that humankind would finally be free from the constraints of superstition. But the scientific outlook on the world was incomplete, and it was not long before the Enlightenment came under attacks which its advocates could not defend against. Reason as a method of achieving knowledge was not fully understood, and could not be properly defended against critical scrutiny.

    As soon as it seemed the debate over science vs. faith had been won by the advocates of the Enlightenment, several thinkers dealt a series of crippling blows to the very notion of rational enquiry. Philosophical objections were leveled against science and reason by thinkers such as Hume and Kant, and these objections have yet to be answered by any prominent modern thinker. Consequently, an intellectual revolt against reason occurred during the nineteenth century, and by the twentieth century most intellectuals had abandoned the Enlightenment. One could even say that an Anti-Enlightenment Project has been under way-an intellectual assault on reason and science. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the assault continues.

     Because thinkers throughout history have overwhelmingly spent their efforts on the negation of knowledge rather than the search for it, little is known about how to attain it. Millennia dominated by supernatural views of existence, with comparatively little effort spent on developing a philosophy of reason, have left our civilization with an impoverished understanding of rational inquiry.

   What would a defense of objectivity, and of reason and science, consist of? Such a defense would have to do several things: it would have to answer the attacks on the validity of sense experience, ground the basic principles of logic in irrefutable first principles, formulate a proper understanding of causality, and show how abstract conceptual knowledge can correspond to an external reality. Twenty-four centuries ago the foundations for such a defense were already laid by the philosopher Aristotle, and it is from an essentially Aristotelian base that a modern attempt to refute the attacks against reason and science must be made.         

Aristotle is considered, along with Plato and Kant, to be one of the three most influential thinkers in the history of western civilization. But Aristotle’s thought has never dominated western civilization in the way Plato’s used to and Kant’s does now. Lost for hundreds of years, his work was not even seriously studied by westerners until one and a half thousand years after his death, in the thirteenth century. After the re-discovery of Aristotle’s major works, Catholic theologians such as Thomas Aquinas began to incorporate certain aspects of his system into their religious views. A kind of Aristotle-by-proxy was consequently advocated by medieval scholastics.

   By the renaissance, philosophers and scientists were already beginning to reject Aristotle as part of their revolt against the dogmatism of the Catholic Church. But they threw the baby out with the bathwater. What they were rejecting was not really Aristotle’s system at all, but the rationalistic fantasy of medieval scholasticism. Whereas medieval monks would argue about how many angels could dance on the head of a pin, the real Aristotle collected biological specimens. Aristotle the earthly, ancient Greek thinker was never fully understood or discovered in the twenty-four centuries after his death. 

  Aristotle was very much a this-worldly thinker. Between Plato, Kant and Aristotle, only Aristotle concentrated on the natural world of experience. Plato was a metaphysical dualist, dividing reality into an imperfect material realm and a supposed “higher” world of forms. Kant also divided reality in two. In his system there is a noumenal world of “things-in-themselves” and a phenomenal world of mere “appearance.” A proper defense of reason and science would require a complete rejection of dualism in any form-an Aristotelian approach. It would require the discovery of principles applicable to everything which is.    

    Aristotle grounded his first principles in what he called “being qua being”-the very nature of reality itself. Aristotle’s world was not split in two, but a single whole. His first principles applied to all of existence. In his work Metaphysics, Aristotle says the job of the philosopher is to discover the most basic principles which are the foundation of all knowledge: “The discussion of these truths will belong to him whose inquiry is universal … he whose subject is existing things qua existing must be able to state the most certain principles of all things ... this is the philosopher.”

    To exist, according to Aristotle, is to be something in particular, as opposed to the nothing of a contradiction: “Evidently then there is a principle which is most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.” This formulation is known as the principle of non-contradiction. Everything which exists is what it is, and cannot be what it is not. Modern philosophy would decry this as a tautology, but Aristotle did not lock himself inside of language-he looked outward at the world. The modern objection to tautologies is a function of Kant’s noumenal-phenomenal dichotomy, and would be dismissed out of hand by Aristotle.   

  According to Aristotle, the contents of a human mind are not circular linguistic constructs, but abstract formulations derived from a straight-line relationship between the subject and external reality. Thus the principle of non-contradiction is not an arbitrary linguistic convention, but the understanding of a universal attribute of existing things qua existing. Aristotle derived the method of logic from the principle of non-contradiction. Logic is the non-contradictory integration of one’s knowledge, and is therefore crucial to the foundation of a proper epistemology. In any analysis of one’s thinking logic calls a halt when a contradiction is discovered. Thus logic is a check on one’s understanding and a means of rooting out error. What is commonly called “common sense” is merely an implicit understanding of logic.

    Importantly for Aristotle, logic was a practical tool meant to be applied to the real world. The method of non-contradictory integration is to be applied to knowledge derived from sense experience. Aristotle identifies sense experience as simply a component of certain living organisms, a means by which they process information about the external world. All attacks on the validity of the senses have stemmed from the notion that because sense experience is a process, it distorts. But for Aristotle, the fact that the sensory apparatus apprehends the world via a certain process is not a disqualification, but a confirmation that the senses are valid. The sensory apparatus interacts in a necessarily predictable manner with the external world because that apparatus and the world are causally linked to each other. Thus, in whatever sensory form a particular organism is aware, that organism is aware of the external world, and its senses are valid.   

  Causality, at least since Hume, has been conceived of as a chain of events, each antecedent event causing the other. This conception has led to confusion. While it is true that antecedent factors play a role, a proper conception of causality would have to incorporate a wider context. In Aristotle’s view, cause and effect is rooted in the identity of acting things. What a thing is, says Aristotle, will determine what it does. An acorn can become an oak tree, and not a catfish, because that is its nature. The actions an entity can take are determined by what that entity is. On this view, when one billiard ball strikes another it sends it rolling because of the nature of the balls and their surroundings, not just antecedent events.

    The incompleteness of modern science lies in the fact that it rests on a purely mechanistic, non-Aristotelian view of causation. Consequently it cannot be defended against critics such as Hume. Aristotle’s view provides a basis for a better understanding of cause and effect, and has the potential to ground science and induction in first principles. Aristotle has the potential to provide for modern science the philosophic foundations it never had.   

  Aristotle also has a unique understanding of abstract knowledge. For him, knowledge does not exist in a vacuum, but is built on previous knowledge and must be related to the whole of one’s understanding. Discovery is not a passive process of diaphanously absorbing truth, but an active process of identification and integration. This is why we need logic-because we need a self-correcting method of inquiry. Applied to sense data, logic becomes a powerful tool with which we can constantly check, double check, and adjust our abstract understanding accordingly. If a contradiction is discovered in one’s understanding, Aristotle’s approach calls a halt. If one’s understanding contradicts the data of sense experience, Aristotle’s approach calls a halt. One must always check one’s premises, making adjustments when new evidence contradicts them. This is the proper foundation for science, and the basis for the scientific method.

    The scientific method has been criticized because, it is claimed, it can never arrive at certainty. But this objection is based on an incoherent formulation of the concept “certainty.” The human mind is not omniscient; indeed the very notion is impossible. At any stage, the amount of knowledge a mind has available to it will be limited. This is not just an attribute of human consciousness, but of any consciousness. On the Aristotelian view a conscious organism, like any other entity, has identity. Because existing things qua existing must have a specific, delimited nature, any form of awareness must also have a specific, delimited nature. Thus any conception of certainty which demands omniscience is based on an impossible standard and should be rejected as nonsense.   

  The fact that science does not lead to epistemic certainty-to infallibility-is not a valid objection to its validity. Rather than being a liability, it is the very self-correcting nature of the scientific method which gives it its tremendous power. It is precisely because of the fallibility of human understanding that we need a proper epistemological methodology. And only by using a proper methodology can we discover facts.

    Reality is not merely a “construct.” What actually exists actually exists. But as long as the notion of objectivity continues to be attacked, our confidence in our ability to discover truth will be shaken. To be defended, objectivity must be properly defined and validated. What is objectivity? Metaphysically, it is the notion that facts exist independently of our understanding of them. Epistemologically, it is the notion that we can discover those facts.   

  Postmodernism is the result of two centuries of post-Kantian philosophy. To refute it would require a counterattack against Kant and other philosophers such as Hume. Indeed the entire modern philosophic tradition which has been derived from such thinkers must be challenged. Of the great thinkers of the past, only Aristotle provides an adequate base for such a challenge. Any modern attempt to vindicate reason, science, and objectivity must therefore start with a re-discovery of Aristotle.      

Source Material

Barnes, Jonathan. Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Cahn, Steven M. Exploring Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. (Translated by F. Max Muller). New York:     Doubleday, 1966.

McKeon, Richard. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Modern Library, 2001.

---H. Acstonus (Crossposted to the Egosphere)

Intrinsic Value, Hedonism, or Eudemonia?

   

Today I am very proud and honoured to present not one, but two Featured Articles by H. Acstonus.  The first is a brilliant examination of Classical Theories on how to live the best life:

   

   What is the good? This is probably the single most important question in moral philosophy. Without knowing what the good is, how can we know how to be moral, or even whether we should be moral at all? Without a clear understanding of the good, how could we even know what being moral is? Throughout the history of philosophy many different answers to this question have been proposed. Among the ancient Greeks, this is no exception.

    One conception of the good is hedonism. Epicurus was one of the greatest champions of hedonism in the ancient world. In this regard, he was similar to later thinkers such as John Stuart Mill. While Mill’s utilitarian conception of the good is the greatest happiness for the greatest number, Epicurus’ view was that the good consisted in the greatest happiness for oneself. Thus, while the question of who is to benefit from one’s actions is answered quite differently by the Utilitarians and Epicurus, the question of what the good actually consists of remains the same: happiness. “So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness,” Epicurus wrote, “since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it.”   

    Plato rejects hedonism, claiming that the good is something above and beyond pleasure. In hedonism’s place Plato offers what I interpret as an intrinsic theory of value. The good exists in a supposed “higher” reality as one of Plato’s Forms. In The Republic, Socrates states: “The power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already…the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.” Therefore, the good according to Plato is not derivative but a primary, independent of any standard apart from itself.

    Plato also attacks the hedonistic view. According to Plato, those things which bring delight and gratification, such as delicious food or rhetoric, are not really good but only seem so because of their pleasantness. Things like medicine, physical fitness, and justice, while sometimes unpleasant, are genuinely good nonetheless due to their benefits. If one does something for the sake of something else, his present activity is clearly not the goal, but that for the sake of which he does it. Medicine is taken for health, sea voyages for wealth, walking to arrive at a destination.

    Unlike Epicurus, pleasure is obviously not the standard of the good for Plato. But the two do have some things in common. Epicurus agrees with Plato in that he holds certain ends as more appropriate than others. Just as Plato argued in favor of doing certain things for the sake of other things, Epicurus argued for prudence and moderation in order to maximize pleasure over the entire course of one’s life. The hedonism of Epicurus is thus not the mindless indulgence in pleasures of the immediate moment: “We do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but will often pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And often we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure.”

     Epicurus, it seems, advocates something very similar to Plato by differentiating between higher and lower pleasures. We “pass over many pleasures” and “consider pains superior to pleasures” in order to achieve greater pleasure in the long run. Thus for both Plato and Epicurus, one forsakes what is pleasant or does what is unpleasant, in the present, in order to achieve a more important goal in the future. To this extent the two thinkers end up agreeing, but they still disagree on what is the ultimate good. Is the good simply pleasure? Is the good something intrinsic with its own ontological status?

    From the preceding discussion I must conclude that neither hedonism nor intrinsic value is a satisfactory account of the good. The question “what is the good” still lingers. The problem with hedonism is that happiness as a standard of the good makes no sense. If we cannot achieve happiness any way we want, but must take certain actions and not others to attain it, does it not follow that something apart from happiness is more primary? Wouldn’t happiness then be an effect and not a cause? If this is the case, then the good must be something apart from happiness, even if it may in fact be linked to happiness. Intrinsic value, on the other hand, seems like a dead end. Intrinsic value does not answer the question of what the good is. It does not identify it or explain any of its properties. In the absence of any definition, all we get is a laundry list of things thought of as good, but no coherent method of knowing why they are supposedly good. What standard do we have to know what is, and isn’t, the intrinsic good? In the end, the advocate of intrinsic value says that the good “just is” good, and that he “just knows” it. But this is not a real explanation.

    What is the good? I think it is rooted in the Aristotelian idea of eudemonia-living and flourishing in accord with one’s nature. In a word, life-one’s own life- is the good. Not life as in merely having a pulse, but life as in really living-flourishing and actualizing the best potential within oneself. The life appropriate for a human being, as necessitated by one’s nature as a certain kind of organism which must survive by a certain kind of means, is the primary from which happiness flows as a consequence. Life as meant in this sense, rather than pleasure, is the standard of the good. Those aspects of reality in relation to us which further our lives, in accordance with our natures, are the good, and those aspects of reality in relation to us which harm our lives are the evil.

    On this view, virtue consists of a set of principles rooted in the requirements of life as a flourishing human being. We achieve a successful life in virtue of doing the things such a life requires. If we choose to live, we must produce goods. To produce goods, we must think (figure out how). To think, we must be honest with ourselves. And to live in peace with others, we must act justly. Thus virtues such as rationality, justice, productivity, and honesty (understood as acceptance of reality) are among the necessary qualities of character we must have if we want to achieve the life proper to a human being. And the constant practice of virtue, over the course of an entire lifetime, makes us better and better moral agents more and more capable of flourishing. "We are,” said Aristotle, “what we repeatedly do. Excellence, therefore, is not an act, but a habit."

    Flourishing and living well is then the ultimate standard of the good, with happiness being a consequence rather than a primary. Further, this standard is not intrinsic, for everything which is construed as good by this view is so in a derivative sense. Therefore this theory is neither hedonistic nor intrinsic. It is a virtue-theory based on the premise that the good is to live and flourish.


Source Materials

Epicurus. Letter to Menoeceus. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Internet Classics     Archive) (http://classics.mit.edu/Epicurus/menoec.html)

Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd and C.D.C. Reeve, eds. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000.

McKeon, Richard. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Modern Library, 2001.

Plato. The Republic, Book VI. (Washington State University Website)    (http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/GREECE/ALLEGORY.HTM)

----H. Acstonus

July 16, 2005

Life's Lessons-Vol. 2

I was really pleased with the last "Life's Lessons", and loved the feedback! Thus I present Volume 2:

 Here related is the story of The Braggart:

    "A man who practised the pentathlon*, but whom his fellow-citizens continually reproached for his unmanliness, went off one day to foreign parts.  After some time he returned, and he went around boasting of having accomplished many extraordinary feats in various countries, but above all of having made such a jump when he was in Rhodes that not even an athlete crowned at the Olympic Games could possibly equal it.  And he added that he would produce as witnesses of his exploit people who had actually seen it, if ever they came to his country.
    Then one of the bystanders spoke out:
    'But if this is true, my friend, you have no need of witnesses.  For here is Rhodes right here - make the jump.' "
    *Pentathlon: Greek Olympic Event considered the top test of an Athlete.  It included 5 events: running, wrestling, long jump, javelin throw, and discus.  The purpose was to test the athletes abilities overall as opposed to specified in one area.

    And thus we see the greatest weapon against one who brags: demand the proof.  Words may be great, but actions are greater still.  In fact, we are truly defined by our actions, not by our words.  I would apply the lessons of the Fable to all aspects of life-especially in the political realm.  We hear so often from foreign leaders, "We will support you in your war with Iraq".  What should our response be? Prove it!  We hear nations boast of their greatness? Show it!  Nobody should be afraid to display in actions what they proclaim in words; for if they are afraid, then indeed their words are hollow and they are cowards.

    But even worse still, those who make a pretense to greatness show the moral fault of not being great.  I admire nations like Japan  who aided the US in Iraq, as opposed to a nation like France who did not support us at all. But reality has a beautiful sense of justice; in the end, the victors are the men of actions, not the men of hollow words.  Thus he who brags and boasts now finds himself sunk in the long run.  Thank you reality.

    What do you think?

-Jason Roberts

July 15, 2005

Soft Around The Edges

    The greatest blessing to liberty is peace.  In times of peace, the people of free nations prosper.  Goods increase, as does opportunity.  Entertainment increases, as does the arts.  Science and celebration dominate the people of free nations; peace allows them to exist free from any inhibition to their creative processes (internal because they are free, external because they are at peace).  There is a catch however; the people tend to become softened to the harsher aspects of reality.  Freedom from war tends to dull one to the possibility that it will happen and what to do when it occurs. This was the exact situation Dionysius of Phocaea faced when trying to prepare his men for war.

    The mighty empire of Persia had conquered all of Ionia with ease (Ionia was the area of Greece on the coast of Asia Minor, modern day Turkey).  Miletus, the largest Greek city in Ionia, resented Persian dominion and rebelled.  Many smaller cities followed as well.  The size of the rebellion met little resistance from Persia at first (there were not sufficient forces in the area to qualm it).  Darius, then Emperor of Persia, gathered a large force to crush the rebellion.

    In response to the impending army, the Ionian states gathered together to discuss the best course of action.  Their decision was to leave, "..the actual defense of Miletus...to its people, while they [the rest of the Ionian Cities] themselves should man every available ship, and concentrate them at the little island of Lade, just off the coast opposite Miletus.  Here they would fight a naval action in defense of the town," (Herodotus, 6.7).  The total Ionian navy consisted of 353 triremes compared to 600 ships from Persia.

    During a meeting of the Ionian Naval Commanders, Dionysius (commander of the Phocaeans) spoke.  "Fellow Ionians...our fate balances on a razor's edge between being free men or slaves-and runaway slaves at that.  Come then: if you are willing to submit for a while to strict discipline and to spend a few laborious days, you will thereby be enabled to defeat the Persians and keep your liberty.  If, on the other hand, you continue to live soft and to go as you please, then I see no hope whatever of your escaping punishment at the king's hands for your revolt..."(Herodotus).  Dionysius's appeal worked and the Ionians began immediately to prepare for war.

    The soldiers endured seven long days of strenuous labor and drill until their resolve cracked; they  refused to work.  Seeing the softness of the men, Samos (an Ionian city) withdrew their support of the rebellion and returned to Persian rule. As they were withdrawing, the Persian fleet came to the island of Lade for battle.  When they spotted Samos retreating, the men of Lesbos retreated as well.  This left a small Ionian contingent (made up mostly of ships from Chios) to defend the area and defeat Persia.  Their attempt failed, and soon after, the rebellion was destroyed.  The consequence for the rebellion was that, "...Miletus was reduced to slavery, and...most of the men were killed by the Persians...the women and children were made slaves...the men of the city who were captured alive were sent as prisoners to Susa [the Persian Capital].  The Persians themselves occupied the land in the immediate neighbourhood of [Miletus]."(Herodotus).

    As the Persians would soon find out, it was not lack of numbers but a lack of strength and courage on the part of the Ionians that lead to a Persian victory (at the battle of Marathon, around 50,000 Persians were defeated by an army of 10,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataeans).  Not only were the odds less than Marathon (less than 2:1), but the Ionians had the advantage of knowing the area and having the time to prepare.  It was indeed Ionian softness, which Webster  defines as, "lacking robust strength, stamina, or endurance especially because of living in ease or luxury...", that crushed their very hope for Liberty.

    With recent news about the increased buildup of military forces in China, as well as a continued resolve to capture Taiwan (allied with Russia and threatening to use Nukes), we as Americans must remember that liberty requires our strength and courage.  If we remain soft to the threats of military dictatorships like China, who also have nuclear weapons, history will repeat itself.  America may find herself opposing a Chinese force at the island of Lade...er...Taiwan.  If so, may our soldiers, our leaders, and the American people remember the words of Dionysius: "...if you are willing to submit for a while to strict discipline and to spend a few laborious days, you will thereby be enabled to defeat the Persians and keep your liberty.  If, on the other hand, you continue to live soft and to go as you please, then I see no hope whatever of your escaping punishment at the king's hands..." with China being the King who certainly would punish us.  But it doesn't have to be that way; if we remain strong both internally (by keeping up our armed forces and continuing their training and drills) and externally (against China-not compromising but retaining our courage) we will find ourselves in the same situation as the Athenians at Marathon-victorious over a numerically superior enemy. Our liberty depends upon it.

-Jason Roberts

Republican Generals

    I am proud to present our first Feature Article!  Enthusiast Jeff Luebcke wrote a great article about the exploits of generals under Republican Governments.  Here it is:

                            
A day, an hour, of virtuous liberty
                           Is worth a whole eternity in bondage.

                                       
-Cato by Joseph Addison

    Scipio Africanus was born in the year 236 BC as the son of Publius Cornelius Scipio the Elder. He was a minor character in Roman history until the middle of the 2nd Punic War. In fact the fame of that era for the Scipio family was borne by his uncle (Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio) and father who were generals in the Roman army campaigning against Carthaginian and Numidian armies in Spain. His heroism was first shown when in 218 BC, he risked his life to save his father during the battle of Placentia. Sadly this effort was in vein, for he lost both his father and his uncle 6 years later (212 BC) when their forces were all but annihilated by the combined forces of two armies under the command of the Carthaginians. One year later Scipio managed to convince the senate to appoint him to the command of Roman forces in Spain.

    One year later the course of the war shifted dramatically. Scipio led a new Roman army across the Ebro comprised of 25,000 foot and 2,500 horse and set out for victory in Spain. This is were the true brilliance of Scipio shows. With adequate information on the locations of the two enemy armies, he was able to maneuver his army as to avoid confronting them, and go straight to the heart of Carthaginian power in Spain: New Carthage. When he arrived at the city walls he went about developing a strategy to take the city. His first effort was a frontal assault on the walls. His first assault was all but repulsed when he learned that at that point in the day where the water had receded enough that there was now a navigable marsh leading to a part of the city that insufficiently protected He led a force of 500 men into the city while he continued with initial assault on the opposite side of the city.  Scipio came up behind him and with pressure from both sides consumed the enemy. He soon followed this successful campaign up with several more victories at Baecula (209 BC), Illipa (206BC ), and Locri (205 BC).

    In 203BC, Scipio leveled the greatest blow to the armies of Syphax and Hasdrubal of the war. In the dead of night he led a force to the Numidian camp and burnt it to the ground, and soon followed this up by burning down the Carthaginian camp. This caused the largest one day loss for Carthaginian forces at a staggering 40,000 dead. After Scipio's stunning victories, the Carthaginians wanted to regain the initiative and engaged the Romans in a Naval Battle, they were quickly defeated. After this defeat the Carthaginians sent out peace envoys to Rome and an armistice was signed. The Carthaginians soon violated the peace terms and the final battle that would determine the fate of the western world would soon be fought on the aired plains of Zama between Hannibal Barca of Carthage and Publius Cornelius Scipio the Younger of Rome.

    When the two forces aligned themselves for battle Hannibal asked for a conference with Scipio and said the the following (again according to Livy), “It is for him who grants peace, not for him who seeks it, to name the terms, but perhaps it may not be presumptuous in us to assess our own penalty. We consent to everything remaining yours for which we went to war-Sicily, Sardinia, Spain and all the islands that lie between Africa and Italy... As I was responsible for beginning the war and as I conducted it in a way which no one found fault with until the gods were jealous of my success, so I shall do my utmost to prevent any one from being discontented with the peace which I shall have been the means of procuring."

    Upon hearing Hannibal he responded by saying, "...I should have acted in a high-handed and arbitrary spirit if I had rejected them. But now that I have dragged you to Africa like a reluctant and tricky defendant I am not bound to show you the slightest consideration. So then, if in addition to the terms on which peace might have been concluded previously, there is the further condition of an indemnity for the attack on our transports and the ill-treatment of our envoys during the armistice, I shall have something to lay before the councils. If you consider this unacceptable. then prepare for war as you have been unable to endure peace."

   
They both departed, and prepared for a battle that would echo through history. The forces arrayed on the Carthaginian side included 5,000 cavalry, 36,000 infantry, and 80 elephants. On the roman side there were 6,600 cavalry and 29,000 infantry.  First the Carthaginians sent their elephants at the Roman lines. The Roman general was prepared for this: he had his men form gaps in the Roman lines for the elephants to charge through. His strategy worked and the elephants were completely ineffective. The two forces soon collided and the battle was on. Scipio realizing his lines could hold, moved his first line of Hasitati to the flanks to overlap the flanks of the enemy. He began to completely envelope the Carthaginian forces. If this was not bad enough for Hannibal, the Roman cavalry had defeated the Carthaginian cavalry and there was no force between his rear and the Roman cavalry. As he feared the Roman cavalry slammed into the rear of the Carthaginian forces. It soon turned into a massacre. The Romans in this battle lost 1,500 men, while the Carthaginians lost over 40,000 men (killed, wounded, and captured). Hannibal was forced to flee in disgrace. Scipio soon returned to Rome under the new title of Imperator (the first man to gain this title).

    The second character I will discuss is George Washington who was born in 1732 AD to a fairly well off father by the name of Augustus Washington. He first came into the lime light in American affairs during the French Revolution, when he tried to hold out against the French and Indians at Fort Necessity, but eventually had to surrender. Later in 1758 he led a 700 man force along side General John Forbes and finally captured Fort Duquesne. The height of his fame was reached during the American revolution when he commanded Colonial forces to victory against the overwhelming numbers and power of the British war machine.

    George Washington scored his first decisive victory against the British on December 1776 at the Battle of Trenton, when he crossed the Delaware to attack a Hessian camp. The casualties were more of less one sided, with Washington losing a few to the cold. Over 700 enemy soldiers were killed and captured. He followed this up in early 1777 with a swift victory against the British at Princeton in New Jersey. These two battles combined resulted in over 8,000 new recruits for the Continental Army in the spring of 1777.   

    Washington realized that he could not fight the war in the manner of the British, so he had to resort to out maneuvering the enemy, engaging the enemy only when the conditions were overwhelmingly in his favor, and consequently extend the war for as long as he can. The way to victory was to make it so costly to the British that they would no longer deem it in their interest to continue the war. By doing this he was buying time for the French army and navy to arrive.

    Washington's true genius was shown in the last great battle of the American Revolution: the battle of Yorktown. In order to distract other British forces, his force along with the French (Rochambeau) left around 2,500 troops in a fort on the outskirts of New York, to make the British believe the entirety of their force was stationed there. At the same time they took their remaining force of some 17,000 men and moved down to Virginia and surrounded Cornwallis' camp. At the same time the French concentrated a large amount of their ships in the area so as to overwhelm the British navy which was spread out all over the colonies. After receiving heavy fire Cornwallis realized he had no option but to surrender, and in October 17th he offered his surrender. Although not a climatic battle like that of Zama, it accomplished just as much.

    These men stood against an overwhelming enemy and not only came out victorious but changed the shape of the world forever. Scipio Africanus and George Washington are two of the most important men in Republican history. The formers actions during the 2nd Punic War spread the power of Rome's republic all over the Mediterranean world. The later created and nurtured a young republic which would soon spread across the New World. These two men are the highest standards of republican virtue who recognized the gravity of the situation, that there were two options: liberty or slavery, as Washington clearly understood, “The time is near at hand which must determine whether Americans are to be free men or slaves.“

    That is the lesson from all of this. We must display the same virtues that these great mean displayed; when Scipio charged against the enemy to save his father and when Washington crossed the Delaware in the dead of night to destroy the enemy. It is by great mens virtue (or vice) that we live or die. What makes these men great is not that they were brilliant at killing, but because they fought for liberty. A man gifted in the art of war, without the moral courage of a free man is impotent against a man that does. They echoed the same spirit of two captured Spartans who, when asked  why they would not submit to the king of Persia, responded, “The advice you give us does not spring from a full knowledge of the situation. You know one half of what is involved, but not the other half. You understand well enough what slavery is, but freedom you have never experienced, so you do not know if it tastes sweet or bitter. If you ever did come to experience it, you would advise us to fight for it not with spears only, but with axes too.”

It is the ax which free men hold- the ax of liberty.

-Jeff Luebcke (Crossposted to the Egosphere)

July 12, 2005

Life's Lessons

    Aesop is a particular treasure of mine.  His short but to-the-point fables have always struck me as important yet practical lessons to be learned.  Far from the theoretical, Aesop deals with the everyday issues in life.  Thus I came up with the idea of presenting different fables from Aesop and discussing them.  All stories from Aesop will come from "Aesop-The Complete Fables", translated by Olivia and Robert Temple.

    I wish one of the fables I ran across was plastered on the wall of every school in the world.  It relates the story of a Fox and a Billy-Goat:

    "A fox, having fallen into a well, was faced with the prospect of being stuck there.  But then a billy-goat came along to that same well because he was thirsty and saw the fox.  He asked him if the water was good.
    The fox decided to put a brave face on it and gave a tremendous speech about how wonderful the water was down there, so very excellent.  So the billy-goat climbed down the well, thinking only of his thirst.  When he had had a good drink, he asked the fox what he thought was the best way to get back up again.
    The fox said:
    'Well, I have a very good way to do that.  Of course, it will mean our working together.  If you just push your front feet up against the wall and hold your horns up in the air as high as you can, I will climb up on to them, get out, and then I can pull you up behind me.'
    The billy-goat willingly consented to this idea, and the fox briskly clambered up the legs, the shoulders, and finally the horns of his companion.  He found himself at the mouth of the well, pulled himself out, and immediately scampered off.  The billy-goat shouted after him, reproaching him for breaking their agreement of mutual assistance.  The fox came back to the top of the well and shouted down to the billy-goat:
    'Hah!  If you had as many brains as you have hair on your chin, you would't have got down there in the first place without thinking of how you were going to get out again.' "

   A wealth of lessons can be learned from this fable.  My favorite lesson, however, is this: always think ahead.  Or as my parents constantly reminded me: think before you do.  Often, we are led by our passions, desires, emotions, etc. and end up finding ourselves wrapped up in a problem.  This problem could have simply been avoided had we taken just a few seconds to think things through.

    That point brings up another lesson: do not let yourself be guided by the 'whim of the moment'.  One of the reasons that the Billy-goat got himself stuck in the well was because he was, "thinking only of his thirst."  When we fail to use reason as a guiding force in life, we begin to fin